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**INSÉCURITÉ DES  
HAZARAS DANS LA  
PROVINCE DE GHAZNI**

**Afghanistan**

Décembre 2021

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## Synthèse générale

Depuis le coup d'État communiste de 1978, l'Afghanistan est un pays en conflit. En effet, les Talibans, après avoir pris le pouvoir en 1996, ont été destitués en 2001, par l'intervention occidentale après les attentats de septembre 2001. Cependant **en 2015, les Talibans constituent toujours le groupement antigouvernemental le plus important et le plus organisé en Afghanistan**, notamment dans la province de Ghazni. Cette province est considérée comme une province de violence et d'insécurité, particulièrement entre 2010 et 2015, période durant laquelle **1046 incidents ont été recensés**. Plus précisément **dans le district de Muqur**, les meurtres d'officiers de police, les attaques sur les civils, les enlèvements, les tortures ne cessent de s'enchaîner. Cette situation instable résulte principalement des agissements **de groupes affiliés à l'État islamique, dont les talibans**.

Situé dans les hautes terres, Jaguri est un autre district important de la province de Ghazni, accueillant la présence des talibans. Bien que l'administrateur du district de Jaguri désigné en 2003 (Mohammad Zafar Sharif) soit apprécié du peuple et affilié à aucun parti, sa position reste très faible. En effet, le commandant qui contrôle de facto le district de Jaguri en 2003 (Khodadad Irfani) est lui affilié à **la faction Nasr du Hezb-e Wahdat, un parti politique pro-hazara**. Plusieurs rapports témoignent des abus commis à Jaguri sous le contrôle de ce parti. Le commandant Irfani était notamment accusé en 2005 de **meurtres de masse et de coopération avec les Talibans**. Même s'il semble qu'aucune incursion des Talibans n'ait eu lieu depuis 2001 à Jaguri, en 2007 un chef policier local fût victime d'une **attaque par des personnes suspectées d'être des militants talibans**. Actuellement, les autorités administratives sont démunies de toute autorité sur le district et les résidents du district ont leurs propres armes et gèrent eux-mêmes leurs désaccords. Il en ressort que depuis le début des années 2000, **les réfugiés évitent de retourner dans plusieurs districts de la province de Ghazni, dont Jaguri, en raison des abus des troupes du Hezb-e Wahdat**. D'autant plus que **l'accès et le départ de Jaguri est difficile en raison de l'insécurité des routes** où les Talibans bloquaient les routes, pillaient les voitures et kidnappaient ou tuaient certaines personnes qui osaient s'y risquer. Bien que ce soit un des districts de la province de Ghazni le plus contrôlé par le gouvernement, **cette présence gouvernementale reste faible et le district reste sous l'influence talibane**. La Cour Nationale du Droit d'Asile (CNDA) a elle-même reconnu l'augmentation du niveau d'insécurité et de violence en 2010, particulièrement dans la province de Ghazni.

Finalement, les Talibans, en majorité des Pachtouns et musulmans sunnites, tentent de reprendre le contrôle sur la majorité du territoire afghan et surtout dans les zones composées par des personnes appartenant à l'**ethnie Hazara**. Cette communauté, de confession musulmane chiite, est la **plus défavorisée d'Afghanistan** représentant seulement 10% de la population. **Victimes de discrimination systématique et de violence répétées par la majorité sunnite**, la jurisprudence de la CNDA a déjà reconnu les persécutions des Hazaras pour des motifs ethniques et religieux. **À l'origine de ces discriminations, on retrouve les Talibans et les Kuchis, en majorité des Pachtouns de confession musulmane sunnites**. Constituant le groupe ethnique le plus important d'Afghanistan, **les Pachtouns pratiquent différentes formes de discrimination** à l'encontre des Hazaras comme l'extorsion d'argent, le travail forcé, les abus physiques ou encore la détention. De plus, leur relation privilégiée avec les Talibans, rend plus facile leur domination.

## 1. L'aéroport de Muqur

L'aéroport de Muqur est un **petit aérodrome public** se trouvant à **11,5 kilomètres de Muqur** et a une altitude de 2012 mètres. Bien que cet aérodrome ait existé, **il ne semble plus en service**, rendant de fait plus difficile la recherche d'informations et la quantité de sources disponibles à son sujet.


**Source:** Asian Development Bank, *Afghanistan Transport Sector Master Plan update (2017-2036)*, 2017, page 49.

Table A2 continued

No.	City Served	Airport	Province	ICAO Airport Code	IATA Airport Code
<b>Small Local Airports</b>					
1	Eshkashem	Eshkashem Airport	Badakhshan	OAEM	
2	Ghaziabad	Ghaziabad Airport	Nangarhar	OAGA	
3	Gardez	Gardez Airport	Paktya	OAGZ	GRG
4	Muqur	Muqur Airport	Ghazni	OAMK	
5	Panjab	Panjab Airport	Bamyan	OAPJ	
6	Sharana	Sharana Airstrip	Paktika	OASA	OAS
7	Taywara	Taywara Airport	Ghor	OATW	
8	Yangi Qaleh	Yangi Qaleh Airport	Takhar	OAYQ	
9	Yawan	Yawan Airport	Badakhshan	OAYW	
10	Gardez	Forward Operating Base Shank	Paktya	OAA	OASH
11	Tapa	Tapa Airport	Kabul		
12	Sherber Too	Sherber Too Airport			
13	Sarhawdza	Aarhawdza Airport			
14	Qara Tapa	Qara Tapa Airport			
15	Kotubkhel	Kotubkhel Airport			
16	Dehdadi	Dehdadi Airport	Balkh, Mazar-e-Sharif		
17	Delaram	Delaram Airport	Farah, Delaram District		
18	Dostmohammadkhan Kelay	Dostmohammadkhan Kelay Airport			
19	Charikar	Charikar Airport			
20	Ajrestan	Ajrestan Airport			

IATA = International Air Transport Association; ICAO = International Civil Aviation Organization.  
Source: ADB staff and consultants.

**Source :** OCHA Services, *Afghanistan – Base map.*




**Source :** Airport Worldwide, *Afghanistan, Muqur.*

- Distance de la ville : 11,5 kilomètres
- Altitude : 2012 mètres
- Coordonnées GPS : 32°52'36.3"N 67°50'42.9"E
- Aéroport public
- Code OACI : OAMK



**Source :** OCHA, *Afghanistan Ghazni Province District Atlas*, 2014.



## **2. La situation sécuritaire de Jaguri entre 1999 et 2010**

Jaguri est l'un des **principaux districts de la province de Ghazni** en Afghanistan. La capitale du district, Sange-e-masha, occupe une place importante pour le commerce dans la région est demeure aussi connu pour ses terres cultivables et son agriculture importante.

Le district de Jaguri possède la particularité d'être **peuplé à majorité de Hazaras**. D'un point de vue sécuritaire, une certaine **tension a régné sur le district et la région** durant plusieurs années. En effet, **les changements politiques fréquents** accompagnés de la **difficulté d'administrer** le district ont eu pour conséquences de favoriser un climat d'insécurité.

Des commandants se sont succédés à la tête du district apportant parfois un **apaisement des tensions** ou une **répression des opposants** au commandement. Par ailleurs, les talibans ont semé la peur dans le district entre 2006 et 2007 par la commission d'infractions et en **contrôlant des routes du district**.

### **2.1. Les commandants du district de Jaguri**

Le district de Jaguri a été administré par de nombreuses personnalités et groupes politiques. Au début des années 2000 des commandants en charge du district ont effectué des **actes répréhensibles sur la population de la région, notamment à l'égard d'opposants politiques**.

**Source :** UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), *Compilation of Country-of-Origin Information on Afghanistan*, 2004.

“In Jaghori district, an official District Administrator was appointed end June 2003, by Central and provincial government. **The new head of the district – Mohammad Zafar Sharif** – native of Sang-e-Masha, centre of the district, is a **former army officer**, and was previously working with a local NGO. **He is an educated man, apparently not connected to any party**, especially with any branch of Hezb-e-Wahdat. He was **warmly welcomed by the population** who gathered in the district capital and pledged to put an end to the rule of weapons.

It is worth noting that **the previous Security Commander – Mohammad Anif Hissani** – was confirmed as the official district Police Chief. He belongs to Hezb-e-Wahdat (Khalili), Nasr faction, and was apparently confirmed on his post under close control of the provincial Governor. He has distanced himself from the Head of Garrison and is apparently cohabiting with the District Administrator.

Even though the District Administrator's personal position is still weak, he has enjoyed a **good reputation** since he took office and benefits from support from the provincial governor and the people, tired of the rule of armed elements."

**"Erfani is the Commander** that is currently and de facto controlling Jaghori district of Ghazni province and **affiliated with Hezb-e-Wahdat (Khalili)**. He is a native Hazara and used to be one of the two **representatives of Jaghori district** at the provincial shura level. He also used to be the **head of the military** shura in Jaghori (which is said to gather around 15 commanders). Erfani has however been isolated by the provincial authorities and Commander Ahsani has officially been appointed in 2003 as the Jaghori Chief of Jaghori Police. He has also been ordered by the provincial authorities to stay away from any role that would portray him as the representative of Jaghori district. He remains, however, to be an important figure for Hezb-e-Wahdat in Ghazni Province".

**"Khodadad Irfani has been an important Hezb-i Wahdat commander in Jaghori district** (and Ghazni province) for many years. After the fall of the Taliban, he was one of the main commanders in the district. He is associated with the Nasr (Khalili) faction of Hezb-i Wahdat.

In Ghazni province, U.N. officials confirmed cases, based on their own field investigations, of **kidnappings, rape, and forced marriages of girls and women, mainly in districts under the control of Hezb-e Wahdat forces, including Jaghori, Malistan, Qarabagh, and Sharistan districts:**

There are serious abuses: **kidnapping, rape, forced recruitment**. This exists in all areas. In Jaghori, there is this commander Irfani.

A 2005 news report on the Mr Irfani's election campaign in Jaghori includes **accusations that Mr Irfani committed mass killings and cooperated with the Taliban"**

**Source** : Refugee Review Tribunal, *Country Research, Research Response AFG30918*, 2006.

"In relation to Jaghori district, the UNHCR stated in February 2004:

How effective is law and order in Jaghuri and location of police force. The official district administrator of Jaghuri is Mr. Zafar Sharif. Nevertheless, the **authorities do not have complete control over the district**, particularly the remote areas. **Persons carry their own weapons** and therefore resort to them **to settle their own problems** and disputes. How effective is police force in providing protection against criminal activity if it is directed at perceived wealthy and westernised returnees. **Not very effective. Westernized and wealthy returnees could be targeted**, particularly for their wealth, and if they transcend rather strongly the norms of the society. (UNHCR Kabul 2004, UNHCR Responses To DIMIA Case Managers' Questions For UNHCR, 14 February – Attachment 26)

Also in relation to Jaghori district, the UNHCR stated in March 2004:

How effective is law and order in Jaghuri and existence of police force. The district administrator was appointed by the central government. However there is still a **lack of rule of law and no professional police force throughout the province**. Is government, ANA or US forces protection against Taliban incursions provided to Hazaras in the Jaghuri District or elsewhere in Ghazni



Province? The **coalition forces have their base** in Ghazni Center but **not in Jaghori district**. They **visit Jaghori from time to time**, and are accompanied by ANA personnel from the 14th Division based in Ghazni Center. There are **no reports of Taliban incursions into Jaghori since November 2001**. (UNHCR Kabul 2004, UNHCR Kabul Responses To DIMIA Case Managers' Questions For UNHCR, 11 March Attachment 27)"

**Source :** Refugee Review Tribunal, *Country Research, Research Response AFG31828*, 2007.

"Sources indicate that there is a **police commander named Bashi Habib who is currently in Jaghori district**. He has the same name as the person who was in charge of the Angori area in March 2004. An advice from UNHCR dated 11 March 2004 indicates that "local Commander Bashi Habib", who was "**a member of Harakat-e Islami party led by Anwari**", was in charge of the Angori area at that time."

"Another article dated 2 June 2007 refers to a person named **Bashi Habibullah**, who was "a local police chief" in Angor village, Jaghori district, whose family was **recently attacked by "suspected Taliban militants"**."

**Source :** Office Française de Protection des Réfugiés et Apatrides, *Le Mouvement islamique d'Afghanistan (Harakat-e Islami Afghanistan) : Focus sur sa présence dans le district de Jaghori (province de Ghazni)*, 5 juin 2020.

« Dans un rapport publié en 2003<sup>1</sup>, l'ONG Human Rights Watch a recensé **plusieurs exactions commises par des commandants** contrôlant certains districts de Ghazni et affiliés à des mouvements moudjahidines. Toutefois, le rapport ne cite aucun cadre du Harakat-e-Islami exerçant une telle influence localement et évoque plutôt des **membres du Hezb-e Wahdat - notamment à Jaghori -, voire des commandants pachtounes anciennement alliés aux talibans**.

Le HCR confirme qu'en 2003, **le district de Jaghori était sous la coupe du commandant Irfani, affilié à la branche Nasr du Hezb-e-Wahdat**. Les milices locales qui l'ont rallié se sont rendues coupables d'exactions cette année-là, notamment à l'encontre particulièrement quiconque pouvant être perçu comme leur étant hostile - à savoir des proches du Harakat-e Islami ou d'autres factions du hezb-e Wahdat. »

« Selon un document publié en 2004<sup>2</sup> par le HCR et cité par le service documentation de l'ancienne juridiction de l'asile, la localité d'Angori, à Jaghori, était alors contrôlée par **un commandant dénommé Bashi Habib. Ancien membre du Hezb-e-Islami, celui-ci a ensuite rallié le Harakat-e Islami**. »

« En 2008, **le Nasr, le Hezb-e Islami et le Harakat-e Islami étaient encore dotés d'une présence militaire à Jaghori et Malistan**. Profitant d'une très faible présence de l'État à Jaghori, tous ces moments ont infligé **divers abus aux populations sous leur contrôle**. »

## **2.2. Les attaques dans ou sur les routes de Jaguri**

Au début des années 2000, les répressions des troupes du Hezb-e- Whadat ont engendré de nombreux **mouvements de population**. L'insécurité grandissante était majoritairement fondée sur les **nombreux kidnappings** qui se sont déroulés dans le district de Jaguri, concernant notamment des jeunes filles, suivis par la mise en place de **checkpoints par les talibans** sur les routes de la région. Ce groupe armé effectuant de multiples exactions dans le district en 2006 et 2007.

<sup>1</sup> Human Rights Watch, Killing you is a very easy thing for us, juillet 2003, [url](#), p.26-27 et 45.

<sup>2</sup> UNHCR, *Afghanistan: Geographic details of Zardalu village in Ghazni province*, 2004.

Cependant, malgré l'absence de contrôle effectif de la zone par les talibans, la multiplication des prises d'otages et des meurtres à l'encontre des habitants de Jaguri n'ont pas diminué.

**Source :** Human Rights Watch, *“Killing you is a very easy thing for us”*, *Human Rights Abuses in Southeast Afghanistan*, 2003, p.46.

“According to U.N. humanitarian officials, **refugees have also been avoiding returning to several districts in Ghazni province**. In fact, recent **abuses** by Hezb-e-Wahdat troops in Malistan, **Jaghori**, Nawur, and Qarabagh districts have reportedly caused people to leave those areas for Ghazni City, as well as for Kabul and Mazar-e- Sharif. **Abuses include political persecution, extortion of money, arbitrary arrests and detentions, and kidnapping and forced marriage of girls and young women**. One man from Jaghori, displaced in Kabul, who was afraid to return to Jaghori district, told Human Rights Watch that he **feared the local commanders** there: “[T]here are fundamentalist agents there, and I am afraid of them.”

“**In Jaghori district in Ghazni province, in late 2002, families were reportedly reluctant to send their girls to school because soldiers connected with Hezb-e Wahdat had kidnapped girls on their way to school**. There are serious abuses: **kidnapping, rape, forced recruitment**. This **exists in all areas**. In Jaghori, there is this commander Irfani. In Malistan, Commander Qasemi, who is with Khalili. In Sharistan, there is commander Etumadi—he is linked with the kidnapping of young girls”

**Source :** UNHCR, *Compilation of Country-of-Origin Information on Afghanistan*, 2004.

“**During 2003 abuses are committed by local militias, rallied to the Nasr faction, motivated by money**. However, **anyone perceived to be opposed to their rule**.”

**Source :** Refugee Review Tribunal, *Country Research, Research Response AFG30918*, 2006.

“In September 2006, a UN agency stated **access to Jaghori was difficult due to deteriorating security and threats of insurgent attacks**:

Due to **the deteriorating security in Ghazni province**, food assistance could **not be delivered in three of the four flood-affected districts**. Due to threats of insurgent attacks, WFP was only able to distribute 16 tons of the 68 tons of food committed for Jaghuri district. WFP is in consultation with the Afghan Red Crescent Society (ARCS) to find ways for a secure and timely distribution in these insecure areas.

On 1 September 2006, **the Taliban closed Jaghori District Road to traffic for 12 hours** where it passed through neighbouring Qarabagh District.

Another report notes that the Taliban have stopped cars on this road many times, including in November 2006. On 27 August 2006, **four people travelling on this road from Jaghori to Ghazni** were kidnapped and a soldier and an Afghan aid worker were later killed”.

In May 2006, three doctors working at Jaghori Hospital were kidnapped. They were released after a gun battle in which 20 insurgents were killed.”

“In relation to the growing threat that Taliban insurgents are presenting to districts surrounding Jaghori district and roads into the district (noted in question 1), it is also noted that when the Taliban had closed the Jaghori District Road to recently, **they punished those who followed perceived “unislamic” practices** such as shaving off their beards or listening to music on their car radios.”

**Source :** Refugee Review Tribunal, *Country Research, Research Response AFG31828*, 2007.

“An article dated 12 May 2007 on the Pajhwok Afghan News website, Kabul indicates that **“the Taliban have stormed a police checkpoint in Angori area, Jaghori District”**. A “local militia official Muhammad Kazim Ebadi said six policemen were killed in the attack while assailants took hostage 10, including three security personnel.”

“There are some differing details provided in articles **regarding an attack on the family of a local police chief in Angor village in Jaghori district**. A Pajhwok Afghan News article dated 2 June 2007 refers to **“suspected Taliban militants” attacking “the house of a local police chief”** named “Bashi Habibullah in Angor village of the Jaghori district. The attackers gunned down the spouse, two sons and as many nephews of the police officer, who was away from home at the time of the attack.”

“An article dated 25 May 2007 includes information on Taliban activity in Ghazni province, and notes that **“several vehicles on the way to Jaghori [District] have been looted and seven passengers have been taken hostage by the Taliban.”**

**Source :** Refugee Review Tribunal, *Country Research, Research Response AFG36497*, 2010.

**“The FIS [Finnish Immigration Service] report states that Jaghouri “is a somewhat secure area”, where the Taliban is not able to effectively act** but shows an interest in disrupting the district.

FIS reports that **the main problem for Jaghouri “is getting in and out of it”** and the Taliban has focussed on the Qarabagh to Jaghouri road. Sources cited by DFAT in February 2009 also refer to the main road from Jaghouri to Ghazni city through Qarabagh as appearing to be the insurgents’ main focus.

The CPAU states that, despite the —pervasivel influence of the Taliban in Ghazni province, **the Taliban remains on the outskirts of Jaghouri and do not control the district**. The CPAU report concludes, however, that the **Taliban has an influence in Jaghouri** with its attacks on education in other areas of Ghazni and attacks on the Kabul-Kandahar highway preventing aid and development projects reaching the district.

In respect of political governance, an Afghanistan NGO Safety Office (ANSO) **report in September 2009 stated that Jaghouri is one of the districts in Ghazni province “said to be under the full control of the GoA [Government of Afghanistan]”**. Another source the CPAU also reported, however, that there is **“an extremely low government presence” in the district**.

The main political parties in Jaghouri identified by the CPAU report are the Hizb-i Wahdat/Khalili/Nasr faction, Hizb-i Wahdat Islami, Hizb-i Wahdat/Akbari, Sepah-i Pasdaran (Mohammad Akbari), Harakat-i Islami, Hizb-i Islami. The Hizb-i Wahdat is a coalition of Hazara parties founded in 1990. Of these parties the Nasr (Sazmani Nasr) and Khalili factions of the Wahdat party reportedly effectively control Jaghouri.”

**Source :** Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and documentation (ACCORD), *Afghanistan: Afghan Hazaras from Ghazni Province*, 2010.

“Hazaras are facing dire threats in Afghanistan's central provinces. **Jaghori residents in Ghazni province have been warned of an imminent Taliban takeover**, and Oruzgan province recently has seen the Taliban killing of Hazaras, decapitated because of their ethnicity and religion. [...] The United Nations Security Council on Afghanistan recently reported that more civilian deaths occurred in 2009 than any other year since 2001. January 2010 brought a further decline, with 40 percent more security breaches than in the previous January. Suicide attack methods have become

more sophisticated, and the use of improvised explosive devices is rising. Increasingly savvy, **the Taliban are now pursuing a new strategy to win the 'hearts and minds' of ordinary Afghans.**”

“Thomas Ruttig, co-director of the Afghanistan Analysts Network, reports in June 2010 of a **possibly imminent attack of the Taliban of Jaghori district**, founding his assessment of the situation on Taliban nightletters being distributed at the border of Qarabagh and Jaghori districts. Aside from **declaring the road to Jaghori closed, the letters appeal to the local population ‘not to prevent the [Taliban’s] entry into this area’**, which according to Ruttig could be a sign of an imminent or planned attack on Jaghori. Although most Hazaras had been hostile to the Taliban’s advance into their region in the 1990s, recent Taliban activity in peripheral areas of the Hazarajat has increased markedly.”

“In an article published on the information platform Australian History and Analysis, Denise Phillips, PhD Candidate of the University of New England (UNE), states that **Hazaras were directly affected by a deterioration of the general security situation in Ghazni province**. According to the Afghanistan Analysts Network, **Taliban were distributing night letters that announced a closure of the road to Jaghori**, thereby raising fears of a replication of a Taliban road blockage of essential supplies in the late 1990s. When 11 decapitated corpses were found in Oruzgan province in June 2010, a police official reported they were killed by the Taliban because of their Hazara and Shiite origin”.

“Thomas Ruttig, co-director of the Afghanistan Analysts Network, reports in **June 2010 of a possibly imminent attack of the Taliban of Jaghori district**, founding his assessment of the situation on Taliban nightletters being distributed at the border of Qarabagh and Jaghori districts. **Aside from declaring the road to Jaghori closed**, the letters appeal to the local population ‘not to prevent the [Taliban’s] entry into this area’, which according to Ruttig could be a **sign of an imminent or planned attack on Jaghori**. Although most Hazaras had been hostile to the Taliban’s advance into their region in the 1990s, recent Taliban activity in peripheral areas of the Hazarajat has increased markedly, he states.”

**Source:** CNDA, *Actualités jurisprudentielles, sélection de décisions de la Cour Nationale du Droit d’Asile*, 2010.

« Considérant, qu’en l’espèce, il peut être tenu pour établi que **M. est originaire de Jaghori**, une localité située dans le district de Ghazni ; que, dans le cadre du conflit armé interne que connaît l’Afghanistan, le secrétaire général des Nations unies, dans son rapport du 10 mars 2010, a reconnu que **l’année 2009 avait été la plus meurtrière depuis la chute du régime des Talibans, avec 2412 civils tués** ; que la situation s’est aggravée en 2010 avec une augmentation du nombre d’incidents de sécurité de quarante pour cent entre janvier 2009 et janvier 2010 ; que **la province de Ghazni a été particulièrement touchée au deuxième trimestre 2010 par cette augmentation du niveau de violence** ; que cette province a connu en juin 2010 les incidents de sécurité les plus graves survenus en Afghanistan au cours de ce mois, selon le Bureau pour la sécurité des organisations non- gouvernementales en Afghanistan ; que, notamment, huit civils ont été tués par l’explosion d’une mine fin juin 2010 ; qu’en particulier **la ville de Ghazni a été la cible à plusieurs reprises de tirs de roquettes attribués à des groupes d’opposition armés** ; que la situation actuelle dans le district de Ghazni peut être qualifiée de violence généralisée ; que M. est exposé en cas de retour dans sa localité d’origine, à une menace grave, directe et individuelle [...] en raison de sa situation d’orphelin âgé de dix-neuf ans qui peut faire de lui la cible de tentatives de **recrutement forcé** »

### **3. Les relations entre Hazara et Pachtoun dans la province de Ghazni et à Muqur**

Ghazni est l'une des trente-quatre provinces de l'Afghanistan qui se situe dans le sud-est du pays. Cette province est composée de dix-neuf districts, dont celui de Muqur, et **abrite près de 1,3 millions d'habitants, ce qui en fait la cinquième province la plus peuplée d'Afghanistan. Il est estimé que 49,7% de sa population est composée de Pachtoun, et 45,2% de Hazaras.** La situation sécuritaire à Ghazni est précaire **du fait de la présence des Talibans** qui menacent particulièrement la minorité Hazara victime d'attaques et de discrimination systématique.

#### **3.1. La minorité Hazara dans la province de Ghazni**

La minorité Hazara, originaire de la région montagneuse du Hazarajat, forme un **groupe ethnique et religieux distinct de la population afghane. Représentant environ 30% de la population**, les Hazaras sont des **musulmans chiïtes**, minoritaires dans un pays à majorité musulmane sunnite, branche de l'Islam dont font partie les Pachtoun et par conséquent, les Talibans. **Ils sont aussi le groupe ethnique le plus pauvre du pays.** De fait, les Hazaras sont la cible de discriminations ethniques et sociales et de violences depuis un grand nombre d'années en provenance des Talibans, et plus récemment, du groupe terroriste Etat islamique. De nos jours, **ils demeurent toujours victimes d'attaques à leur rencontre au sein de cette province.**

**Source :** Home Office, UK Border Agency, *Country Policy and Information Note Afghanistan: Hazaras*, 2018.

“Hazara principally live in the **central and western provinces of Afghanistan**, with a sizable population in Kabul and other major cities. Their traditional homeland is the **Hazarajat**, a mountainous region consisting of the provinces of Bamiyan and Daykundi, and parts of the **provinces of Ghazni** [...]”

**Source :** UN Press, *Le Secrétaire général extrêmement préoccupé par le massacre de population civile dans le centre de l'Afghanistan*, 2001.

« Depuis lors, des sources d'informations crédibles ont fait état d'**exécutions sommaires généralisées de personnes civiles du groupe ethnique Hazara par les Taliban** qui ont apparemment accusé la population locale de soutenir les forces Hezb-e-Wahdat. Il ne s'agit pas du seul évènement tragique que connaissent les Hazaras, un groupe ethnique à majorité chiïte, qui a **toujours été le groupe ethnique le plus défavorisé en Afghanistan.** »

**Source :** Minority Rights Group International, *World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples, Afghanistan, Hazara*, dernière mise à jour en 2021.

“**Systematic discrimination, as well as often repeated targeted violence and resulting displacement**, has led the Hazara community to lose much of their standing in the social hierarchy of modern Afghanistan. Their engagement in unskilled labour has resulted in further stigmatization, with a clear indicator of this being the low rate of inter-ethnic marriages with Hazaras. Perhaps as a consequence of this, Hazaras have been relatively isolated from other cultural influences, and their identity has remained relatively static.”

“A key issue for the Hazara community is the **general climate of impunity, whereby those who committed atrocities** – both past and present – to evade justice. Hazaras also remain **concerned about the resurgence of the Taliban, who they feel pose a direct threat to their community.** There have also been increasing ethnic tensions and incidents of violent clashes between Hazaras

and nomadic Kuchis over access to land in recent years. Due to the severity of their persecution under the Taliban, Hazara leaders have insisted, along with leaders of other minority groups, to be included in all negotiations with the Taliban.

With the increasing presence of foreign Islamist groups such as Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), active in the country for a number of years, **attacks against religious minorities have been on the increase**. Being Shi'a and therefore both a religious and a visible ethnic minority, **Hazaras are particularly vulnerable**. **Suicide bombings targeting Hazara public events** have taken place with **increasing regularity**, most of which have been **claimed by groups stating allegiance with ISIS**. These include, in **July 2016, the killing of 85 people** at a peaceful protest composed mostly of Hazaras. It was the **deadliest attack on civilians since 2002 and targeted the Hazara on the basis of their Shi'a religious identity**. Other attacks include a **December 2017 bombing that left at least 41 dead and another 80 injured in a Hazara neighbourhood** of western Kabul and an assault in **March 2018 that resulted in the deaths of at least nine people**. However, the **Taliban too is thought to be responsible for the increasing kidnappings of Hazaras**, particularly on remote highways, with some of the victims killed while others have been held for ransom”.

**Source** : Naval Postgraduate School, Program for Culture and Conflict studies, *Ghazni provincial overview*, last update 2017.

“The Hazara, a distinct ethnic and religious group within the population of Afghanistan; **they have often been the target of discriminatory and violent repression**. [...] the Hazara are noticeably different in physical appearance when compared to the Pashtun majority. In terms of religion, the vast majority of the **Hazara are of the Shia Muslim faith**, again in contrast to the Pashtuns who are Sunni Muslim. Due to these differences, “**the Hazara have experienced discrimination at the hands of the Pashtun-dominated government throughout the history of modern Afghanistan**.” As the traditional underclass of Afghan society, Hazara were exploited and made to work as servants and laborers. As a result, there tends to be an anti-government and anti-Pashtun bias among the Hazara. In present day Afghanistan, the **Hazara are divided geographically into two main groups: the Hazarajat Hazara and those who live outside the Hazarajat**. The Hazarajat is located in the Hindu Kush Mountains in central Afghanistan and is “centered around Bamiyan province and include[s] areas of Ghowr, Uruzgan, Wardak, and Ghazni province.” [...] **Due to atrocities committed against them by the Taliban, the Hazara by and large are opposed to the Taliban**. In August 1998, the Taliban massacred approximately 4,000 Hazara in Mazara-e-Sharif; this massacre was followed by another the next month when the Taliban killed another 500 Hazara in Bamiyan. The Hezb-e Wahdat (Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan) is an umbrella political organization which commands the support of large numbers of Hazara. The Hazara are also often at odds with the Kuchi population within the Hazarajat.”

**Source** : Human Rights Watch, *Afghanistan : Les talibans expulsent de force des membres d'une minorité chiite*, 22 octobre 2021.

« **Les Hazaras sont un groupe ethnique majoritairement musulman chiite qui a été victime de massacres et d'autres violations graves des droits humains par les forces talibanes dans les années 1990**. Ils sont la cible de discriminations et d'abus de la part des gouvernements afghans successifs depuis plus d'un siècle ».

**Source** : ACCORD, *Afghanistan: afghan Hazaras from Ghazni Province*, 2010, p.5.

“In its annual report on religious freedom published in October 2009<sup>3</sup>, the USDOS underlines the **socially segregated position of Hazaras**, additionally referring to **Hazara complaints against the government of ignoring minorities, especially Hazaras**. On the other hand, the government

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<sup>3</sup> USDOS, *International Religious Freedom Report 2009 (Afghanistan)*, 26 octobre 2009, [url](#).

in 2009 made significant efforts to address **historical tensions affecting the Hazara community**: Most Shi'a were members of the Hazara ethnic group, which was **traditionally segregated from the rest of society for a combination of political, ethnic, and religious reasons**, some of which **resulted in conflicts**.

Source: CNDA, *Actualités jurisprudentielles, sélection de décisions de la Cour Nationale du Droit d'Asile*, 2016.

« Considérant [...] qu'il est de **nationalité afghane, de confession chiite et membre de la communauté hazara de la province de Ghazni** [...] qu'à cet égard, il ressort du dernier rapport sur la Situation sécuritaire en Afghanistan, publié en janvier 2016 par le Bureau européen d'appui en matière d'asile, que dans cette province, les **civils sont exposés à d'importantes violences en raison du conflit interne** existant dans ce pays ; [...] qu'enfin, il ressort du dernier Rapport biennuel sur la Protection des civils en temps de guerre de la Mission d'assistance en Afghanistan de l'ONU publié en août 2015, des rapports du Département d'Etat américain pour l'année 2014 sur les Libertés religieuses en Afghanistan, publié en octobre 2015 et sur la Pratique des droits de l'Homme en Afghanistan, publié en juin 2015, que les **membres des communautés hazara et chiite sont régulièrement la cible de persécutions pour des motifs ethniques et religieux en Afghanistan** ; que ces agissements sont **essentiellement le fait des talibans** ; que les autorités n'interviennent généralement pas pour protéger ces ressortissants mais tolèrent cette situation à des fins politiques ; [...] que ces circonstances sont également corroborées par le rapport portant État des lieux sur les minorités et les peuples autochtones dans le monde, publié en juillet 2015 sur l'Afghanistan par le Minority Rights Group International ainsi que par une dépêche récente de Human Rights Watch intitulée « Afghan killings highlight risks to ethnic Hazaras » diffusée en novembre 2015 ; que dans ces conditions, **en tant que membre de la communauté hazara de confession chiite, M. A. doit être regardé comme craignant avec raison** au sens des stipulations précitées de la convention de Genève, d'être **persécuté**, en cas de retour dans son pays d'origine, par les talibans et par les combattants de l'Etat islamique pour un **motif ethnique et religieux**, sans pouvoir se prévaloir utilement de la protection des autorités ; que, dès lors, il est **fondé à se prévaloir de la qualité de réfugié** »

« Après avoir établi qu'il était **originaire de la province de Ghazni** [...], la Cour a établi ses **craintes en cas de retour au motif de son origine et de sa confession**, au regard des **persécutions dont cette communauté est victime** tant de la part des **talibans**, dont les autorités afghanes tolèrent les agissements à des fins politiques, que **d'individus** revendiquant leur **appartenance à l'État Islamique**. »

Source : Orient XXI, *Afghanistan. Exacerbation des tensions ethniques sur fond de retrait américain*, Diane Villeman, 12 mai 2021.

« Les nouvelles élites politiques articulent leurs intérêts personnels avec les demandes spécifiques pour leur ethnie, maintenant une insécurité constante de laquelle découle une absence de cohésion nationale. « Le gouvernement est pachtou et ne peut s'empêcher, en fin de compte, de protéger ses frères », explique Mustafa avec amertume. **Les Hazara se sentent trahis par un gouvernement qui leur avait promis une réduction de l'insécurité et des discriminations dont ils sont victimes**. Pour nombre d'entre eux, la sécurité est l'enjeu le plus important. « [...] Non seulement on craint pour notre vie tous les jours à cause des bombardements, mais on évite d'aller dans certaines provinces, dangereuses lorsque l'on est hazara comme moi ». [...] Si les talibans constituent une menace indéniable sur l'ensemble du territoire, les crimes organisés, le banditisme et le racket préoccupent également les Afghans — et notamment **les Hazara chiites, premières cibles de ces exactions**. »

**Source :** OHCHR, Mohammad Husain Hasrat, *Over a century of persecution: massive Human rights violations against Hazaras in Afghanistan*, 2019, p. 25.

“Besides Ghazni – Gharabagh- Jaghori and Ghani- Nahoor way which is mostly used by Hazaras of Jaghori and partially Malistan Urozgan, the Jalriz pass in Maidan Wardak province and Ghorband valley are the next **deadliest ways for Hazara passengers** by media’s record in recent years. **The Ghazni – Gharabagh – Jaghori rout is the only dangerous rout where kidnaping and killing cases are recorded almost by weekly bases.** The majority of incidences are ignored by national news outlets. **The negligence of such pain on Hazara people originates mostly from a widespread opinion considering them as deserving subject of victimhood** (often for being historical victim). In other words, multitude and frequent occurrence of such incidents have changed them to normal reality.”

**Source :** UNHCR, *UNHCR eligibility guidelines for assessing the international protection needs of asylum-seekers from Afghanistan*, 2018, p. 93.

“**Hazaras are reported to face continuing social discrimination**, as well as to be targeted for extortion through **illegal taxation, forced recruitment and forced labour, physical abuse, and detention.** Hazaras, **who are predominantly Shiites**, have historically been **marginalized and discriminated against by the Sunni majority population.**”

**Source :** Amnesty International, Communiqué de presse, *Afghanistan. Les talibans responsables du massacre d’hommes Hazaras* - Nouvelle enquête, 24 août 2021.

« En Afghanistan, des combattants talibans ont **massacré neuf hommes hazaras** après avoir pris le contrôle de la province de Ghazni, le mois dernier, a déclaré Amnesty International le 19 août.

L’équipe de recherche sur le terrain a interrogé **des témoins qui ont fait un récit terrifiant de ces homicides**, commis entre le 4 et le 6 juillet dans le village de Mundarakht, dans le district de Malistan. **Six de ces hommes ont été tués par balle et trois sont morts sous la torture, l’un d’eux ayant été étranglé avec son écharpe après avoir eu les muscles des bras tranchés.**

Ces meurtres **ne représentent probablement qu’une infime partie de l’ensemble des homicides commis par les talibans** jusqu’à présent, car ce groupe a coupé les services de téléphonie mobile dans un grand nombre des régions qu’il a récemment prises, et il contrôle la diffusion depuis ces régions des photos et vidéos. ».

« Ces homicides ciblés montrent bien que **les minorités ethniques et religieuses sont particulièrement en danger dans le contexte d’un régime taliban en Afghanistan.** ».

### **3.2. Les relations entre Hazara et Pachtouns dans la province de Ghazni**

Les Pachtoun et les Hazaras constituent les groupes majoritaires au sein de la province de Ghazni mais **les Pachtoun constituent un groupe privilégié en tant qu’ethnie la plus représentée en Afghanistan.** Ceci entraînant alors une hostilité envers les Hazaras de la part des Pachtoun, dont les Kuchis (Pachtoun nomades habitant Ghazni), et leur marginalisation.

**Source :** Minority Rights Group International, *World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples - Afghanistan: Kuchis.*

“**Kuchi means ‘nomad’** in the Dari (Persian) language. **Kuchis are Pashtuns** from southern and eastern Afghanistan. They are a social rather than ethnic grouping, although they also have some of the characteristics of a distinct ethnic group”.



**Source :** European Asylum Support Office, *Country of Origin information report - Afghanistan security situation*, 2017.

« The population of Ghazni is described as culturally diverse, with the **largest groups being Pashtuns and Hazaras**, and a small Tajik population which is concentrated in Ghazni City. Some **Kuchi nomads**, Hindus and Sikhs are also present in Ghazni. »

**Source :** European Asylum Support Office *Afghanistan Security situation, Country of Origin Information Report*, , septembre 2020, p. 132.

“NSIA estimated the population of Ghazni for 2020/21 at 1 362 504, with 68 993 of its residents living in the provincial capital of Ghazni City. Urban population constitutes about 5 % of all inhabitants of the province. **Ghazni is inhabited by Pashtuns (49 %), Hazara (46 %), Tajiks (5 %), and other smaller minorities.** Three districts – Jaghori, Malistan and Nawur – are inhabited exclusively by Hazara population. **Kuchi nomads also inhabit Ghazni**, and their presence in the province may differ throughout the year due to migration.”

**Source :** Minority Rights Group International, *Afghanistan, Pashtuns*, 2015.

“Pashtun, also called Pushtan, Paktun or Pathan, are the **largest ethnic group in Afghanistan**. They live mainly in the south and the east of the country. They have a distinct language called Pashto (an official language since 1936) but also speak Pakhto, which are both Iranian dialects that fall within the Indo-European group of languages. They are generally able to speak Farsi, when necessary, often relying on the language in the context of trade dealings in the region. It is speculated that Pashtun are descendents of Eastern Iranians, who immigrated to the area from Iran. However, there is also an interesting legend, which claims that they actually originate from one of Israel's tribes. Pashtun are Sunni Muslims and can also be found in the Northwest Province in Pakistan (about 14 million). They are seen as the historic founders of the Afghan Kingdom, with an apparent predominance in administration power until recently.”

**Source :** Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, *Responses to information requests*, 2011

“However, according to the US Congressional Research Service, the Hazaras’ “increased political strength has caused **ethnic tensions with the Pashtuns**” (US 5 May 2011, 22). [...] The Congressional Research Service reports that “**many**” Pashtuns are “**said to be increasingly resentful of the Hazara Shiite minority**”.

“According to the Congressional Research Service, the Hazaras remain “**wary of repression by Pashtuns and other larger ethnic factions**”. A long history of conflict with the **Pashtuns** lies at the **root of Hazara opposition to the Afghan government’s** recent efforts to negotiate a power-sharing deal with the Taliban.”

“The US State Department’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2010 indicates that Shiite Hazaras continue to experience “[s]ocial discrimination ... along class, race, and religious lines. [...]. In some areas, **Hazaras** and other Shiites are being **extorted for money “through illegal taxation”** and face “**forced recruitment and forced labor, physical abuse, and detention**”. **Freedom House also indicates in its annual report that the Hazara Shiite Muslims were one of three religious groups that faced “official obstacles and discrimination by the Sunni Muslim majority”**

**Source :** OHCHR, Mohammad Husain Hasrat, *Over a century of persecution: massive Human rights violations against Hazaras in Afghanistan*, 2019, p. 30.

“**Ghazni, Ghor, Bamyan, Daykundi and Balkh are those provinces where the Hazaras are more susceptible for road blockage, movement ban and sanction by the Taliban.**”

**Source :** ACCORD, *Afghanistan: afghan Hazaras from Ghazni Province*, 2010, p.5.

“According to the USDOS of March 2010, Shia Hazaras faced social discrimination: Social discrimination against Shia Hazaras continued along class, race, and religious lines. **Ethnic Hazaras reported occasionally being asked to pay additional bribes at border crossings where Pashtuns were allowed to pass freely.**”

“The **Hazaras accused the government, led by Pashtuns, of providing preferential treatment to Pashtuns** and of **ignoring minorities, especially Hazaras**. The government made significant efforts to address historical tensions affecting the Hazara community, including affirmative hiring practices. Although there were reported incidents of unofficial discrimination, and treatment varied by locality, Shi'a generally were free to participate fully in public life.”

“The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) stated in July 2009 that **Hazaras were affected by social discrimination, neglect by the government** (despite efforts to address historical tensions affecting the Hazara community, and the rising power of warlords, which might pose a direct threat to the Hazara community: Social discrimination against the Hazaras continues to be reported, including being asked to pay bribes at border crossings where Pashtuns were allowed to pass freely. Despite significant efforts by the Government to address historical tensions affecting the Hazara community, including preferential employment, some Hazaras community leaders accused President Karzai of **providing preferential treatment to Pashtuns to the detriment of other minorities, particularly the Hazaras**. Furthermore, the rising power of warlords is also a concern for the Hazaras as they may pose a **direct threat to the Hazara community given the absence of State presence and rule of law in many areas.**”

**Source :** US Department of State, *2009 Human Rights Report: Afghanistan*, 2010.

“Social discrimination against Shia Hazaras continued along class, race, and religious lines. **Ethnic Hazaras reported occasionally being asked to pay additional bribes at border crossings where Pashtuns were allowed to pass freely.**”

**Source :** Sarwan, Asmatullah et Siddique, Abubakar, *Why are the Taliban attacking Hazaras in Afghanistan ?*, Gandhara, 2018.

“For nearly 18 years, Afghanistan’s hard-line Islamist Taliban movement largely refrained from attacking the country’s predominately Shi’ite Hazara minority.

**But the Taliban recently began targeting Hazara-inhabited regions in the central provinces of Uruzgan and Ghazni.** Hundreds have been killed and thousands displaced by the fighting, which began in late October.

**The fighting was apparently provoked by the breakdown of a longstanding agreement between the two, according to former Taliban members and Ghazni locals.** Hazara leaders, for their part, deny they had engaged in any written or verbal understanding with the insurgents. The Taliban regime is accused of harshly persecuting the beleaguered minority during its stint in power in the 1990s”.

“The fighting is tinged by ethnic tensions as **many Taliban leaders and cadres are ethnic Pashtuns. Pashtuns are the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan**, comprising nearly half of the country’s estimated 30 million people, **while Hazaras make up some 10 percent of the population and have been persecuted historically**”.

**Source :** Grethemeyer, Jan-Heeren, *Ethnicity and national liberation: the Afghan Hazara between resistance and civil war*, Jean-Pierre Digard éd., Le Fait ethnique en Iran et en Afghanistan. CNRS Éditions, 1988, pp. 211-218.

“The Pushtun administrators were only thinly scattered throughout the Hazarajat region and this indeed contributed to the fact that the Hazarajat was only superficially internally colonised. But this development was accompanied by a **consequent policy of marginalisation and of a systematic policy of cultural, economic and political discrimination through the reigning Pushtun elite** : The Hazarajat was partitioned for so called administrative purposes ; public utilities e.g. schools, clinics, post offices, etc. were either not established at all or in a very few places and then of an inferior standard ; although all Hazaras had to do military service, no Hazara had normally the right to become an officier ; it was taboo to narrate the history of the Hazaras. After the Second World War intensive modernisation programmes were implemented but the Hazarajat region did not benefit from any of them. **A diffuse but effective oral propaganda campaign defamed the members of this race as second class human beings**”.

**Source :** Mardam Bey, Soulayma, *Les Hazaras, histoires d'une persécution plus que centenaire*, L'Orient-Le Jour, 5 novembre 2021.

« Je suis née en 1993. J'ai grandi avec les talibans », [...] « Parce que j'étais une fille, je ne pouvais pas aller à l'école », raconte-t-elle. Une expérience commune à son genre, toutes communautés confondues, mais à laquelle se conjugue son identité ethnique. « **Même si nous vivions dans le district de Jaghori, dans un village isolé, je pouvais ressentir la peur des gens** », ajoute celle qui a quitté sa terre natale pour le Royaume-Uni à l'âge de 13 ans, en 2006, bénéficiant d'une procédure de regroupement familial après que son père a obtenu l'asile politique en 1999. « Quand on était petits, on aimait bien sortir et jouer ensemble. On nous disait “faites attention, un taliban ça ressemble à ça”, avec l'idée qu'ils ont des traits “pachtounes”, se souvient Homira Rezaï. **Du coup, quand on tombait sur des Pachtounes, on prenait la fuite** ».

« **Tout au long de l'histoire contemporaine, les discriminations contre les Hazaras ont pris des formes diverses, mêlant violence structurelle et racisme ordinaire.** Les autorités à Kaboul n'ont cessé de maintenir le Hazarajat dans un **état de marginalisation, l'ont exclu des politiques éducatives ou de développement agricole.** Les Hazaras ont été **bloqués dans leur promotion sociale**, empêchés d'occuper les échelons supérieurs de l'armée et, de manière plus générale, les fonctions plus prestigieuses au sein de la société ».

« En août, Amnesty International a indiqué qu'au moins neuf hommes hazaras ont été massacrés par les talibans **lorsque le groupe a pris le contrôle de la province de Ghazni en juillet** ».

**Source :** SciencesPo les études du CERI, *Guerre, reconstruction de l'Etat et invention de la tradition en Afghanistan*, 2016, p.16.

« Cette double réification de deux « ennemis complémentaires » est lourde de dangers potentiels, comme l'ont d'ores et déjà illustré les **affrontements sanglants entre Hazara et Kuchi** dans le Wardak en 2010 et à Nahoor, dans le Ghazni, en 2010-2012, et la **mobilisation ethnopolitique subséquente des parlementaires hazara et pachtounes, à l'approche des élections législatives, pour défendre leurs clientèles respectives.** »

**Source :** Afghanistan Analysts Network, *The kuchi-hazara Conflict, Again*, 27 mai 2020.

“The displaced villagers are also unhappy with the deployed security forces. A total of around 300 ANP and 160 ANA forces were sent to the area, mainly from Bamian province, but they seem to keep a low profile, and finding themselves **outnumbered by the Kuchi fighters**, who are estimated by various sources as being between 500 and 1000, **have till recently avoided taking**

**any steps to enforce the withdrawal of nomads.** As Sayyed Abdul Qahar complains: “house, goods, livestock – the people lost everything. The fruit trees and the fields will hardly bear anything if they are not cared for at this time of year, we are about to lose our harvest completely if we are not allowed to go back. We could not even recover the bodies of our martyrs, they are still lying on the hills. That is the ultimate injustice. **The government has done nothing about that.**” Another elder reports having heard of **great numbers of Hazara stolen livestock being sold at Ghazni**”

#### **4. La situation sécuritaire à Muqur de 2010 à 2015**

**Muqur est l'un des districts composant la province de Ghazni** qui, par ricochet, souffre également de la précarité et de la situation sécuritaire de Ghazni. Les Talibans ont provoqué de nombreux incidents de violence entre 2010 et 2015 et la présence de groupes affiliés à l'Etat islamique a été observée dans la province, renforçant ainsi cette insécurité.

**Source :** European Asylum Support Office, *Country of Origin Information Report: Afghanistan*, 2016.

“According to Pajhwok, Ghazni is one of the most important and central provinces of Afghanistan. The Central Statistics Office (CSO) considers the province of Ghazni to be the second largest with regards to the density of population. UN OCHA estimates the population for 2015 to be 1,228,831 for the province of Ghazni.

**Ghazni consists of the following districts :** Jaghuri, Malistan, Nawur, Ajiristan, Andar, Qarabagh, Giro, **Muqur**, Waghaz, Gelan, Ab Band, Nawa, Dih Yak, Rashidan, Zana Khan, Khwaja Omari, Jaghatu and Ghazni centre. (791) The old city and the Bala-e Hesar (castle) in the provincial capital are symbols of history; trade has grown steadily in the city since it is the centre of four routes to various destinations.”

**“Ghazni is considered a volatile province**, where insurgents are operating in various districts and frequently carry out activities, resulting in high **numbers of security incidents. From 1 January to 31 August 2015, Ghazni province counted 1,046 security incidents.**

Several security operations led by ANA, ANP and the NDS were conducted in the province **to clear areas from insurgents.** Additionally, **weapons and explosive materials** were seized during the operations. Examples of security incidents include:

<b>Violence targeting individuals</b>	<b>72</b>
<b>Armed confrontations and airstrikes</b>	<b>747</b>
<b>Explosions</b>	<b>120</b>
<b>Security enforcement</b>	<b>106</b>
<b>Other incidents</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Total security incidents</b>	<b>1,046</b>

Table 15: Security incidents by type, Ghazni (Jan-August 2015).”

“In November 2014, three **policemen were killed in a Taliban attack.** In December 2014, a female member of the Provincial Council in Ghazni, Zakyah Rahimi, was **attacked by motorcyclists** in front of her home in Qala Shada on the outskirts of the city.

In January 2015, eleven locals and seven Taliban insurgents were killed during clashes between counter-insurgents and Taliban. The incident took place in the district of Andar when the Taliban insurgents attacked a checkpoint.

**At least 10 people who were Hazara were abducted in the province of Ghazni in March 2015.** They were **travelling from the district of Jaghori to Ghazni city**. Search operations were conducted by security forces to rescue the passengers. No group has claimed responsibility. Also in March, at least six children were killed and another 10 injured while playing cricket when a bomb exploded in the capital of Ghazni.”.

**Source :** Sixième rapport de l'Équipe d'appui analytique et de surveillance des sanctions créée par la résolution 1526 (2004) du Conseil de sécurité, présenté au Comité du Conseil de sécurité créé par la résolution 1988 (2011), 2015

« La multiplication virale des références à l'EIIL [État Islamique d'Irak et du Levant] est manifeste, comme en témoigne, selon des sources gouvernementales afghanes, l'observation, dans 25 provinces, de groupes arborant l'une ou l'autre de ces références ou manifestant leur solidarité avec l'EIIL. **Les Forces nationales de défense et de sécurité afghanes ont signalé qu'elles avaient rencontré ou observé des groupes affiliés à l'EIIL dans les provinces** de Badakhshan, Badghis, Balkh, Farah, Faryab, **Ghazni**, Ghor, Helmand, Herat, Jawzjan, Kandahar, Kapisa, Khost, Kunar, Kunduz, Logar, Nangarhar, Nuristan, Paktya, Paktika, Sari Pol, Takhar, Uruzgan, Wardak et Zabul.»

« **L'exploitation, par les Talibans, des mines** situées dans des zones qu'ils contrôlent ou qui sont sous leur influence et leur implication dans la contrebande de produits à destination de l'étranger se produisent dans les **provinces de Ghazni**, Wardak, Sari Pul, Kandahar, Paktya, Helmand, Khost, Logar et Zabul. »

**Source :** Institute for War and Peace Reporting, *Afghanistan's High Peace Council: Five Years On*, 2016.

“Mohammad Akbar Hotak said that the Council had rolled out more than ten projects to bring individual fighters into the peace process.

An ongoing **lack of security and tribal tensions** were the main challenges they faced, he added. “[For example] **people in Muqur district** who joined this process **are currently living in Qala-e nau, the provincial capital, due to security problems,**” Hotak explained. Mohammad Afzal Afzali, head of Muqur's development council, said that the Council needed to focus on **building public trust.**”

**Source :** Institute for War and Peace Reporting, *Afghanistan: Ghazni Militia Holds Locals to Ransom*, 2013.

“Leaders of a militia force established to fight Taleban forces in Ghazni province in Afghanistan have set up private prisons where they **torture and extort money from local people**, an IWPR investigation has found.

More than 50 villagers have told IWPR of **abuses** they have suffered at the hands of pro-government paramilitaries at three detention centres in Ghazni's Moqor district.”

Interviewed by IWPR, the three top militia commanders in Moqor district freely admitted to torturing detainees, justifying this by describing them as Taleban members or contacts.”

“In the Moqor district, the paramilitaries began with 40 men in April 2012 and now have around 180. According to district government chief Saheb Khan, makeshift jails operate at three militia bases in this district, in the villages of Bara Khan Khel, Qala-e Godam and Qala-ye Khanadar.

The main commanders in Moqor are Sayed Ali, Faizol and Ghias. According to Faizol, “We have 180 men in three groups. We are **armed with Kalashnikovs, rockets and [other] rifles.**”

IWPR interviewed residents in a sample 15 of the 200 villages in Moqor district and found **55 people who said they had been tortured** at these bases.

They also said they were **forced to pay over money to obtain their release.** For this group of 55 people, the ransom money totalled 70,000 US dollars.

Market trader Asadullah, 22, said that in early **May 2012**, armed men under Faizol’s command came to his shop in the **Moqor bazaar** where he sold solar energy equipment.

After **beating him badly**, they stole eight sets of solar panels and then **took him off to their detention centre.**

He says his captors **tortured him for four days and nights** and repeatedly **demanded money.** He eventually managed to secure his release through the intervention of his uncle, a senior officer in the Afghan National Army.”

“The **authorities in Ghazni** say they are **aware of these ongoing abuses**, but insist there is **nothing they can do** to prevent them or bring justice to the victims.

“**Moqor’s district government** chief Saheb Khan said he had informed the **authorities in Kabul** about the privately-run prisons on a number of occasions, but was told that he had **no right to interfere in the militia’s activities.**”

**Source :** Enca, *Attacks kill 10 police in Afghanistan*, 2013.

“Taliban attacks killed at least ten Afghan police on Sunday, officials said, in the latest violence against the force which is due to take more security responsibility from NATO troops before their withdrawal next year.

In one of the incidents, **Taliban fighters attacked a security check post in the Muqur district of Ghazni province** in southern Afghanistan, killing six police, according to the district governor. "Six of our local police were martyred after hours of clash with Taliban when they attacked their post early today," he said.

He added a **second attack on a local police check post in Muqur** wounded four police.”

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