



CLINIQUE DOCTORALE
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Clinique de Droit international
des droits de l'homme

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**TIBET ET CHINE :
SITUATION ACTUELLE,
LÉGISLATION
RELIGIEUSE ET
CONDITIONS
CARCÉRALES**

Décembre 2024

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La dernière mise à jour date du 15 décembre 2024.

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QUESTIONS

QUESTION 1 : Quelle est la situation actuelle du Tibet par rapport à la Chine et ses autorités?

QUESTION 2 : Quelle est la législation chinoise au sujet du Dalaï-lama et des représentations iconiques de celui-ci?

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SYNTHÈSE GÉNÉRALE

Située dans les montagnes de l'Himalaya, la région du Tibet a été le berceau d'une civilisation unique, marquée par le bouddhisme, qui a profondément influencé la spiritualité, l'art et les traditions locales. Pendant des siècles, le Tibet a maintenu son indépendance relative, bien qu'il ait été en interaction avec diverses dynasties et puissances voisines. L'organisation sociale et politique de la région reposaient sur des structures religieuses et communautaires, avec le dalaï-lama jouant un rôle central en tant que chef spirituel et temporel. Cette situation a perduré jusqu'au milieu du XXe siècle, lorsque des changements importants ont commencé à façonner le destin de la région, notamment son rattachement à la Chine.

Actuellement, la situation au Tibet est complexe avec une relation souvent difficile entre la région et les autorités chinoises, fruit de siècles de tension. L'identité du Tibet est mise à l'épreuve par la volonté de Beijing de maintenir un contrôle centralisé et de promouvoir une vision unificatrice qui cherche à intégrer pleinement la région au sein de la Chine.

En outre, le développement des infrastructures et l'expansion économique au Tibet, présentés comme des progrès par les autorités chinoises, suscitent des préoccupations concernant leurs impacts sur la population locale, l'environnement et les traditions. La situation des droits humains, difficile à évaluer en raison de l'isolement du Tibet, inquiète la communauté internationale. Par ailleurs, la surveillance accrue et la politique répressive chinoise limitent l'expression culturelle tibétaine, renforçant un climat de méfiance et de tension.

A titre d'exemple, depuis 1996, la liberté de religion et d'expression au Tibet est encadrée par des restrictions légales, notamment l'interdiction de posséder des images du Dalaï-lama, leader spirituel du bouddhisme tibétain. Cette mesure s'inscrit dans la volonté des autorités chinoises de limiter les influences considérées comme contraires à l'unité nationale, le Dalaï-lama étant considéré comme une figure déstabilisatrice. Avec le développement des technologies numériques, ces restrictions ont été étendues au domaine digital, notamment grâce à l'adoption de lois sur la cybersécurité avec des filtres et des censures appliqués aux contenus liés au Dalaï-lama ou à la culture tibétaine en exil. La diffusion de ces contenus sur les réseaux sociaux ou leur possession peut entraîner des sanctions juridiques graves, allant des amendes à des peines de prison.

En effet, la stratégie de la Chine pour assurer la sécurité intérieure repose en grande partie sur une approche judiciaire punitive. Le pays détient la deuxième plus grande population carcérale au monde et se prévaut d'un taux d'incarcération inégalable (environ 99%). L'absence persistante de données transparentes s'agissant des conditions de détention vaut au pays une critique nourrie de la communauté internationale. Un bon nombre d'acteurs, ONG, rapporteurs spéciaux du Conseil des droits de l'homme, journalistes, tentent de contourner cette opacité et relatent des pratiques inquiétantes. En particulier, l'existence de nouvelles formes de contrôle et de privation de liberté, qui seraient massivement déployées dans le Xinjiang et le Tibet à des fins de répression politique et de marginalisation culturelle. Ces pratiques, pour certaines officieuses, impliquent l'usage de la disparition forcée, de la résidence surveillée, de traitements inhumains et dégradants, ainsi que de tortures ayant pu conduire jusqu'au décès de détenus.

I/ La situation actuelle du Tibet par rapport à la Chine et ses autorités

Les relations entre le Tibet et la Chine reposent sur une histoire complexe, marquée par des tensions idéologiques et des visions divergentes (A). L'intégration de la culture tibétaine dans le cadre des politiques d'unification chinoises a soulevé des enjeux autour de la préservation des traditions et des mesures de contrôle (B). Dans ce contexte, les politiques de développement de la Chine ont entraîné des changements économiques et d'infrastructures, modifiant le paysage régional tout en répondant à des objectifs stratégiques (C). Enfin, les politiques de répression contribuent à maintenir un contrôle étendu sur la région, ayant des répercussions importantes pour la population locale et leur identité et les Tibétains sont soumis à des pratiques de surveillance renforcées tant sur le territoire qu'en exil (D).

A) Des tensions idéologiques entre la Chine et le Tibet

Source: Xinhua, *Tibet Since 1951: Liberation, Development and Prosperity*, The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, 2021.

“Tibet has been an integral part of Chinese territory since ancient times, and one of the main Tibetan-inhabited areas in China. In the aftermath of the Opium Wars in the middle of the 19th century, **the UK-led imperialist powers began to cultivate the idea of “Tibet independence”**, intentionally undermining China's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

– **Tibet has been an inseparable part of China since ancient times. China is a unified multiethnic country with a long history”**

“Historical facts clearly demonstrate that “Tibetan independence” was no more than a product of **imperialist aggression against China**. Driving imperialist forces out of Tibet was the precondition for the Chinese people to safeguard national unification.

– Liberating Tibet was the shared aspiration of all ethnic groups in Tibet.”

“On April 29, the Central People's Government and the local government of Tibet began official negotiations for the peaceful liberation. After serious consultations and thorough discussions, they signed **the 17-Article Agreement in Beijing** on May 23.

The 17-Article Agreement stipulates:

- **The people of Tibet shall unite and drive out aggressive imperialist forces; they will return to the family of the People's Republic of China.**
- The PLA troops shall enter Tibet to consolidate national defense.
- All foreign-related affairs of Tibet shall be dealt with by the Central People's Government on a centralized basis.
- The local government of Tibet shall actively assist the PLA to enter Tibet and consolidate the national defense.
- The Tibetan people shall have the right of regional ethnic autonomy under the unified leadership of the Central People's Government.
- The religious beliefs and customs of the Tibetan people shall be respected.”

“Old Tibet was ruled by a theocratic feudal serfdom. This system crushed human dignity, ignored human rights, and impeded development in Tibet, all of which flouted the progressive trend in China and elsewhere in the world. In old Tibet, there was no separation of religious and political power, and the former enjoyed absolute supremacy. **Religious power prevailed over political power**, while

political power protected religious privileges. The two combined to defend the interests of the three major stakeholders: officials, aristocrats and higher-ranking lamas in the monasteries.”

“Meanwhile the serfs and slaves, who accounted for 95 percent of the population, had no means of production or freedom of their own. They were subjected to the three-fold exploitation of corvée labor, taxes, and high-interest loans, and struggled for mere existence.”

Source: Sebastien Berriot, Come Bastin, Justine Leblond, « Tibet : 65 ans d'occupation chinoise vu depuis la Chine, l'Inde et le Canada », Franceinfo, 11 mars 2024.

« Cependant hier, le 10 mars, jour de l’anniversaire du soulèvement tibétain en 1959, en pleine session annuelle du parlement chinois, l’un des membres d’une des deux assemblées venues du Tibet a été choisi pour évoquer en public *"les réalisations extraordinaires de la Chine au Tibet"*. La semaine dernière, le ministère chinois des Affaires étrangères a aussi rappelé que **la Chine a apporté stabilité sociale, croissance économique, et, selon les termes officiels, "harmonie entre les diverses croyances religieuses"**. »

« Ce discours de propagande est destiné à contrecarrer la vision opposée défendue par les militants tibétains en exil qui, eux, dénoncent la **pression exercée par Pékin sur la région autonome**, ainsi que les accusations par l'ONU de violations des droits de l’homme au Tibet qui visent toujours le régime de Pékin. Il y a quelques jours encore, le Haut-commissaire de l’ONU aux droits de l'homme a évoqué des lois, des politiques et des pratiques **contraires aux droits humains**. »

« **Difficile de savoir ce qui se passe précisément au Tibet**, car la région est soumise à une surveillance toujours très stricte. Si les journalistes étrangers peuvent se rendre au Xinjiang, où se trouve la majorité ouïghoure, cela reste **impossible et interdit au Tibet**. »

B) La culture tibétaine à l'épreuve de la volonté unificatrice de la Chine

Source: Xinhua, *Tibet Since 1951: Liberation, Development and Prosperity*, The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, 2021.

“China attaches **great importance to the protection and development of traditional Tibetan culture**. It has **invested huge human, financial and material resources** to protect, develop and carry forward the fine traditional culture of Tibet through a **variety of legal, economic and administrative means**.”

“The state respects and protects the **rights of all ethnic groups** in Tibet to live and conduct social activities in accordance with traditional customs and habits. While maintaining their traditional ways and styles of dress, diet and housing, people of all ethnic groups have also absorbed many new and modern cultural customs.”

“The state formulates guidelines and policies to fully implement the system of regional ethnic autonomy, protect normal religious activities in accordance with the law, and promote the unity and common prosperity of all ethnic groups.”

“People in Tibet enjoy the right to be masters of the country and the region in accordance with the law. Since its founding, the autonomous region has issued 152 local regulations and normative documents, **providing an important legal guarantee for the rights and interests of all ethnic groups**.”

“Since reform and opening up in 1978, **economic and cultural exchanges between ethnic groups have become closer and the sense of national identity has grown stronger.** Every year on National Day, and during the Peaceful Liberation Celebration and the Ethnic Unity Month, Tibet conducts themed education on the Chinese Dream and patriotism. Thanks to these efforts, ethnic unity and progress have been promoted”

“National unity and social stability are important guarantees of all the undertakings of Tibet, and a solid buttress ensuring a happy life for all ethnic groups in Tibet. Over the years, Western anti-China forces have used Tibet as a pretext to disrupt China and interfere with its development, and the 14th Dalai Lama and his supporters have continued to try to promote “Tibetan independence” by provoking incidents to jeopardize peace and stability in Tibet. **The Chinese government has taken effective measures to maintain social stability and harmony in the region.**”

Source: “Chinese occupation of Tibet”, FreeTibet, 2024.

“**Tibetan school children are also being denied classes in their mother tongue, and increasingly being taught in Chinese instead.** Schools teaching in Tibetan are being forced to close. Around 800,000-900,000 Tibetan children have been separated from their families and forced to undergo education in colonial boarding schools, where they are subject to indoctrination, an attempt by the CCP to eliminate Tibetans’ national identity.”

Source: Katia Buffetrille (entretien avec Mathilde Domont), « Le Tibet sous occupation chinoise. Quelles menaces pour la population et l'héritage tibétain ? », Institut d'études de géopolitique appliquée, Paris, mars 2023.

« En effet, alors que la Chine communiste avait, dans les années cinquante, adopté le modèle soviétique de reconnaissance des nationalités et accordé aux 55 minorités ethniques un statut « d'autonomie », depuis 2014 elle suit une **politique assimilationniste**, théorisée par des ethnologues de RPC tels Ma Rong, Hu Angang et Hu Lianhe. »

« Ma Rong milite pour que Han et non Hans soient assimilés en une seule nation et promeut **une Chine dans laquelle les identités ethniques seront remplacées par une identité nationale unique.** L'élection récente de Pan Yue au comité central laisse craindre que ce programme d'assimilation ne s'intensifie. **Nommé en juin 2022 à la tête de la Commission des affaires ethniques, Pan est connu pour ses positions en faveur de la « fusion ethnique ».** »

« En d'autres termes, il est demandé aux **maîtres et religieux du bouddhisme tibétain de devenir des propagandistes du Parti.** L'Académie bouddhique fondée à Nyethang, à une vingtaine de kilomètres de Lhassa, participe activement à la nouvelle éducation des religieux, sachant que les monastères tibétains, bien que soumis à des campagnes de « rééducation patriotique » depuis le milieu des années 1990, restaient des lieux où le savoir, non seulement religieux et rituel, mais aussi linguistique était préservé, puisque la langue tibétaine y était la langue d'érudition et de communication. »

« Par ailleurs, **les destructions totales ou partielles de monastères, de statues ou autres signes religieux sont récurrentes, sans oublier l'obligation de mettre le drapeau chinois sur les bâtiments religieux, voire les photographies des leaders politiques chinois passés et présents.** Un exemple récent : un étudiant a été détenu deux jours et condamné à une forte amende et à des séances de rééducation politique en février 2023 pour avoir déployé le drapeau bouddhique lors des fêtes du Nouvel

an à la place du drapeau chinois et avoir exécuté des danses et chants tibétains au lieu de chants de propagande chinoise. »

« Le témoignage a été corroboré par deux rapports d'experts indépendants de l'ONU. Ces enfants non seulement subissent le traumatisme d'être séparés de leurs parents, mais aussi celui d'être coupés de leurs racines, de leur culture et de leurs traditions. Élevés dans la langue chinoise, ils perdent très rapidement leur langue au profit du mandarin. Lorsqu'ils rentrent dans leur famille, ils communiquent difficilement avec leurs proches qui, souvent, ne parlent pas le chinois. Poussés à abandonner leur identité tibétaine, endoctrinés politiquement et culturellement, ils deviennent des étrangers dans leur propre famille et dans leur propre territoire. **C'est donc un vaste programme d'assimilation qui est mis en place « afin de lier les peuples de chaque groupe ethnique à un seul brin de corde »**, selon les propos de Xi Jinping prononcés en 2014, le « brin de corde » étant bien entendu les Han (près de 93%) qui écrasent par leur nombre les autres populations de la RPC. »

C) Les infrastructures et l'économie au Tibet dans le contexte des politiques de développement de la Chine

Source: Xinhua, *Tibet Since 1951: Liberation, Development and Prosperity*, The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, 2021.

“Democratic reform represented an **epoch-making change** in Tibetan society and in the human rights of its people. It granted political, economic and social **emancipation to a million serfs and slaves**, effectively promoted the development of social productive forces in Tibet and opened up the road toward modernization.

– **The Tibet Autonomous Region was established to launch Tibet on the path to socialism.”**

“Over the last seven decades, the central government has introduced many favorable policies for the region, covering tax and finance, infrastructure, industrial development, education, health, cultural preservation, environmental protection, and other fields. **The central government increases its fiscal transfer to Tibet every year and has planned and carried out a number of major projects** at different stages which have a bearing on the **long-term development of the region and the living standard of the people**. As a result, the local people **enjoy much better working and living conditions**, and their sense of gain, happiness, and security is growing”

“The region now has a modern industrial system with distinctive local features, covering clean energy, natural drinking water, farming and animal product processing, folk handicrafts, Tibetan medicine, and building materials, among others.”

“In old Tibet there was **not a single proper school**. The illiteracy rate exceeded 95 percent, to say nothing of complete ignorance of modern science and technology. From 1951 to 2020, the central government invested RMB224 billion in Tibet's education. **Now, the region has established a modern educational system** which includes preschool, primary and middle schools, vocational and technical schools, institutions of higher learning, and continuing and special education institutions. Students enjoy 15 years of publicly-funded compulsory education”

“Before liberation, there were only **three small, shabby government-run institutions of Tibetan medicine** and a small number of private clinics. Now, Tibet has a **full system covering regular medical services**, maternity and childcare, disease prevention and control, and Tibetan medicine and therapies.”

“Tibet has relocated the impoverished to improve their living and working conditions. Poverty-stricken populations in Tibet are concentrated in the northern pastoral areas, the southern border areas, and the eastern areas along the Hengdun Mountains. All these areas are located at high altitudes. They are remote from vital markets and live in harsh conditions. **Therefore, relocating the inhabitants of these areas is a rational solution to lift them out of poverty**”

Source: “Chinese occupation of Tibet”, Free Tibet, 2024.

“Tibetans who **protest** against mining, damming and other resource extractions are routinely met with **violence** and **repression** by security forces.

China has used **economic incentives and force to move over two million Tibetan nomads** from the land they have lived off for generations into urban settlements. Without the skills to obtain work in an urban environment, nomads face poverty, unemployment and social exclusion.”

D) L’impact des politiques de contrôle sur l’identité tibétaine et sa diaspora

a) La politique de répression chinoise sur le Tibet

Source: Xinhua, *Tibet Since 1951: Liberation, Development and Prosperity*, The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, 2021.

“From the late 1970s, under pressure from significant shifts in the international landscape, the 14th Dalai Lama and his supporters began to alter their tactics.

On the one hand, they **continued to provoke incidents of violence** to keep up pressure on the central government. For example, in 1987, 1988 and 1989 they planned and instigated multiple violent incidents. In 2008, they planned and executed violent riots in Lhasa on March 14 and launched a number of international incidents designed to sabotage the preparations for the Beijing Olympic Games. Since 2011, the 14th Dalai Lama and his supporters have incited Tibetan lamas and lay followers inside China to engage in acts of self-immolation, and released a Self-Immolation Guide on the internet, giving rise to a surge of self-immolation incidents in some parts of China.”

“All experience since liberation has proved that **without national security, the fundamental interests of the ethnic groups of Tibet cannot be protected**. Without a stable social environment, there will be no economic, cultural or eco-environmental development, nor can the people’s right to a stable and happy life be guaranteed. Over the years, the 14th **Dalai Lama and his followers**, supported by Western anti-China forces, have contributed **nothing positive to the social solidarity and progress of Tibet**.”

“Under the strong leadership of the CPC, the officials and people in Tibet have worked diligently with one heart and one mind to resolve many long-standing and troublesome problems and achieved many notable successes that were unimaginable in the past. All-round progress has been made in all endeavors.”

Source: Samuel Ravier-Regnat, « Répression au Tibet « en matière d’information, ce territoire est un véritable trou noir » », Libération, juillet 2023.

« Jusqu’au début des années 2000, **les personnes poursuivies** par les autorités étaient surtout **celles qui suivaient les enseignements du dalai-lama**. Dans les années 2000 et notamment après le soulèvement

de 2008, le régime chinois a mis en place une **politique sécuritaire de prévention dont le but est de contrôler l'ensemble de la population**, au-delà des seuls opposants politiques. Il utilise pour ce faire des méthodes de contrôle social telles que la **censure ou le placement forcé d'enfants** dans des internats pour les éloigner de leurs parents »

Source: Katia Buffetrille (entretien avec Mathilde Domont), « Le Tibet sous occupation chinoise. Quelles menaces pour la population et l'héritage tibétain ? », Institut d'études de géopolitique appliquée, Paris, mars 2023.

« Les informations que nous recevons sont partielles ou ne sont connues que tardivement du fait des contrôles et de la censure. Cependant, **l'arrestation et les condamnations de plusieurs intellectuels qui ont exprimé leurs opinions sur la culture ou l'identité tibétaine sont parvenues jusqu'à nous**, preuve que les Tibétains n'ont pas renoncé à faire entendre leur voix, en dépit des dangers. »

« Des **protestataires solitaires** appelant au retour du Dalaï-lama ont été également observés, essentiellement à Ngawa et Kanze (Kham), entre 2014 et 2018. La première manifestation d'importance à Lhassa attestée depuis 2008 a eu lieu en octobre 2022 en réaction aux restrictions dues au Covid. Mais de nombreux protestataires étaient en fait des migrants han qui voulaient rentrer dans leur région d'origine, ce qui peut expliquer la réponse mesurée des autorités. **Une manifestation de cette ampleur constituée de Tibétains est unimaginable tant les risques de répression brutales sont craints par la population.** Certes, des Chinois et des Tibétains ont été arrêtés, mais les Chinois ont été relâchés plusieurs jours avant les Tibétains et l'on ignore actuellement les répercussions sur la vie et la famille de ces derniers. »

Source: "Chinese occupation of Tibet", Free Tibet, 2024.

"Tibetans face intense surveillance in their daily lives, with security cameras, police checkpoints and party officials monitoring their movements and activities.

Peaceful protests are suppressed with **severe violence**. Protesters are **imprisoned, tortured** and may even be **shot**.

China has repeatedly **violated UN conventions** through extensive use of torture against Tibetan political prisoners.

Tibetans charged with "separatism" (acts intended to divide or damage the Chinese state) can face sentences up to and including the **death penalty**.

Even **children** face abuses of their freedom and human rights"

Source: "UN Rights Chief Says China Committing Violations in Xinjiang", Tibet, ICTJ, 4 mars 2024.

"UN human rights chief Volker Turk on March 4 called on China to implement recommendations to **amend laws that violate fundamental rights**, including in the Xinjiang and **Tibet regions**. China seized control of Tibet in 1950 in what it describes as a "peaceful liberation" from feudalistic serfdom. International human rights groups and exiles, however, have routinely condemned what they call China's oppressive rule in Tibetan areas. Turk, who said his office was engaged in "dialogue" with Beijing, also called for the release of human rights defenders, lawyers, and other people detained for "picking quarrels and making trouble."

b) La surveillance des Tibétains, même en exil

Source: Jessie Lau, “Beijing accuses of using spying, threats and blackmail against Tibetan exiles”, The Guardian, 10 février 2024.

“Thousands of Tibetans around the world have been subjected to spying, blackmail and threats against family members still living in Tibet, according to a new report.

The Chinese government’s repressive policies in Tibet continue to be documented, but the new report by the Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (TCHRD) is the first to investigate the widespread targeting of exiles in countries including the US, India, France, Australia and Canada, researchers say.”

“About 80 to 90% of Tibetan refugees with family living in Tibet have experienced transnational repression, a security official from the Central Tibetan Administration, based in Dharamshala, India, told researchers.”

“Gyal Lo said transnational repression not only severed family connections, but also undermined solidarity among the Tibetan diaspora and reduced their ability to mobilise against Chinese policies in Tibet.”

Source: “Chinese Transnational repression of Tibetan diaspora communities”, TCHRD, 2024.

“Transnational repression (TNR) has been defined by Freedom House as the phenomenon whereby “governments reach across national borders to silence dissent among their diaspora and exile communities.”

“The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) exerts transnational repression against a variety of communities, labelled “the five poisons”: Tibetans, Uyghurs, Taiwanese, Chinese dissidents (including Hong Kong protesters), and Falun Gong practitioners.”

“Although transnational repression campaigns have been practised for decades, their frequency has significantly increased in recent years. The CCP has strengthened its extraterritorial powers to persecute all perceived sources of opposition.”

“An estimated 80 to 90% of Tibetan refugees with family and relatives living in Tibet have experienced TNR, according to a senior official at the security department of the exile Tibetan government.”

“For Tibetans living abroad, it is becoming harder and harder to stay in touch with their families and friends in the region. Those going into exile today have no certainty of ever seeing their relatives again, nor of maintaining any meaningful communication with them. Those who are still in contact must refrain from sharing any personal information that the Chinese authorities could use against them (such as updates on the human rights situation in Tibet), for their conversations are carefully monitored at all times and across all platforms. The authorities also take advantage of family ties and friendships to extract personal information that will then be used against exiled Tibetans:

“I am still able to talk to my family in Tibet about mundane things, but contacts are minimal. I often hear about all communications being closely monitored, especially for families with relatives living in exile.”

(Tenzin from Chamdo City, TAR, now living in India)

“Although I am still able to contact my family in Tibet, we must choose our words wisely and self-censor.”

(Yeshe from Kardze TAP, now living in India)”

“While leaving the PRC may provide a feeling of relief and the impression of relative safety, many exiled Tibetans have realised that the CCP’s surveillance apparatus extends far beyond the borders of China. **It is a known fact that Chinese authorities are actively collecting personal information about exiled Tibetans through direct extortion or espionage.** In many cases, this involves spies planted by the CCP in overseas Tibetan communities, who both gather information and seek to influence diaspora members:

“I tried for many years to obtain a permit to return to Tibet, but in vain. A couple of years ago, police officers from the local Public Security Bureau visited my home and asked my family why I wanted to return and what I had been doing so far in India. Later, the police informed my family that they had learned from a source abroad that I had connections with a Tibetan activist organization in India. Indeed, I had worked for about three months as a driver for a GuChuSum [i.e. a former political prisoners association] in India. I was shocked to find that Chinese authorities were able to collect information about my life in India in such detail.”

(Tsundue from Malho TAP, now living in India)”

“Chinese authorities use diverse methods to control the behaviour of exiled Tibetans abroad (including online), mostly coercing them into renouncing their activism. **The most common method seems to be to threaten the victim’s relatives in Tibet.** In other cases, disengaging from political activities is a necessary condition to obtain a visa to visit one’s family in Tibet.”

“After having been imprisoned in Tibet for three years for publishing a book criticising Chinese policies, I arrived in Australia in 2017 under the political prisoner rehabilitation project. I recently heard that my family in Tibet had been interrogated numerous times by Chinese authorities, and the authorities now know everything about me. As a result, my family members keep urging me to behave; I have to be more careful because I do not want the authorities to harm my family members.”

(Tsepak Kyab from Malho TAP, now living in Australia)

“Going into exile tends to entail a stage of economic precarity - the cost of organising one’s border crossing and journey to a safe destination, but also the administrative and living costs when settling into a new country where one may not have the right to work immediately. **For this reason, while they wait for their new situation to stabilise, exiled Tibetans often rely on money sent by their relatives back in Tibet. By closing this avenue, Chinese authorities seek to impoverish and disempower exiled Tibetans, certainly limiting their capacity for political and cultural advocacy, potentially giving them no choice but to return to Tibet.**”

““In my hometown, there are serious consequences (such as intense interrogations and beatings in detention) for those maintaining contacts with and sending money to exiled relatives. Many of us are facing the same situation.”

(Yonten from Nagchu City, TAR, now living in India)”

Source: Katia Buffetrille (entretien avec Mathilde Domont), « Le Tibet sous occupation chinoise. Quelles menaces pour la population et l'héritage tibétain ? », Institut d'études de géopolitique appliquée, Paris, mars 2023.

« Même si les contrôles sont généralement plus stricts dans la RAT, les régions tibétaines du Kham et l'Amdo ne sont nullement à l'abri des mesures répressives. **On a appris cette année que les relations entre Tibétains du Tibet et Tibétains en exil sont dorénavant criminalisées dans le district de Drago (Kham) et qu'il est interdit aux habitants de communiquer avec leurs parents ou amis résidant en exil.** »

« (le gouvernement chinois) Ce dernier a d'ailleurs lancé depuis plusieurs années des campagnes de publicité pour promouvoir le retour au pays de ces exilés tibétains, faisant miroiter de meilleures perspectives économiques qu'en Inde. Toutefois, les Tibétains qui optent pour le retour savent qu'ils seront l'objet d'une surveillance particulière. »

« Sur la question du contrôle chinois sur la diaspora : le gouvernement chinois étend en effet son contrôle bien au-delà des frontières de l'Inde et du Népal. **La Chine recrute des espions**, notamment parmi les étudiants chinois, mais aussi parmi les Tibétains, les Népalais ou les Indiens, **pour obtenir des informations sur les activités des militants tibétains pro-Dalaï-lama et pro-démocratie.** Dharamsala (Inde), siège du gouvernement en exil, est connu pour être un repaire d'espions à la solde du gouvernement chinois. »

c) La collecte d'ADN, nouvelle technique de surveillance des Tibétains

Source: “Human Rights Council: Repression and forced assimilation of communities in Tibet and Xinjiang”, International Federation for Human Rights, 2022.

“In Tibet, the Chinese authorities continue to systematically apply policies that violate the fundamental rights of Tibetans, in particular under the leadership of President Xi Jinping. It is deeply disturbing that Chinese authorities have significantly increased policing, including **arbitrary collection of DNA from residents (including from children) in many towns and villages throughout the Tibet Autonomous Region.** This further strengthens Beijing’s surveillance capabilities over the Tibetan people and represents a serious intrusion on the right to privacy.”

Source: Katia Buffetrille (entretien avec Mathilde Domont), « Le Tibet sous occupation chinoise. Quelles menaces pour la population et l'héritage tibétain ? », Institut d'études de géopolitique appliquée, Paris, mars 2023.

« Une nouvelle loi promulguée en février 2023 renforce encore la surveillance numérique et la censure dans la RAT (Région Autonome du Tibet), ainsi que le contrôle des Tibétains qui pourraient avoir une activité en ligne jugée critique à l'égard du gouvernement. Des organisations internationales telles que Human Rights Watch ont alerté la communauté internationale en septembre 2022 au sujet du **prélèvement massif d'ADN de Tibétains de tout âge dans la RAT, qui viserait à « améliorer l'efficacité des vérifications et aider à attraper les personnes en fuite », mais ne constitue en fait qu'un moyen supplémentaire de contrôle, tout comme la reconnaissance faciale.** »

« Dans la RAT, en particulier, les libertés religieuses, déjà restreintes, ont été sérieusement diminuées. Or, le bouddhisme tient une place prépondérante dans la vie des Tibétains, comme religion bien sûr, mais aussi comme manifestation identitaire. »

Source: “China: New Evidence of Mass DNA Collection in Tibet”, Human Rights Watch, 2022.

“The available information indicates that people cannot decline providing their DNA and that police do not need credible evidence of any criminal conduct. **A report from Lhasa municipality in April 2022 stated that blood samples for DNA collection were being systematically collected from children at kindergartens and from other local residents.** A report from a Tibetan township in Qinghai province in December 2020 stated that DNA was being collected from all boys aged 5 and above.”

“The Chinese government is already subjecting Tibetans to pervasive repression,” said Sophie Richardson, China director at Human Rights Watch. **“Now the authorities are literally taking blood without consent to strengthen their surveillance capabilities.”**”

“There is no publicly available evidence suggesting people can decline to participate or that police have credible evidence of criminal conduct that might warrant such collection. The reports Human Rights Watch studied indicate that DNA was to be collected from all residents of these areas, including temporary residents. None of the reports indicate any conditions under which a resident could refuse to provide a sample.”

“The purpose of the DNA collection in the Chamdo municipality, one of the seven regions, was described as “improving verification efficiency and helping catch fleeing persons.” In other areas of the region, residents were told similarly that the collection of DNA was needed for general crime detection. As one official report put it, mass collection is necessary “for the public security organs to detect various illegal cases, and to effectively crack down on illegal and criminal elements.”

II/ La législation chinoise au sujet du Dalaï-lama et de sa représentation iconique

Depuis l’occupation du Tibet par la Chine en 1959 et l’exil du Dalaï-lama en Inde, les Tibétains sont soumis à des règles de plus en plus restrictives quant à leur liberté de religion. En effet, si le cadre constitutionnel et législatif (A) semble protéger cette liberté, l’interdiction de l’affichage et de la publication et/ou diffusion d’images du Dalaï-Lama, ainsi que de ses représentations, est de plus en plus stricte (B).

A) Le cadre législatif de la liberté de religion et d’expression

Source: *Constitution de la République populaire de Chine de 1982*, Dijithèque MJP, 2018.

- Article 4§4 :

« **Toutes les nationalités** jouissent de la liberté d'utiliser et de développer leur langue et leur écriture, de conserver ou de réformer leurs usages et coutumes. »

La version en anglais est plus exacte car elle parle de “**all ethnic groups**” et pas de « nationalités » comme en français, ce qui serait **plus correct** au regard de la législation chinoise pour le cas d’un moine tibétain : »

- Article 36 :

« Les citoyens de la République Populaire de Chine jouissent de **la liberté religieuse**.

Aucun organisme d'État, aucun groupement social, aucun individu **ne peut contraindre un citoyen à épouser une religion ou à ne pas la pratiquer, ni adopter une attitude discriminatoire** à l'égard du citoyen croyant ou du citoyen incroyant.

L'État protège les pratiques religieuses normales. Nul ne peut se servir de la religion pour troubler l'ordre social, nuire à la santé des citoyens et entraver l'application du système d'enseignement de l'État.

Les groupements religieux et les affaires religieuses ne sont assujettis à aucune domination étrangère.»

Source: École de politique appliquée, Faculté des lettres et sciences humaines Université de Sherbrooke, « Accord entre la Chine populaire et le Tibet », 1951.

« L'invasion du Tibet par la Chine suscite des protestations, mais les appels à l'aide des Tibétains, qui opposent peu de résistance, n'entraînent **aucune action** de l'Inde ou de l'Organisation des Nations unies (ONU). Alors âgé de 15 ans, le Dalai-Lama, chef spirituel et temporel du Tibet, se met en route pour l'Inde. Des négociations entreprises avec le gouvernement chinois mènent à un accord qui est signé à Beijing en mai 1951. Il prévoit que le Tibet devienne une province sur laquelle la Chine exercera le contrôle dans plusieurs domaines - armée, éducation, finances, etc. - , tout en assurant le **maintien des droits des habitants, le respect de leur religion ainsi que la dignité du Dalai-Lama.**»

« 4. Les **autorités centrales n'altéreront pas le système politique** existant au Tibet, Les autorités centrales ne modifieront pas non plus le statut établi, les fonctions et les pouvoirs du Dalai-Lama. Les responsables des divers rangs resteront à leur poste comme d'habitude.»

« 7. La politique de **liberté de croyances religieuses** inscrite au programme commun de la Conférence consultative politique du peuple chinois sera mise en oeuvre. Les croyances religieuses, les traditions et les coutumes du peuple tibétain seront **respectées**, et les monastères lamaïques seront **protégés**. Les autorités centrales ne toucheront pas aux ressources des monastères. »

Source: *Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law of the People's Republic of China*, Congressional-executive Commission on China, 1984.

“Article 11:

Autonomous agencies in ethnic autonomous areas guarantee the **freedom of religious belief** to citizens of the various nationalities.

No state organ, public organization or individual may compel citizens to believe in, or not to believe in, any religion, nor may they discriminate against citizens who believe in, or do not believe in, any religion.

The state protects normal religious activities. No one may make use of religion to engage in activities that disrupt public order, impair the health of citizens or interfere with the educational system of the state.

Religious bodies and religious affairs shall not be subject to any foreign domination.”

“Article 53:

Autonomous agencies of an ethnic autonomous area shall promote the **civic virtues** of love of the motherland, of the people, of labor, of science and of socialism and conduct education among the citizens of the various nationalities in the area in patriotism, communism and state policies concerning the nationalities. The cadres and masses of the various nationalities must be educated **to trust, learn from and help one another** and to respect the spoken and written languages, folkways and customs and **religious beliefs** of one another in a joint effort to safeguard the unity of the country and the unity of all the nationalities.”

B) La prohibition sur la possession d’images du Dalaï Lama

a) La première interdiction sur les photographies et icônes du Dalaï Lama

Source: « Répression chinoise sur le bouddhisme tibétain. Un rapport publié à l’occasion du second examen périodique universel de la République Populaire de Chine », Fédération Internationale pour les Droits Humains, 2013.

« A partir de **1994**, les autorités chinoises ont lancé une campagne particulièrement agressive contre le dalaï-lama, **interdisant notamment l’affichage de photographies le représentant et forçant les moines et les nonnes à le dénoncer**. Tandis que ces politiques ont tout d’abord été **mises en œuvre dans la Région autonome du Tibet**, elles ont progressivement été imposées dans les **régions orientales du plateau tibétain**, où les Tibétains avaient auparavant davantage la possibilité de s’exprimer et de pratiquer leur religion. »

« Pour mener ce que le PCC appelle une « **guerre contre le sabotage sécessionniste** », le gouvernement chinois essaie d’**ébranler la pratique du bouddhisme tibétain et de remplacer**, dans le cœur et les esprits tibétains, la loyauté envers le dalaï-lama par une **fidélité au Parti-État chinois**, sapant ainsi les racines même de l’identité nationale tibétaine.

Au cours des deux dernières décennies, cette approche a mené à la **mise en place de mécanismes administratifs et légaux** qui permettent aux autorités de **lutter contre toute activité religieuse** perçue comme une **menace à la stabilité sociale et à l’unité de la nation**, tout en affirmant agir en respect de « l’état de droit ». »

« Depuis le milieu des années **1990**, le **durcissement des restrictions sur la liberté religieuse** dans les régions tibétaines reflète l’orientation générale de la politique religieuse en Chine. Toutefois, la répression contre les monastères et les couvents peut également être considérée comme faisant partie d’un effort plus large pour **réprimer la dissidence tibétaine** à travers un mélange de propagande, de rééducation, de réglementation administrative, de punitions et de mesures sécuritaires de plus en plus sophistiquées. »

« Les représentants du gouvernement de la RPC affirment parfois qu’il **n’existe aucune loi interdisant la détention ou l’exposition d’images du dalaï-lama**, mais qu’en vérité la plupart des Tibétains ont choisi de ne pas afficher sa photo. Cette affirmation ne correspond **pas à la réalité** : les fonctionnaires continuent **d’enlever les photos du dalaï-lama des monastères et des domiciles privés** et la

vénération publique du dalai-lama reste interdite. Dans certains monastères où les moines ont participé aux manifestations de 2008, des policiers armés ont apposé un tampon sur les images du dalai-lama ou l'y ont défiguré.

Bien qu'il **n'existe aucune mesure juridique** connue concernant **l'interdiction formelle de l'affichage d'images du dalai-lama**, les origines de cette **pratique remontent** au « Troisième Forum sur le travail au Tibet » en **1994**. Après cette importante réunion stratégique sur le Tibet des décideurs politiques de la RPC, un « avis consultatif » probablement inspiré par des **ordres non publiés du Parti** a été émis par « l'Association bouddhiste chinoise » en 1996. Les restrictions sur la vente, la réimpression et la possession de portraits du dalai-lama ont été **réitérées dans des déclarations publiques** et des **réglementations régionales et locales** depuis la formulation de ces politiques en 1994, et ce, malgré différentes nuances, et malgré la distinction entre lieux publics et monastères ainsi qu'entre les groupes ciblés, à savoir les moines et les nonnes, et la population en général. »

« Ces nouvelles mesures affecteront près de la **moitié de la zone** que le gouvernement chinois désigne comme « **Région autonome du Tibet** » et un peu **plus de la moitié des Tibétains** résidant dans les **régions autonomes tibétaines de Chine**. Elles instituent un **contrôle plus fort et poussé** de l'activité religieuse au Tibet. »

« Le 10 mars 2010, certains moines du monastère de Ditsa, qui regroupe plus de 400 moines dans la province de l'Amdo, ont **diffusé des brochures et collé des affiches**, dans l'enceinte du monastère, pour exprimer leur **loyauté envers le dalai-lama** et appeler à un « Tibet libre ». Selon certains Tibétains en exil qui sont en contact avec des Tibétains de la région, au moins **30 agents de sécurité** sont arrivés au monastère et ont été rejoints plus tard dans la journée par **plus de 100 autres**. Ceux-ci ont **détenu** Jamyang, un moine de 18 ans du comté de Tsigortang (en chinois : Xinghai), dans la préfecture autonome tibétaine de Tsolho (en chinois: Hainan) située dans la province du Qinghai, ainsi que Yeshe, un autre moine de 19 ans du même comté de Tsigortang, et Tulku Woesser, un lama réincarné d'une trentaine d'années qui a été libéré après trois jours d'interrogatoire. »

Source: “Chinese occupation of Tibet”, FreeTibet, 2024.

“The CCP has attempted to erase the Dalai Lama from Tibet. Possessing pictures of the Dalai Lama or mentioning him in public can result in **imprisonment and torture.**”

Source: “The Dalai Lama and Tibet”, FreeTibet, 2024.

“China **strongly criticises the Dalai Lama both inside and outside Tibet**. It accuses him of seeking to rule Tibet and being a “splittist” who seeks Tibetan independence. **His image is banned inside Tibet and Tibetans may be jailed for calling for his long life or publicly praising him.** In jail, as well as in religious institutions, Tibetans are frequently ordered to denounce the Dalai Lama.”

Source: Alloncle Michel, *Restrictions à la liberté du culte au Tibet avec la Question de Monsieur Alloncle Michel*, 1996.

« M. Michel Alloncle attire l'attention de M. le ministre des affaires étrangères sur les restrictions drastiques à la liberté du culte au Tibet et le durcissement radical de la Chine à l'encontre du dalai-lama, chef spirituel du bouddhisme tibétain. En effet, selon des sources chinoises, le dalai-lama, Prix Nobel de la paix, n'est plus considéré comme un « chef religieux » par les autorités de Pékin qui viennent

d'interdire toute possession ou affichage de ses photographies, tant dans les lieux de culte qu'à titre privé. »

Source: *Réponse du Ministère des affaires étrangères, 1996.*

« Les informations dont le gouvernement français dispose confirment effectivement que le **comité régional pour les minorités et les affaires religieuses du Tibet** s'est réuni le 4 avril dernier et a incité les participants, issus de l'administration et des monastères tibétains, à « **bannir progressivement les photographies du dalaï-lama dans les temples et à éradiquer l'influence des forces séparatistes du dalaï-lama** ». Le Quotidien du Tibet du 5 avril rapporte, par ailleurs, que deux circulaires issues du même comité et un règlement du bureau des affaires religieuses du Conseil des affaires d'État (gouvernement chinois) incitent à convaincre religieux et croyants que « le dalaï-lama n'est plus un chef religieux, mais une **personne coupable envers la patrie et le peuple** ». Par la suite, le même journal chinois s'est fondé le 13 mai sur les instructions du président chinois Jiang Zemin lors de la cinquième session plénière du quatorzième comité central du PCC **pour confirmer l'interdiction de détenir des photographies du dalaï-lama** et inciter à « l'affaiblissement de l'influence de la religion au Tibet ». Cette **interdiction** semble avoir été **mise en pratique début mai** dans les hôtels et les restaurants, les écoles et les monastères ; des perquisitions de domiciles privés semblent par ailleurs avoir été conduites. »

Source: Getzelman Sarah, “Forbidden Image The 1996 Chinese Ban of the Fourteenth Dalai Lama’s Image”, juin 2022.

“The operations of the Chinese government follow a **pattern difficult to trace**: the **announcement of the ban or order is made by the official to the media**, this information is **related to the people through the local newspapers**, and the ban or **order is enforced by lower ranking officials** thereafter. Though the date of this newspaper ban is debated, April 5 is cited in “Artist Found Traumatized After Alleged Torture,” World Tibet Network News (TIN), November 26, 1996. In Lhasa, a Tibetan commented on the ban to a member of the Tibetan Information Network: “This act has made us feel resentful, and deep ill feeling has been surfacing amongst Tibetans here.””

“**On April 5, 1996**, Tibetan newspapers announced **the absolute ban on all images of the Dalai Lama**. In a calculated move, officials decided to **introduce the ban gradually**. A group of enforcement officials visited public buildings in Lhasa on April 24th to further ensure enforcement of the ban.”

“On May 16th, **all middle and secondary school children** were **informed** that the **possession of Dalai Lama images would no longer be permitted**. Official work teams arrived at **several monasteries** to ensure the **ban was followed**. To a lesser degree, the ban had actually **begun two years earlier** with the enforced restriction of religious materials in TAR governmental offices.”

“The first stage of the **anti-image agenda** was enacted when **all governmental officials within the TAR were completely banned from any displays of religious affiliation**. This same time period brought about several new restrictions to be followed by the monasteries; **the most severe repercussions were executed against those responsible for an image of the Dalai Lama on the premises.**”

“In Shigatse, the second largest city in Tibet, **public announcements** were made on loudspeakers **informing Tibetans that anyone with photos of the Dalai Lama would be required to surrender them to officials.**”

“Pictures of the Dalai Lama with the Tibetan national flag are even ‘more’ illegal.”

“On May 7, 1996, the **majority of the monks at nearby Ganden monastery chose to refuse cooperation** with government officials. Rather than sign documents denouncing the Dalai Lama, these monks either returned to their villages or attempted escape through the Himalayas.”

“Ten years have passed since the umbrella ban on all images of Tenzin Gyatso in Tibet. Have the Chinese authorities achieved their goal? **If the objective was to lessen outward signs of independence, then it has been a success.**”

“During a recent visit to Tibet, I noted numerous instances of **people surreptitiously defying the ban**. I spotted one monk working on a painting, and though he was initially hesitant as I approached, he quickly showed me a painting sitting next to him—a **portrait of the Dalai Lama**. I was allowed to enter his living quarters where **another image of the Dalai Lama was displayed prominently in the center of the room**. The **risk** involved in creating such images is **obviously great**. However, the importance of practicing one’s faith seems to have superseded the Chinese government’s policies. Thus, the **Tibetans continue to create and possess images of the Fourteenth Dalai Lama.**”

Source: Wee, Sui-Lee, “China lifts 17-year ban on Dalai Lama photos at Tibet monastery”, 2013.

“Chinese officials have **lifted a ban on Tibetan monks displaying photographs of the Dalai Lama at a prominent monastery**, a rights group said on Thursday, an unexpected policy shift which could ease tensions in the restive region.

The decision concerning **the Gaden monastery in the Tibetan capital Lhasa** - one of the most historically important religious establishments in Tibet - **reversed a ban introduced in 1996**, the Britain-based Free Tibet group told Reuters, citing sources with direct knowledge of the situation.”

“Chinese officials in western Qinghai province are **also considering lifting a ban on Tibetans displaying pictures of the exiled spiritual leader**, according to the International Campaign for Tibet, a U.S.-based advocacy group.”

“Beijing **considers the Dalai Lama**, who fled China in 1959 after an abortive uprising against Chinese rule, **a violent separatist.**”

Source: *2023 Report on International Religious Freedom: China (Includes Hong Kong, Macau, Tibet, and Xinjiang)*, U.S. Department of State Office of International Religious Freedom, 2023.

“Nongovernmental organizations (NGO) and media outlets reported **authorities continued to arrest individuals for possessing photographs of and materials concerning the Dalai Lama and for celebrating his birthday.**”

“**Images of the Dalai Lama were banned**, with **harsh repercussions for owning or displaying his image**. Repression, including **arbitrary surveillance**, increased around politically sensitive events, religious anniversaries, cultural events with religious components, and the Dalai Lama’s birthday.”

“In some counties of the TAR, **punishments for displaying images of the Dalai Lama included expulsion from monasteries.**”

b) La prohibition étendue au contenu multimédia et à la sphère digitale

Source: Dalha Tenzin, “Chinese Censorship vs Tibetan Activism On Social Media”, 2016.

“Today, in the age of social media with a global network of online supporters at disposal, protests are no longer ‘local’. This fast and unpredictable reach of activists certainly has **Beijing worried**. **Consequently**, China has been **cracking down hard on internet users** who demonstrate sympathy and support for the Tibetan cause, **blocking avenues for the spread of all relevant information.**”

“Ban on Social Network sites in China

In China **many of the popular global social networking sites are blocked** while their **indigenous social media platforms are heavily censored**. The world’s most populous country is a part of the infamous SICK group of countries (Syria, Iran, China and North Korea) that has **banned Facebook**.

According to Steven Millward, Tech blogger and China editor at TechInAsia.com, **China’s extensive internet surveillance system**, the “**Great Firewall of China**,” **restricts access to popular foreign websites** such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube. China, which boasts of the world’s largest online population as well, says its online censorship policies are aimed at maintaining social stability, and that it will help stop the spread of false rumours and inappropriate materials.

However, Millward notes that there could be up to 700,000 Facebook users in China, despite the official ban. **Facebook has been blocked in China since 2009**, when Uighur activists made a series of online posts on the site encouraging protests in the northwest region of Xinjiang.”

“The government also **censors the internet and maintains highly repressive policies in areas where ethnic minorities live**, like **Tibet**, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia.”

“Although the government **continues to block websites run by human rights groups, foreign news outlets**, the Google search engine and social media sites such as Facebook, **the rise of Chinese online social media**, in particular Sina Weibo, and WeChat, has created a **new platform for citizens** to express opinions and to **challenge official limitations of freedom of speech despite intense scrutiny by China’s censors**.

According to an anonymous Chinese technology blogger, the **government web censorship filtering system blocks access to particular articles on the internet** that could be related to the Tibetan issue using a **highly sophisticated keyword filtering mechanism.**”

“Web users in China are **not able to access news reports** if they contain **keywords such as “Tibet”, “riot”, “violence” and “Lhasa”**. According to a study, out of **more than 1.3 million** (or more than 16 percent) **of messages screened by the authorities** on Weibo, were **deleted**. **Messages containing certain phrases, like “Tibet,” “freedom” and “Dalai Lama” were more likely to be flagged by the Chinese government.**”

“More importantly, the research suggests that **China’s censors are dynamic, often deleting messages as they appear in real time.** Messages originating from restive Tibetan area, for example, face **much higher levels of censorship** than those from the rest of China, with up to **53 percent of all messages being deleted.** In 2012, Weibo started requiring users to register with their real names, under orders from the government, which has led to a lot more self-censorship.”

“However, **Chinese authorities argue that they are simply ‘regulating’ and not censoring online content.** Lu Wei, Chinese politician and the senior executive official in charge of cyber security and Internet policy in China said that **the country doesn’t censor online content, but like most countries, regulates it.** He argues, “If we really censor the Internet, how come our Internet user population and their reliance on the Internet keep growing?””

“According to Lobsang Gyatso Sither, Digital Security Program Manager at Tibet Action Institute, with the development of technology in Tibet and in exile, **WeChat has become an easy mode of communication.** However, he quickly added that the **technology comes with its own risks including arrests of many Tibetans for sharing information.**”

Source: Zamlha Tempa Gyaltzen, “The Snooping Dragon: How China Keeps its Pulse on Tibet Tenzin Dalha”, novembre 2023.

“In **2013**, administration of the Great Firewall shifted to the **Cyberspace Administration of China** (Horsley 2022). **Regulation over internet access** has grown more comprehensive, specific, and extensive with the State Council giving the CAC overall responsibility for internet supervision. The authoritarian government has **increasingly trampled on the rights of people in Tibet**, Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and Inner Mongolia amongst others. Criticisms of its actions based on international law or human rights norms are increasingly rebuffed by the Chinese government on grounds of national sovereignty and “internal affairs”. **The CCP has responded with stepped-up repression** over the past decade—**jailing dissidents, mobilizing security forces, censoring information, and preempting popular unrest.**”

“Most **VPNs** providers also make it possible for them to remain anonymous online, so that even the ISP cannot track or monitor their online activity. Using dedicated connections and virtual tunneling, a VPN provides the user with privacy, security, and the freedom to browse the internet without fear. Under the authority of the **newly appointed CCP secretary of the so-called Tibet Autonomous Region, Wang Zunzheng**, this **last vestige of internet freedom**, this haven for activists and journalists resisting one of the most despotic regimes on earth is being **intensely censored.**

The **Chinese** authorities frequently **advise Tibetans not to engage in any antisocial activities including contacting their family members and acquaintances outside Tibet.** Families fracture as a result. Many **Tibetans** are **detained under vague and fictitious charges** such as ‘leaking state secrets’ and ‘inciting separatism.’ Tibetan are jailed and interrogated with no apparent evidence of any wrongdoing. Interrogation has led to forced confessions. Tibetans are **subjected to arbitrary arrests, detention, and torture for exercising their rights and freedom of expression in cyberspace.** Since the **implementation of laws**, it has resulted in **more scrutiny and direct suppression of freedom of expression and rights to privacy.** The law announced tougher punishment creating “public disorder

by engaging in separatist acts. The law is a strategic move by CCP to **create more communication barriers between the Tibetans inside and outside.**”

“Beijing’s stupendous growth and **deployment of intensive use of high-tech surveillance and new cyber law** has further stifled the voices of the people, enhanced monitoring of Tibetans leading to **further infringement of their freedom of expression and enforcing greater self-censorship**. High-tech algorithms in Tibet and globally have come with little to no transparency or accountability. **Chinese cyber security law** dissuades people from freely expressing their thoughts online, thus it further stifles free expression and reduces them as a sitting duck, **targeted by a hyper-vigilant algorithm-based preventive policing apparatus.**”

“Furthermore, **profiling of Tibetans including mass DNA collection drive to create a biological database to intensify the monitoring and surveillance of Tibetans** is a complete violation of their fundamental human rights.”

Source: “Weaponising Big Data: Decoding China’s digital surveillance in Tibet”, Tibet Watch, février 2024.

“Before the launch of the National Anti-Fraud Centre app in 2021, WeChat was a principal source of information used by researchers and journalists to monitor different emerging issues ranging from trending topics, blogs, and ‘moments’ to audio-visual contents and recordings of Buddhist teachings **For the first time, virtual chat groups directly accessible on smartphones allowed direct individual and group discussions between Tibetans from different regions of Tibet and the exile.**”

“However, the **growing number of chat groups and their members inevitably came under state surveillance**. This resulted in **detention of Tibetans**, suspension of accounts, and **ban on keywords** deemed politically sensitive by the cyberspace authorities. As a result, Tibetans both in the PRC and in exile have consciously **learned to self-censor the keywords** in both written and spoken languages, and instead use codewords during online communication with each other.”

“**Surveillance and self-censorship are particularly heightened on politically charged anniversaries or days of cultural significance** such as 6 July, the Dalai Lama’s birthday and 10 March, Tibetan National Uprising day in 1959 (and anniversary of the 2008 protests that swept across Tibet, leading to a crackdown of unprecedented scope and intensity).”

“In a voice message heard by Tibet Watch in December 2023, a Tibetan mother in Lhasa told her recently married son to tell his wife to **stop contacting her because she had an image of the Dalai Lama on her WeChat profile**. The mother referred to this as a photo of the Buddha, knowing her son and his wife would understand. The message followed a WeChat call the daughter-in-law made to her from India after which the latter found that except for her, **everyone in their family chat group had disappeared**. An eight-year-old Tibetan girl, now in exile, **consistently used Lama, a general honorific title for spiritual leaders** in Tibetan Buddhism, instead of other specific words Tibetans normally use for the Dalai Lama, such as Gyalwa Rinpoche (འགྲུབ་བ་རིན་པོ་ཆེ།) and Gongsa Chok (འགོང་ས་མཚོ།)”

Source: “Wave of Arrests Across Eastern Tibet After Digital Search Operations: Six of those arrested have been identified while details of around 30 others are yet to be ascertained”, FreeTibet, juillet 2021.

“Sources in eastern Tibet have told Tibet Watch of around **30 arrests connected to the birthday celebrations of the 14th Dalai Lama**. Details of the majority of those arrested are yet to be confirmed but the arrests are **connected to increased digital surveillance operations in the area.**”

“**Two Tibetans** in their 40s, Kunchok Tashi and Dzapo, were **arrested for allegedly sharing photos of the Dalai Lama on social media** and encouraging others to recite Tibetan prayers on the occasion of his 86th birthday on 6 July.”

“**Chinese authorities** arrived unannounced and methodically **conducted digital search operations** in Golog and Serthar County earlier this month. On 13 July, **four Tibetans**, Loga, Dather, Wangchuk Kyi, and Rinchen Sangpo, were **arbitrarily detained by authorities** after the **contents of their phones were investigated and digitally searched** under suspicion of keeping photos of their revered exiled spiritual leader, His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama.”

“Ahead of the Dalai Lama’s 86th birthday, in addition to the **prohibition of visible manifestations of faith to the Dalai Lama like religious events, his photos and videos**, **Chinese authorities also banned symbolic cultural practices** such as throwing prayer flags in the sky and offering Sang - powdered incense- in the region of Serthar and Golok of eastern Tibet.”

“**Social media chat groups, their founders and members are monitored heavily by Chinese authorities**, such as the young teenager, Dadul who was beaten and left with broken legs, and Rinchen Tsultrim, a committed language advocate, who was **sentenced to four years and six months.**”

Source: “Annual Report Human Rights Situation in Tibet 2023”, Tibet Centre For Human Rights and Democracy, 2024.

“Chinese authorities continued to maintain **a strong grip on online spaces by introducing a revised law on counter-espionage** that came into effect on 1 July, which imposed further restrictions on the right to privacy and freedom of expression. An equally repressive central government directive issued in 2022 called the « Measures for Rewards for Citizens Reporting Behaviors Endangering National Security” had already laid the grounds for the revised counter-espionage law by **introducing a reward mechanism for citizens reporting to the authorities about so-called acts of ‘endangering national security.**”

“While **any content related to His Holiness the Dalai Lama is routinely and diligently censored online**, an edited footage of the exiled Tibetan spiritual leader was allowed to be widely shared on the Chinese cyberspace sometime in April 2023. **For decades, Chinese authorities have heavily censored any content related to the Dalai Lama**, to the extent that households and **mobile phones are often inspected for hidden images or portraits** of the Tibetan spiritual leader.”

“The footage mentioned above was an edited version that contained defamatory content against the Dalai Lama. But when a netizen shared **the unedited version of the same video on 17 April**, the person was **barred from posting or sharing further content on his Douyin account.**”

“In keeping with its long-standing ban on Dalai Lama’s photos, Chinese authorities on 26 October detained a Tibetan woman named Wangchuk Tso in an undisclosed location in Dronglung township in Dola (Ch: Qilian) County, Tsojang (Ch: Haibei) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, for sharing a photo of the Dalai Lama in online groups on Douyin and WeChat as well as sending messages to Tibetans living overseas.”

“The online groups became popular among devout Tibetans who **actively used them to share information and offer prayers for those affected by the pandemic.**”

“Yangtso was **detained** on 2 March after a **phone search revealed that she had contacted people overseas and sent photos.**”

“While **online spaces have remained under heavy restrictions**, local Tibetans have for years found it **nearly impossible to express their views** through public protest and demonstration.”

Source: Pelbar, “China clamps down on social media ahead of Dalai Lama’s birthday”, 02 juillet 2024.

“The Chinese government is **intensifying already stringent social media restrictions on Tibetans** to keep them from celebrating the July 6 birthday of the Dalai Lama, two Tibetan sources said.

Authorities **already ban the possession of photos of the Tibetan Buddhist leader, who turns 89, and posting images of him or religious symbols on social media.**

But during the **past three weeks**, authorities have more frequently and **rigorously checked the cell phones** of Tibetan travelers to ensure they have **not downloaded any photos**, said the sources who live inside the western region of China and who requested anonymity for safety reasons.

Police also have summoned individuals deemed suspicious to local offices to warn them **not to contact family members living outside the Tibet Autonomous Region**, they said.”

“Every year, authorities **intensify their monitoring of Tibetans in the run-up to the birthday of the Dalai Lama**, who has lived in exile in northern India since 1959 and is viewed by China as a “splittist” seeking independence for Tibet.”

“The second Tibetan said **whenever he travels from Lhasa to Shigatse**, the region’s second-largest city, **authorities now closely monitor his mobile phone.** “I am questioned about **whether I possess a photo of the Dalai Lama or if I have been in contact with anyone,**” he said.

In Golog Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in southeastern Qinghai province, Chinese officials and monastery heads have ramped up propaganda efforts, **urging Tibetans to exercise caution and self-control on social media.**”

Source: *2023 Report on International Religious Freedom: China (Includes Hong Kong, Macau, Tibet, and Xinjiang)*, U.S. Department of State Office of International Religious Freedom, 2023.

“**Regulations** known as the “20 Prohibitions” **forbid monks from using social media** to “incite subversion, defame or insult others, assist extremist religious groups, provide undisclosed information of the state to domestic or foreign individuals or organizations, or receive or release illegal information.” **Individuals who “misuse” social media may be imprisoned for up to eight years.**

National measures promulgated in 2022 **ban unauthorized domestic online religious content and prohibit overseas organizations and individuals** from operating **online religious information services in Tibet.**”

“Human rights organizations and media reported **authorities exercised strict control over telephone and online communications in Tibetan areas.** As a result, some **disappearances, arrests, detentions, deaths, and destruction of religious property** that occurred in prior years **only became known during 2023.** The government **continued to control access to Tibetan areas, limiting the spread of information** and making it difficult to ascertain the exact number of individuals imprisoned because of their religious beliefs or affiliation, determine the charges brought against them, or assess the extent and severity of abuses they suffered.”

Source: “Tibetan teacher detained for expressing joy over Dalai Lama’s video put under house arrest and fired from work”, TCHRD, mai 2023.

“The freely shared video of His Holiness on Chinese cyberspace was a rare discovery for any online user living behind the Great Firewall. For decades, **Chinese authorities have heavily censored any content related to His Holiness,** to the extent that **households and mobile phones are often inspected for hidden images or portraits** of the Tibetan spiritual leader. Even those sending prayer requests to the Dalai Lama’s private office are being subjected to heavy interrogation and punishment including detention.”

Source: Newsdesk Phayul, “Tibetan woman arrested for sharing photo of Dalai Lama”, novembre 2023.

“A Tibetan woman named Wangchuk Tso has reportedly been **arrested on October 26, 2023 by Chinese authorities for sharing a photo of Tibetan spiritual leader His Holiness the Dalai Lama in a WeChat group.**”

“Tibetans under Chinese rule since Tibet’s annexation in 1959 have seen various shades of repression and restrictions, particularly when it comes to anything related to exiled leader and Buddhist figure His Holiness the Dalai Lama. **Keeping his photo and sharing it in Tibet attracts severe punishment including imprisonment, torture and even forfeiture of government benefits.**”

Source: “Tibetan monk sentenced following secret trial: Jampa Choepel was arrested at his monastery after an online post about Dalai Lama, sentenced to a year and half in prison”, FreeTibet, 26 septembre 2024.

“A **Tibetan monk was sentenced to one and a half years in prison** in August following a secret trial.”

“Jampa was arrested in March at Penkarthang Monastery in Rebkong County, eastern Tibet. On 10 March, Tibetan Uprising Day, he had **published a post about the teachings of the Dalai Lama on the background of his WeChat account.**”

Source: “Tibetan monk imprisoned for Dalai Lama pictures released after two years”, Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, 2017.

“A Tibetan monk was released from prison last month after serving **two years sentence for storing pictures of the Tibetan spiritual leader His Holiness the Dalai Lama** and for sharing the same on social media.”

Source: Kunchok Sangyal, “China arrests Tibetan woman for contacting people outside the region”, juin 2023.

“Police **arrested** Yangtso, 23, from the town of Shigatse on March 2, after **checking her cell phone and seeing that she contacted and sent photos to people outside the Tibet Autonomous Region.**”

III/ Les conditions de détention dans les prisons en Chine

La Chine est difficile à appréhender, le Parti Communiste Chinois maintient dans l’opacité les effets de sa politique pénale. Cependant, on distingue une pratique générale en matière de détention consistant en une très fréquente incarcération des personnes poursuivies et condamnées (A) et des pratiques plus officieuses mélangeant différentes formes de privation de liberté et de contraintes (B). Enfin, le Tibet n’échappe pas la politique répressive du gouvernement, et de nombreux témoignages tendent à dénoncer l’existence de peines, traitements inhumains ou dégradants, voire de torture, de risque de disparition forcée et de mort en détention (C).

A) La pratique générale de la République Populaire de Chine en matière de détention

Source: Martine Bulard, « Défendre le Tibet sans (forcément) encenser le dalaï-lama », Les blogs du «Diplo», 2008.

« On vient d’apprendre que la femme de M. Hu Jia, l’un des animateurs du mouvement des avocats **condamné à trois ans et demi de prison, a disparu de son domicile, où elle était assignée à résidence** »

Source: Han Dongfang, « En Chine, colère cherche syndicats », Le Monde Diplomatique, 2014.

« Le pouvoir doit comprendre qu’il **ne peut régler les problèmes en emprisonnant les protestataires** - généralement, il enferme les meneurs durant quelques jours, mais certains restent en détention plus longtemps - et en ignorant les causes des conflits. »

Source: Le Monde avec AFP, « En Chine, plus de 99 % des personnes poursuivies par la justice jugées coupables en 2015 », Le Monde, 2016

« En 2015, **près de 100 % des personnes poursuivies devant des tribunaux chinois ont été reconnues coupables**, selon le rapport annuel de la Cour suprême rendu public dimanche 13 mars. [...] **Au total, 1 039 personnes ont été jugées « innocentes » l’an dernier**, a détaillé le président de la haute instance, Zhou Qiang, en présentant le texte devant l’Assemblée nationale populaire (ANP), la chambre d’enregistrement législative du régime. **En revanche, 1,232 million d’accusés ont été reconnus coupables, portant le taux de condamnation à 99,92 %.** »

Source: “Well-known labour activists detained by Shenzhen police”, China Labour Bulletin, 2019.

“At least five Chinese labour activists have been detained in what appears to be a coordinated police crackdown late on the evening of 20 January.

[...]

It is possible that, in the light of the Jasic case and the high-profile worker activism in Shenzhen – there have been at least 17 strikes and protests in the municipality since 1 October last year - the authorities have decided to take **resolute action against the labour activists** who are dedicated to helping workers defend their legal rights. **Wu Guijun first came to light as an activist in 2013** when he organized workers at Hong Kong-owned furniture maker Diweixin in Shenzhen in protest at the company’s refusal to discuss compensation for the planned closure and relocation of the factory. **He was detained for more than a year before being released without charge in June 2014.”**

Source: “Labour activist Chen Weixiang released from detention”, China Labour Bulletin, 2020.

“Chen was the latest activist to be detained simply for helping disadvantaged workers defend their rights. Last year began with the detention of three labour activists and citizen journalists from iLabour who had been helping migrant workers with occupational disease defend their rights. Around the same time, Shenzhen police detained **five activists including well-known campaigners** Zhang Zhiru and Wu Guijun. **Prominent anti-discrimination activist** Cheng Yuan, and his two colleagues, Liu Dazhi and Wu Gejianxiong, were detained by the authorities in Changsha in July, and several **well-known social workers** who had been helping migrant workers in Beijing, Guangzhou and Shenzhen were detained in coordinated raids in May. In late October, **#MeToo activist** and journalist Huang Xueqin was also detained by the authorities in Guangzhou. **Some of the activists were quietly released without charge while others have been formally charged and await trial.”**

Source: Xinhua, “China prosecutes over 1.81m criminal suspects in 2019”, China Daily, 2020.

“Procuratorates across China approved the **arrests of over 1.08 million criminal suspects and prosecuted more than 1.81 million in 2019**, according to a meeting of chief procurators held in Beijing this weekend.”

Source: *New system that offers more lenient sentences boosts judicial efficiency*, The Supreme People’s Court of the People’s Republic of China, 2020.

“The report was submitted to the bimonthly session of the National People’s Congress Standing Committee, the country’s top legislature, for review.

The number of offenders brought before courts by prosecutors each year rose from 824,000 in 1999 to 2.2 million last year, Zhang said, adding that the types of crimes being prosecuted had changed a great deal.”

“From January 2019 to August, more than 1.41 million criminal cases were finalized through application of the system, the report said.”

Source: Tenzin Dalha, “From Public Space To Cyberspace: The CCP’s Increasing Oppression Of Tibet”, Tibet Policy Institute, 2020.

“All political prisoners are denied access to subsidies, government jobs and restrictions are further extended to the members of their family”

Source: *Assessment of human rights concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, People’s Republic of China*, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2022.

“OHCHR notes that China has in general a 99.9 per cent conviction rate in criminal cases. The Government has stated that in many counties the proportion of defendants of ethnic minorities in criminal convictions is lower than the proportion of ethnic minorities in the total population of that region, without providing disaggregated data for the proportion of ethnic minorities convicted for terrorism or state security related crimes.

60. The Government has stated that between 2013 and 2017, the XUAR courts completed 297,000 criminal cases. Based on official statistics, it would appear that the bulk of these cases were completed in 2017. According to the Government’s information, **the number of detainees in public security agencies in XUAR increased by 35 per cent in 2017 and by about eight per cent in 2018 year on year.”**

“65. OHCHR also reviewed numerous reporting and data documenting the arrest and imprisonment, often on lengthy custodial sentences, of prominent scholars, artists, and intellectuals from the Uyghur community, including during the “Strike Hard” period. Several such cases have been taken up by UN human rights mechanisms. Beyond the general Human rights concerns already identified, criminal prosecution and detention of such individuals has a broader deleterious effect on the life of their community.”

“67. While a specific determination of the extent to which the dramatic increase in incarceration rates over recent years has resulted in arbitrary detention is not possible based on the information available at this stage, the information reviewed by OHCHR raises wider concerns. This is in the context of how a criminal justice system, marked by overly broad and vague definitions of crimes, limits on due process rights, and lack of judicial independence, may be leading to broader patterns of arbitrary deprivation of liberty in the context of the criminal justice system.”

Source: “Call for the release of human rights defenders Huang Xueqin and Wang Jianbing”, International Federation for Human Rights, septembre 2023.

“Today sees the start of the trial of journalist and #Metoo activist Sophia Huang Xueqin and labour activist Wang Jianbing, after two years of arbitrary detention. Civil society organisations, including the FIDH and the World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT) within the framework of the Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders, express their deep concern about their conditions of detention and call for their immediate and unconditional release.

[...]

The health condition of Sophia Huang Xueqin is alarming as she is believed to have experienced significant weight loss and amenorrhea (no menstruation) for at least five months. Credible reports indicate that her sleep is often interrupted and that she has been subjected to interrogations in the middle of the night.”

Source: « La situation des droits humains dans le monde », Amnesty International, 23 avril 2024.

« **Des personnes ayant participé aux événements rendant hommage aux victimes d'un incendie survenu en novembre 2022** dans un immeuble d'habitation à Ürümqi, capitale de la région autonome ouïghoure du Xinjiang, **et à d'autres manifestations connexes contre les sévères restrictions liées à la pandémie de COVID-19** (surnommées « manifestations A4 » ou « révolte des feuilles blanches », car les protestataires brandissaient des feuilles de papier vierges) **subissaient toujours diverses formes de harcèlement. Parmi les dizaines de personnes** qui auraient été arrêtées (des jeunes pour la plupart) figuraient Cao Zhixin, Li Yuanjing, Zhai Dengrui et Li Siqi, **qui ont été libérées sous caution en avril après environ quatre mois de détention.** »

« **Des militant·e·s de premier plan ont été condamnés à de lourdes peines d'emprisonnement**, comme le juriste Xu Zhiyong et l'avocat spécialisé dans la défense des droits humains Ding Jiayi, qui ont été condamnés respectivement à 14 et 12 années de prison après avoir été déclarés coupables de « subversion de l'État » en 2022. Ces deux hommes figuraient parmi des dizaines de personnes prises pour cibles après avoir assisté en 2019 à une réunion informelle au cours de laquelle avaient été abordées la situation de la société civile et l'actualité chinoise. **En juin, le défenseur des droits humains Chang Weiping a été condamné à trois ans et demi d'emprisonnement pour « subversion de l'État » après avoir raconté des actes de torture qu'il disait avoir subis lors de sa détention en 2020 en lien avec cette réunion.** Il avait été déclaré coupable à l'issue d'un procès à huis clos près d'un an plus tôt. En avril, la police a arrêté Yu Wensheng, avocat spécialisé dans la défense des droits humains, et son épouse, Xu Yan, alors qu'ils allaient rencontrer des diplomates de la délégation de l'UE à Pékin. Ils ont tous deux été inculpés en octobre pour « avoir cherché à provoquer des conflits » et pour « incitation à la subversion de l'État ». Yu Wensheng avait déjà été emprisonné précédemment pour son travail en faveur des droits humains. **La journaliste citoyenne Zhang Zhan, qui avait été arrêtée en mai 2020 puis condamnée à quatre ans d'emprisonnement, a été admise à l'hôpital d'une prison de Shanghai en juillet à la suite de la détérioration de son état de santé due à la grève de la faim qu'elle menait.** »

Source: “World Prison Population List (14th edition)”, World Prison Brief, 01 mai 2024.

“There are nearly 1.8 million prisoners in the United States of America, **1.69 million in China (plus unknown numbers in pre-trial detention and other forms of detention)**”

“China :

- **Prison population total : 1,690,000**
- Date : 31.12.18
- Estimated national population : 1,418b
- Prison Population Rate : 119

(note de bas de page) The China figures are for sentenced prisoners only. **Figures for pre-trial detention and other forms of detention are not available; more than 650,000 were so held in 2009** (Supreme People's Procuratorate). **In addition, it is widely reported that more than a million Uighur Muslims are detained in camps** in Xinjiang province.”

Source: « La réincarcération de la militante Zhang Zhan met en évidence l'intolérance de Pékin à l'égard de la dissidence », Amnesty International, 04 septembre 2024.

« **Les autorités chinoises doivent cesser de persécuter la journaliste citoyenne Zhang Zhan, a déclaré Amnesty International après la réincarcération de cette militante moins de quatre mois après sa libération de prison.**

Zhang Zhan, qui est détenue au Centre de détention du nouveau district de Pudong, à Shanghai, semble avoir été prise pour cible parce qu'elle a continué de défendre les droits humains après sa sortie de prison, le 13 mai.

[...]

Selon les informations reçues par Amnesty International, **elle a été interrogée à plusieurs reprises par la police au cours du mois écoulé, certains interrogatoires ayant duré plus de 10 heures.** »

Source: “Political Prisoner Database”, The Dui Hua Foundation.

“Names: 49,267, People under coercive measures: 7,365, **Official records: 22,870, Unofficial records: 40,907**

as of September 30, 2024

Top Provinces

<i>Xinjiang</i>	<i>1,297</i>
<i>Sichuan</i>	<i>706</i>
<i>Shandong</i>	<i>396</i>
<i>Liaoning</i>	<i>303</i>
<i>Henan</i>	<i>302</i>
<i>Tibet</i>	<i>300</i>

The information above is based on information Dui Hua has obtained, **the information does not represent all cases involving political prisoners in China.**”

B) Pratiques spécifiques de coercition et de privation de liberté

Source: Philippe Grangereau, « Sitôt libéré, le dissident Hu Jia sera cloîtré », Libération, 2011.

« **Le prisonnier politique chinois Hu Jia, qui doit être libéré le 26 juin après trois ans et demi de prison, a de grandes chances d'être aussitôt mis en résidence surveillée dans son logement à Pékin.**

[...]

Huang Qi, qui doit sortir de prison aujourd'hui à Chengdu après avoir purgé trois ans pour « *possession de secrets d'Etat* », **devrait être le prochain** »

Source: Rémi Castets et Agnès Stienne, « Les Ouïgours à l'épreuve du « vivre-ensemble » chinois », Le Monde Diplomatique, 2019.

« **Selon le chercheur Adrian Zenz**, qui s'appuie sur l'examen des marchés publics pour la construction ou l'agrandissement de structures d'internement, **plus de 10 % de la population ouïgoure, soit un million de personnes, serait soit passée par ce dispositif, soit actuellement emprisonnée (2). Contrairement à ce qui se passe dans les camps de réforme par le travail (laogai), ici les suspects ne passent pas devant la justice et peuvent être enfermés pour des périodes indéterminées.** Les travaux de Zenz et les rapports des organisations de défense des droits humains montrent que la **mécanique répressive comporte plusieurs échelons, avec des classes de rééducation ouvertes, mais aussi des centres fermés, à la discipline de fer.**

[...]

Très officiellement, le **Haut-Commissariat des Nations unies aux droits de l'homme a demandé un droit d'accès. Les autorités chinoises ont fini par reconnaître l'existence de ces structures**, en les présentant à la fois comme des lieux d'éducation patriotique et des centres de formation professionnelle destinés à favoriser l'insertion des minorités. De fait, des séances d'éducation patriotique et d'autocritique, ainsi que des interrogatoires, s'y mêlent à des cours de langue pour les personnes les moins à l'aise en mandarin. Cependant, **les témoignages dans les médias étrangers de ceux qui ont fui le pays après avoir été libérés peignent un tableau plus sombre** que celui des médias chinois; ils décrivent des **conditions de détention parfois très dures, de fortes pressions, voire des actes de torture psychologique ou physique.**

[...]

M. Chen a également **renforcé un programme** portant le doux nom de « **Faire famille** » : **les fonctionnaires séjournent régulièrement chez les habitants**, en restant parfois plusieurs jours, pour **identifier les comportements subversifs, pousser à la dénonciation et faire de l'éducation patriotique. Plus d'un million de fonctionnaires seraient impliqués**, notamment dans les zones rurales du Sud.

[...]

Des universitaires de renom, des artistes et même des sportifs célèbres ont brusquement disparu - probablement internés - ou ont été placés en résidence surveillée. Depuis quelques mois, des condamnations parfois extrêmement lourdes ont été prononcées. Ainsi, l'ex-directeur du bureau pour la supervision de l'éducation du Xinjiang et l'ex-président de l'université du Xinjiang ont été **condamnés à mort pour « tendances séparatistes »**. Après avoir été arrêté en 2014, l'économiste et écrivain Ilham Tohti, l'une des dernières figures critiques des cercles intellectuels ouïgours, a été **condamné à la prison à vie.** »

Source: « Chine. La liberté de Wang Quanzhang est « illusoire » tant que les autorités n'auront pas levé les restrictions dont il fait l'objet », Amnesty International, 2020.

« En apprenant la **libération de Wang Quanzhang, avocat chinois spécialiste des droits humains, après quatre ans et demi d'emprisonnement pour « subversion de l'État** », Doriane Lau, chercheuse sur la Chine à Amnesty International, a déclaré :

« Nous avons des motifs de craindre que la **libération de Wang Quanzhang n'offre à cet homme qu'une liberté illusoire. Les autorités chinoises ont depuis longtemps pour pratique de surveiller et de contrôler les défenseur·e·s des droits humains, même une fois qu'ils sont sortis de prison.** »

[...]

Ce n'est **qu'en juillet 2018 qu'un avocat a informé sa famille qu'il était en vie et se trouvait en détention à Tianjin**. À l'issue d'un **procès inéquitable**, il a été condamné en janvier 2019 à **quatre ans et demi d'emprisonnement** pour « subversion de l'État ». Ces accusations ont été forgées de toutes pièces.

La femme et le fils de Wang Quanzhang n'ont été autorisés à lui **rendre visite qu'en juin 2019, soit près de quatre années après qu'il a été placé en détention**.

Amnesty International craint fortement qu'il n'ait été **soumis à la torture et à d'autres formes de mauvais traitements pendant son incarcération**. **Son épouse Li Wenzu, harcelée et surveillée en permanence depuis 2015**, a confié qu'il était devenu « un tout autre homme » après l'avoir vu en 2019. »

Source: Assessment of human rights concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, People's Republic of China, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2022.

“38. According to the Government's 2019 White Paper on “Vocational Education and Training in Xinjiang” and relevant legal provisions, **three categories of individuals can be held in such centres**. The **first category includes individuals who have been convicted for terrorist or “extremist” crimes** and who are, upon completion of their sentence, “assessed as still posing a potential threat to society”. Such people are, according to the law, **sent to VETC facilities by a court decision**. The second category includes **“people who were incited, coerced or induced into participating in terrorist or extremist activities**, or people who participated in terrorist or extremist activities in circumstances that were not serious enough to constitute a crime”. Those people can be **referred to VETC facilities upon a decision of the police**. The third category consists of « **people who were incited, coerced or induced into participating in terrorist or extremist activities, or people who participated in terrorist or extremist activities that posed a real danger but did not cause actual harm**”. In these cases, the **procuratorate can decide to waive a sentence on the condition that the offender's “subjective malice is not deep, and they can sincerely repent and voluntarily accept education and assistance”**.

“39. In the same 2019 White Paper, the Government stated that **“education and training [in VETC facilities] is not a measure to limit or circumscribe the freedom of the person”**, while in its response to the CERD Committee it stated that VETC facilities are “schools by nature”. **Under international human rights law, however, a deprivation of liberty occurs when a person “is being held without his or her free consent”**, involving a “more severe restriction of motion within a narrower space than mere interference with liberty of movement”. **A deprivation of liberty, within the meaning of international human rights law, can occur in any type of location and does not need to be officially labelled as such**.

[...] 41. **Individuals interviewed by OHCHR who had been placed in VETC facilities** described being taken to such facilities, usually by public security officials. The majority of the interviewees who were apprehended between 2017 and 2019 **were held at a police station before referral to a VETC facility**. They said that they were told that they had to go to a VETC facility and were not given an alternative option. **None of the interviewees felt they could challenge the referral process, and none had access to a lawyer prior to being sent to the VETC facility nor at any point during the time they were present there**. Several underwent long interrogations in police stations before their eventual placement.”

“69. Repeated claims raised of **adverse conditions and harsh treatment of detainees by the authorities in the VETC facilities have been raised. The Government has denied such allegations**, asserting in its 2019 White Paper on “Vocational Training and Education in Xinjiang” that the rights of “trainees” are fully respected.

70. Former **detainees interviewed by OHCHR had spent periods of time, generally ranging from two months to 18 months**, in facilities in eight different geographic locations across XUAR, including in Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, Aksu, Bayingol, Hotan, Karamay and Urumqi prefectures. **Two-thirds of the twenty-six former detainees interviewed, reported having been subjected to treatment that would amount to torture and/or other forms of ill-treatment**, either in VETC facilities themselves or in the context of processes of referral to VETC facilities. These claims of mistreatment took place either during interrogations or as a form of punishment for (alleged) wrongdoing. **Their accounts included being beaten with batons, including electric batons while strapped in a so-called “tiger chair”; being subjected to interrogation with water being poured in their faces; prolonged solitary confinement; and being forced to sit motionless on small stools for prolonged periods of time.** Persons reporting beatings for confessions described being taken to interrogation rooms that were separate to the cells or dormitory spaces where people were staying. **Over two-thirds of the individuals also reported that, prior to their transfer to a VETC facility, they were held in police stations, where they described similar instances of being beaten while also immobilised in a “tiger chair” in those facilities.”**

“74. **A number of interviewees stated that they suffered from persistent health conditions** as a result of the harsh conditions and treatment they reported experiencing in the facilities. Some of the **interviewees also described their stay in the facilities as a “psychological torture”**, due to the uncertainty about the reasons for their detention, the length of their stay, their conditions, the constant atmosphere of fear and lack of contact with the outside world, especially their families, and the stress and anxiety associated with the constant surveillance. As one interviewee stated, **“the worst thing was that you never knew when you would be let out”**. Many of the interviewees reported long-term psychological consequences from their periods of confinement at VETC facilities, including feelings of trauma.”

“78. In conclusion, descriptions of detentions in the VETCs in the period between 2017 and 2019 gathered by OHCHR were marked by **patterns of torture or other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, other violations of the right of persons deprived of their liberty to be treated humanely and with dignity, as well as violations of the right to health.** Allegations were also made of instances of **sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV)** in VETC facilities, including of rape, which also appear credible and would in themselves amount to acts of torture or other forms of ill-treatment. Based on currently available information, it is not possible to draw wider conclusions as to the extent to which there may have been broader patterns of SGBV in VETC facilities. **The Government’s blanket denials of all allegations**, as well as its gendered and humiliating attacks on those who have come forward to share their experiences and have added to the indignity and suffering of survivors.”

Source: Jialing Zhang, « Sous l'œil de Pékin : total Trust », Filmtank, Allemagne, Pays-Bas, 96 minutes, 2023.

[à partir de 5:10 min] “My husband is **a lawyer (Weiping Chang). The police arrested him on January 12th, 2020**, on suspicion of “inciting subversion of state power”. **I haven’t seen him since.”**

[à partir de 9:40 min] “I can’t just watch him being persecuted. So I wrote an article. **“In December 2019, Weiping Chang met with a dozen lawyers and friends in Xiamen. [...] Soon after the meeting they were arrested. Weiping Chang was put under ‘designated residential surveillance’ for over ten days, and later, under house arrest in his hometown of Shaanxi. During the ten months he waited for his trial, [...] he talked about being tortured while under arrest.”** They held me at the **Baotai Hotel, on a torture rack, all day, for ten days.** This extreme torture has left me with permanent injuries. I have no feeling in my right index and ring fingers. **“A few days later, he was arrested again”.**”

[à partir de 15:15 min] “We saw the neighbor install a peephole camera. Two professional handymen came with toolboxes. Maybe I’m overthinking, but it looks like it’s for surveillance. [...] They want our neighbors to isolate us.”

[à partir de 17:30 min] “(Quanzhang Wang) I was jailed only because we fought hard for human rights. [...] **During the massive crackdown, nearly 300 lawyers were detained, interrogated and temporarily put on probation.** Some were forced to write a confession. **The total number of people ultimately arrested was about 27.** Only a handful were taken to a trial. [...] Lawyers were forced to plead guilty on TV, I refused. So, **they imprisoned me for a long time** without any qualms.”

[à partir de 41:25 min] “(Quanzhang Wang) **We’ve been invited to events for Human Rights Day at foreign embassies. The police are trying to prevent our attendance,** but they couldn’t find a legal excuse. [...] **After I was arrested, I wasn’t allowed to see a lawyer for over half a year. I didn’t know where I was being held. [...] On days they consider to be politically sensitive, they barricade our door so we can’t leave our home.”**

Source: Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of slavery, *Information received concerning the extensive labor transfer program in the Tibetan Autonomous Region, placing rural workers into low-skilled and low-paid industrial jobs, allegedly eroding Tibetan minority languages, cultural practices, and religion*, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, février 2023.

“Tibetans who have shared their concern about this marginalization of their languages have allegedly been subjected to **arrest or protracted prison sentences.** There are cases of Tibetan **advocates for the use of the language and the protection of the Tibetan identities,** being sentenced to **several years of imprisonment.** Prisoners are themselves reportedly **denied the right to use the Tibetan languages in detention, including when communicating with one another or with visitors, preventing them from effectively maintaining ties with their family members,** particularly older persons, who cannot speak the Putonghua-language.”

“**Although the Government has asserted that all work placements are voluntary** and respect “the will of the Tibetan farmers and herders”, sources suggest that in practice, Tibetans have no say in this process or decision-making, and policies are imposed from above. **There are consequently serious concerns regarding the voluntary nature of the programme.”**

“As it is our responsibility, under the mandates provided to us by the Human Rights Council, to seek to clarify all cases brought to our attention, we would be grateful for your observations on the following matters:

[...]

- 3. **Please provide disaggregated statistics on the number of ethnic Tibetans transferred through the labour transfer programmes in the past years.**
- 4. **Please indicate if Tibetans have a choice of opting out of the ‘labour transfer’ programmes, of selecting the place where they are posted and on any potential consequences faced by those who do not wish to participate in the labour transfer scheme.”**

Source: *“Vocational training” programmes threaten Tibetan identity, carry risk of forced labour, say UN experts*, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, avril 2023.

“UN experts* today expressed **concern over allegations that so-called “labour transfer” and “vocational training” programmes** in the Tibet Autonomous Region of China are being used as a **pretext to undermine Tibetan** religious, linguistic and cultural identity, to monitor and politically indoctrinate Tibetans, and **warned that such programmes could lead to situations of forced labour.** **“Hundreds of thousands of Tibetans have reportedly been ‘transferred’** from their traditional rural lives to low-skilled and low-paid employment **since 2015**, through a programme described as voluntary, but **in practice their participation has reportedly been coerced,”** the UN experts said. [...] They urged the Chinese Government to explain the steps it intends to take to **comply with its international obligations** to prevent forced labour and trafficking, and to ensure access to remedy and compensation for victims of such practices.”

Source: « La situation des droits humains dans le monde », Amnesty International, 23 avril 2024.

« **La disparition subite de la vie publique du ministre des Affaires étrangères, Qin Gang, et de celui de la Défense nationale, Li Shangfu, et la mort soudaine de l’ancien Premier ministre Li Keqiang ont illustré le manque persistant de transparence** du Parti communiste chinois et du gouvernement. »

C) Le Tibet : une région autonome de la République Populaire de Chine aux conditions de détention opaques

Source: “Relentless: Detention and Prosecution of Tibetans under China’s “Stability Maintenance” Campaign”, Human Rights Watch, 2016.

“Because the Chinese government does not allow independent media reporting or human rights investigations, releases very little information on arrests and prosecutions of Tibetans, **and has severely punished Tibetans for sharing information** about such cases with outsiders, **the available case descriptions are often incomplete and many details cannot be independently verified.** Since 2008, moreover, the number of Tibetans crossing into Nepal and India to seek asylum has dropped from more than 2,000 per year to about 50, and few Tibetans have been allowed to travel abroad since 2012, further limiting the number of sources of information available about conditions in Tibet.

Because of these limitations, as noted above, we cannot say for certain that our 479 cases are representative of all political detentions of Tibetans during the 2013-2015 period. But our cases, carefully vetted for reliability, shed light on recent developments in Tibetan areas not available elsewhere”

“Our data for 2013-2015 indicates a significant increase since the 1990s in the types of activities that led to detention. These included giving moral support to the families of imprisoned protesters, giving speeches about Tibetan language use, running a literacy campaign, petitioning, criticizing local

environmental policies, and seeking the return of confiscated land. Many of these detentions for new types of offenses in rural communities correlated with the implementation of stability maintenance in those areas.”

“**A sixth village leader—Bachen Gawa, the head of Buzhung village, also in Driru—died in custody in November 2014, allegedly from mistreatment by police.** All that is known about his case is an exile report that he opposed the introduction of stability maintenance policies in the village and was removed from his position by local officials.

[...]

Exile sources reported the deaths of 14 Tibetan detainees while in custody or shortly after release in 2013-2015, allegedly from beatings and other mistreatment by police or lack of medical treatment. All had been detained in connection with protests or expressions of dissent.”

Source: Samuel Ravier-Regnat, « Répression au Tibet « en matière d’information, ce territoire est un véritable trou noir » », Libération, juillet 2023.

« En matière d’information, **la région autonome du Tibet est un véritable trou noir**, beaucoup plus que le Xinjiang, par exemple, où la répression contre les Ouïghours est assez fortement documentée. Cela est dû à **une forme de désensibilisation** à la cause tibétaine, mais aussi au fait que **l’accès au territoire est extrêmement limité par les autorités chinoises**. C’est particulièrement le cas depuis 2019. Auparavant, l’accès était plus facile et notre rapport repose aussi sur l’analyse d’ONG qui ont pu travailler sur le sujet quand c’était encore possible »

« Mais pour **obtenir des informations nouvelles et fiables, nous avons utilisé cette méthode de mesure de l’éclairage nocturne**, déjà testée dans d’autres régions inaccessibles comme le Xinjiang ou la Syrie. C’est une méthode qui existe depuis une dizaine d’années. Bien sûr, elle présente des **limites : elle ne permet pas de savoir pourquoi les gens sont détenus, ni dans quelles conditions ils sont incarcérés**. Elle donne des indications sur l’intensité de l’éclairage nocturne dans les prisons tibétaines, et par voie de conséquence sur le niveau d’activité de ces sites »

« Le rapport porte sur l’**observation de 79 prisons et centres de détention**, soit tous les sites dont nous avons connaissance quand l’accès à l’information était encore possible. **Presque tous ont été construits avant 2011** et la plupart sont des centres de détention de faible sécurité. Au niveau global, il semble que la **taille et le niveau d’activité des prisons tibétaines sont relativement constants au cours de la dernière décennie**. Cependant, si l’on opère une sorte de zoom, on découvre que **depuis 2019 l’éclairage nocturne augmente dans ce que nous savons être des établissements de haute sécurité**, là où les détenus restent le plus longtemps et où sont incarcérés ceux dont Pékin juge qu’ils sont les plus à même de nuire au régime. Cela révèle une **possible évolution vers des incarcérations plus longues des opposants tibétains**. Ces conclusions renvoient à celles que nous avons publiées en 2021 concernant la région du Xinjiang, où l’activité des prisons de haute sécurité a également augmenté ces dernières années. »

« Jusqu’au début des années 2000, les personnes poursuivies par les autorités étaient surtout celles qui suivaient les enseignements du dalaï-lama. [...] Notre travail montre que dans le même temps, les **formes de répression draconiennes contre les opposants politiques persistent dans les établissements de haute sécurité**, dont l’activité augmente. Mais nous savons toujours très peu de choses sur ce qui se passe au Tibet. »

Source: Benjamin Laurent, « Des images satellites dévoilent l'augmentation de la répression chinoise au Tibet », GEO, juillet 2023.

« Une opération en 2018 a ciblé des groupes supportant supposément l'augmentation de l'autonomie du Tibet. Mais le fait est que **la Chine filtre volontairement les informations sortant de la région et interdit parfois l'accès aux journalistes**, comme entre le 19 mars et le 26 juin 2023 »

« **L'étude de Rand a donc été menée "en utilisant des images satellites ainsi que les informations sur la luminosité nocturne"**, des données difficilement manipulables par le gouvernement chinois. L'analyse de la firme s'est focalisée sur 79 centres de détentions, avec 14 prisons de haute sécurité concentrant la hausse des activités nocturnes. Les centres de détentions classiques ont connu une forte augmentation de la luminosité en 2017, tandis que dans le cas des centres de haute sécurité, le pic intervient entre 2021 et 2022.

Les relevés mensuels sont comparés à ceux des mois et années précédentes pour déterminer une augmentation potentielle. Selon l'équipe de chercheurs, **cette hausse pourrait indiquer la construction de nouveaux bâtiments** ou l'extension de ceux existants, ainsi que la **hausse du nombre d'occupants**. Cette hausse peut **aussi signifier le passage à des détentions plus longues**. »

Source: “A night-time lighting analysis of Tibet's prisons and detention centers”, RAND, juillet 2023.

“Authorities in Tibet are engaging in preventive repression towards their population. As part of their nationwide 'stability maintenance' strategy, they are detaining, persecuting, and **convicting Tibetans for non-violent forms of protest** and other expressions of dissent such as assisting or supporting self-immolations **and carrying pictures of the Dalai Lama**.”

“In contrast with the body of knowledge on the detention and imprisonment of Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities in Xinjiang, the **Tibetan detention system is still very much a black hole to the international community**”

“Key Findings :

- **There are at least 79 prisons and detention centres across Tibet.**
[...]
- Zooming in on individual facilities, however, **we uncovered recent patterns of growth in night-time lighting concentrated in higher security facilities since 2019.**
- **This trend may suggest a shift towards longer detentions and imprisonments and is similar to recent observations in Xinjiang too**, where a high percentage of these facilities showed active growth in night-time lighting in 2019 and 2020.”

“**The lack of evidence readily available to foreign audiences does not, however, indicate an absence of repression**, but rather highlights a need for further research into the CCP’s **ongoing imprisonment and detention of ethnic minorities in Tibet, and across China more broadly**. This comes as the implementation of a so-called ‘**vocational training and labour-transfer**’ scheme in **Tibet has raised international alarm** at the prospect of Tibetans becoming subject to mass securitisation and, especially, **detention on a scale and intensity similar to that currently seen in Xinjiang**, while other imperceptible forms of repression have also gradually been uncovered”

“An **important but still poorly understood mechanism of stability maintenance is the use of so-called ‘vocational training centres’, detention facilities and prisons**. **Data available on the**

purpose, scale and conditions inside these settings remain limited in both quality and quantity (i.e., volume, type and origin of data sources). This is in stark contrast with the level of information now available on the detention system in Xinjiang, which has been well documented using all-source information. **The lack of evidence on the situation in Tibet should not be considered evidence of an absence of repression**”

“Though vocational training and labour-transfer programmes exist in Tibet, as far as present information shows they do not exist to the same degree or extent as in Xinjiang. Re-education camps in Xinjiang are often linked to factories and forced labour. As far as is known, this does not appear to be the case with the so-called ‘vocational training centres’ in Tibet, ruling out the labour-camp tag. From what we can tell, these centres are not Xinjiang-style internment camps. **While elements of coercion have been reported across a number of these training centres, raising questions over the consensual nature of these establishments, the use of force has not been reported and many Tibetans may voluntarily subscribe to these programmes.** As one report says, ‘There is currently no evidence of TAR labour training and transfer schemes being linked to extrajudicial internment.’ **There is also no evidence at present that these centres have systematically and on a mass scale been the place of severe human-rights abuses including torture, illegal organ harvesting and death.**

[...]

As with ‘vocational training centres’, however, there is also a **lack of evidence to firmly establish the scale and severity of the situation inside Tibetan detention facilities and prisons. Though nothing on the scale of the methods applied to the Uyghurs has so far been reported in Tibet, accounts of torture, rape and sexual abuse during imprisonment in specific detention facilities and prisons have been reported.** Some detainees also report being subject to forced political education while in custody, being made to renounce ethnic and religious identities, and being forced to learn Mandarin and memorise patriotic songs.”

“The literature review found detailed accounts from former detainees reported by Tibetan advocacy groups, but these are not necessarily representative of all experiences within detention facilities. Reports of torture and sexual abuse during imprisonment in extrajudicial facilities and prisons have been reported but it is not clear how widespread they are and to what extent they are government sanctioned”

“The CCP has shifted its approach away from mass securitisation using highly visible elements of repression such as detention facilities towards imperceptible practices”

“Available data so far record at least 79 prisons and detention centres throughout the TAR. Detention facilities occur frequently throughout Tibet, with most towns and villages having a detention centre”

“Ultimately, we assess that the majority of facilities (41 out of 79) identified by TRP are small, low-security detention centres.”

“By comparison, we see that night-time lighting growth across Tibet’s long-term high-security prisons experienced a major period of growth in 2019 and 2020, while similar growth was seen across the four high-security detention centres in the TRP dataset in 2020 and 2021. And although smaller low-security detention centres experienced little growth and periods of greater decline in night-time lighting in recent years, their larger counterparts (with greater support infrastructure

consistent with potential longer-term detention) showed more sustained night-time lighting growth on average in recent years, and less sustained decline by comparison. Taken together, these trends are suggestive but not conclusive of a trend towards increased long-term imprisonment and detention of Tibetan dissidents as opposed to shorter-term detention.”

Source: “Documenting and Locating Tibetan Detention Facilities”, Tibet Research Project, consulté le 06 décembre 2024.

“89 Detention facilities confirmed in Tibet”

Source: “Blood on the Snows: Torture in Tibet 2008-2015”, Tibet Watch, 2015.

“Many of the protesters who were arrested in 2008 are still in prison and very few of those who have been released have managed to travel into exile. **With all the security restrictions that the Chinese government has in place, it is impossible for Tibet Watch researchers to travel into Tibet and speak directly to prisoners or former prisoners.** We are reliant on the testimonies of those who have escaped China’s control and are brave enough to speak out”

“Tibet Watch has received a significant number of reports of people being arrested simply for having made comments on social media which were critical of the Chinese government. For example, a young mother was arrested in Driru County on 13 October 2013 and **charged with expressing anti-Chinese opinions on the social networking application Wechat.**”

“The copy of the document obtained by Tibet Watch is titled “Document on Giving Rewards for the Protection of Stability and Management of TAR Border Areas’ Farmers and Nomads” and **outlines how rewards will be offered for “information on illegal escape and entry into the country”, “information affecting the stability of border areas”, “information on separatist activities of the Dalai Clique” and “information related to terrorist activities”.** The rewards offered range from 500 Yuan up to 50,000 Yuan. The majority of the rewards offered are 10,000 to 20,000 Yuan. The document further states that: Any person having knowledge and collecting and arresting the concerned person and bringing him to the Public Security Bureau (PSB) will be rewarded two and a half times more than the prescribed reward; For collecting information and helping the PSB in the arrest of the above described person will be rewarded one and a half times more than the prescribed reward; and For information collected by two or more farmers and nomads, an average reward will be given according to the number of people. The rewards offered are financially substantial and there is a significant risk that anyone arrested on any of the specified charges will be subjected to torture or other mistreatment.”

“Golog Jigme was initially arrested in March 2008, following his involvement in the film project Leaving Fear Behind. He was **severely tortured while in detention.** He was released and **re-arrested two more times before disappearing in September 2012.** On 18 May 2014 he arrived at the Tibetan Reception Centre in Dharamsala, India. The following testimony was provided to Tibet Watch shortly after his arrival. [...] That morning, I felt that I was in danger of being arrested, that someone was following me and that my mobile phone was being monitored. While doing the prayer, I also told one of my friends that I sensed something was going to happen to me. Most of the monks who were invited to the prayer at Golog Lhabzo's painting studio had participated in the protests of 14 March 2008 (which the Chinese call the 3.14 protests) [...]. On the local news channel there was coverage of protests in Sangchu County which were being condemned. After 15 minutes, **dozens of standard police officers and Special Police Units (SPU) of Kanlho Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP) stormed into**

the house. They were led by Captain Zhang, the head of the Kanlho TAP police department. Captain Zhang was in plain clothes and the rest of his officers were in uniform.”

“At first **I struggled to keep my monk's robes, but they forcibly took them off me and put on the uniform.** There were no shoes for us and we were told to walk barefoot. When **I tried to put on my own shoes a policeman slapped my face** for disobeying their orders. [...] I spent that night in Kachu Prison. The next day, **I was hung from the ceiling by my handcuffs, which were put through a hook in the ceiling. My toes just touched the cold floor.** That day, **I was interrogated by two Chinese officials.** They couldn't understand Tibetan and my Chinese was not good enough to understand their questions. **We had trouble communicating with each other and they started punching and kicking me to entertain themselves. I was hung like this for a whole day.** [...]

My handcuffs were removed and then **I was re-handcuffed with the hot chimney of that stove between my arms.** The stove and its chimney got hotter and hotter and my arms, chest and **both sides of my face got burned and blistered.** I kept turning my face, so the middle part (nose, chin and forehead) would not burn. At one point, I couldn't stand the heat anymore. **So, I gave a hard tug to the chimney with my handcuffs. The hot chimney fell down and hit the neck of one of the police officers and burned him. My action made the policemen angry and they started beating me.”**

“Chonjor :

Tibet Watch received reports that a young Tibetan man (in his twenties) named Chonjor was beaten to death in police custody in the Labrang area. He was detained by local police and handed over to the People's Armed Police on 9 December 2011. When **his family went to the police station the next day to enquire as to his whereabouts, they were told that he was dead.** A witness reported that he faced severe torture while in custody. No reason was given for his arrest [...]

Tsering Gyaltzen :

Tsering Gyaltzen **was one of many Tibetans from Drango who went into hiding following a protest there on 23 January 2012** (although he did not personally participate in the protest). **During the protest, two Tibetans were shot dead** and scores more sustained gunshot wounds when Chinese state security forces opened fire on the protesters. **Over 100 Tibetans from the area were arbitrarily detained following the protest. Tsering Gyaltzen was last seen on 9 February 2012** being taken away by security forces. According to an eyewitness, he had been badly beaten and was unable to walk. They believed his back had been broken. His relatives repeatedly went to the Public Security Bureau office to inquire about him. Each time they asked, local officials denied any knowledge of him. **In late May 2012, a police officer told Drango Monastery that Tsering had died.** The family held a death ceremony but could not perform the traditional sky burial because they had not received his body.”

“Tenzin Choedak

Lhasa, Tibet Autonomous Region, December 2014:

Tenzin Choedak died on 5 December 2014 in Lhasa's Mentsee Khang (Traditional Tibetan Medical Institute). He **had been serving a 15 year prison term in Chushul prison near Lhasa and was released by prison authorities just days before his death.** Tenzin Choedak **was severely beaten and tortured over the six years he was in detention.** [...] He spent many years in Lhasa with a European NGO working on environment and health issues of rural Tibetans.

In mid-April 2008, Tenzin Choedak was arrested by Lhasa police on allegations of leading the March 2008 protests and his whereabouts and situation remained unknown to family members for several months. In September 2008, Lhasa Intermediate People's Court sentenced him to a 15 year prison term. Tenzin Choedak **lost his vision as a consequence of beatings and torture suffered in prison.** He also suffered chronic diseases as a result of torture which damaged his brain and he would often vomit blood.

In November 2014, the family were allowed to visit Tenzin Choedak but he was almost **unrecognisable as his body had become so emaciated**. He had become **mentally unsound and was unable to recognise his own mother**. Even in this condition, Tenzin Choedak was still shackled by his hands and feet in bed and was watched by four members of police personnel in the ward of the hospital. Tenzin Choedak was handed over to his family on 2 December 2014. According to the Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “When he was returned to his family, Choedak had dislocated jawbones and damaged kidneys. **He was physically emaciated and vomiting blood because of a brain injury. All the bones in his feet were broken.**”

Source: The Tibetan Political Prisoner Database.

“**5634 Prisoners on the database**”

“**Lhasa 486 prisoners**”:

(obtenu en appliquant le filtre **Prisoners** et **Lhasa**)

[https://tppd.tchrd.org/library/map/?q=\(allAggregations:!f,filters:\(origin:\(values:!\(%2754010101000005%27\)\)\),from:0,includeUnpublished:!t,limit:30,order:desc,sort:creationDate,treatAs:number,types:!\(%27619b9b30a3121426c786ee97%27\),unpublished:!f\)](https://tppd.tchrd.org/library/map/?q=(allAggregations:!f,filters:(origin:(values:!(%2754010101000005%27))),from:0,includeUnpublished:!t,limit:30,order:desc,sort:creationDate,treatAs:number,types:!(%27619b9b30a3121426c786ee97%27),unpublished:!f))

Source: Tenzin Dalha, “From Public Space to Cyberspace: The CCP’s Increasing Oppression Of Tibet”, Tibet Policy Institute, 2020.

“This year, Chinese authorities **arrested 10 Tibetans in Lhasa for spreading ‘rumors’** about the coronavirus outbreak on 12 March on WeChat.”

Source: Gabrielle Tétrault-Farber, “UN rights chief says China committing violations in Xinjiang, Tibet”, Reuters, 04 mars 2024.

“**I also call on the government to implement the recommendations** made by my Office and other human rights bodies in relation to laws, policies and practises that violate fundamental rights, **including in the Xinjiang and Tibet regions**”

Source: “2023 Annual Report on Human Rights Situation in Tibet Released”, Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, 20 mars 2024.

“**On 26 January 2023, a senior Tibetan Buddhist scholar known for his mediation died in police custody in Lithang County, Kardze Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture**²¹. Geshe Phende Gyaltzen, 56, had been detained in March 2022 for “his active involvement in the renovation of Shedrub Dhargyeling monastery” in Lithang. **He had been in good health before his detention**. Severe restrictions were imposed immediately after his passing, including warning residents in Lithang not to speak about the monk’s passing with outsiders.

Local Tibetans were barred from paying their last respects to the monk’s body. His family members were denied the opportunity to perform last rites. In July 2022, **less than four months in police detention, he had been admitted to a hospital due to failing health but was returned to the detention facility where he later died.**”

“**From 26 October to 10 November 2023, a female Tibetan human rights defender, Tsering Tso, was sentenced to 15 days of administrative detention** by the Yushu Public Security Bureau (PSB) in

the Yushu city detention centre. **It was the second time in three years** that Tso was detained in administrative detention. [...]

In reality, Tso posted two video statements on 16 and 19 October in which she criticised the feudalistic mindset of official power holders and shared the challenges she faced in opening her own business in Kyegudo city, exposing the unfair practices of the local government leaders. Tso is originally from Trika (Ch: Guide) County in Tsolho (Ch: Hainan) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture but works and lives in Yushu City.

[...]

In March, information about Tibetan writer and interpreter Zangkar Jamyang emerged more than two years after his arbitrary detention. He was sentenced to four years in prison. The details of his sentencing remain unknown, although it is presumed that he was likely sentenced for “inciting separatism”.

[...]

In April, Mr Tsultrim from Tsarima (Ch: Carima) township in Kakhog (Ch: Hongyuan) County, Ngaba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture, was sentenced in secret to a two-year prison term by the Intermediate People’s Court of Ngaba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture under the charge of “inciting separatism”. **Mr Tsultrim had been detained for a second time in February 2023 for merely possessing a photo of the Dalai Lama on his mobile phone. He was detained incommunicado until his sentencing.** He was denied the right to a fair trial including barring his family members from observing his trial. He is currently serving his prison term in Yak-nga (Ch: Ya'an) Prison in Sichuan.”

“On an **unknown date in November 2023, four monks - Sonam, Kalsang Tsering, Nyima, and Phuntsok - were detained** from a prayer session at Lhadong monastery in Nubling village, Gemar (Ch: Kema) Township, Dingri (Ch: Tingri) County, Shigatse (Ch: Xigaze) City. They were detained on the suspicion that they were conducting prayer services for the exiled Tibetan spiritual leader His Holiness the Dalai Lama. **The monks’ family members have no information about their situation, raising concerns that they are held in an undisclosed location vulnerable to torture and ill-treatment.**”

“**Reports also emerged in 2023 of former Tibetan political prisoners still being subjected to beatings and ill-treatment.** On 19 August, the well-known Tibetan language advocate **Tashi Wangchuk was attacked and severely beaten by a group of unidentified masked men when he arrived at a hotel in Darlak (Ch: Dari) County, Golog Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture from Sershul (Ch: Shiqu) County, Kardze Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture. He was later evicted from the hotel and refused lodging by several other hotels as well. After the incident, he went to Darlak County Hospital, where he was refused medical treatment**”

Source: « La situation des droits humains dans le monde », Amnesty International, 23 avril 2024.

« **En février, cinq expert·e·s des Nations unies ont écrit au gouvernement chinois pour lui faire part de leur inquiétude concernant les programmes de transfert de main-d’œuvre**, dans le cadre desquels des millions d’habitant·e·s tibétains de zones rurales auraient été déplacés de leur foyer et coupés de leurs moyens de subsistance traditionnels pour occuper des postes peu qualifiés et mal rémunérés dans l’industrie. Ces expert·e·s ont souligné que cette pratique risquait d’avoir des conséquences néfastes sur les langues, les pratiques culturelles et la religion de la minorité tibétaine et **pourrait constituer une forme de traite des êtres humains aux fins de travail forcé.** »

Source: “Abuses in real time in China”, Reporters without borders.

“The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is the world’s largest prison for journalists, and its regime conducts a campaign of repression against journalism and the right to information worldwide [...]

Detained as of today :

- **110 journalists**
- **3 media workers”**

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