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**AFGHANISTAN**

**La situation sécuritaire  
dans la province  
Nangarhar depuis le  
retour au pouvoir des  
Talibans**

Mars 2024

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## TABLE DES MATIÈRES

Demandes de recherche .....	6
Synthèse générale .....	7
I - Etat des lieux dans le district de Khogyani, province Nangarhar au niveau sécuritaire depuis la prise de pouvoir des talibans .....	8
1) La province de Nangarhar : une situation sécuritaire alarmante depuis la prise de pouvoir des talibans .....	8
2) Le district de Khogyani : une situation sécuritaire peu documentée depuis la prise de pouvoir des talibans.....	12
II - Les modalités de la prise de pouvoir des talibans dans les villages du district de Khogyani.	13
1) La prise de pouvoir des talibans facilitée par divers acteurs .....	13
1.1. Facilitée par des alliances locales .....	13
1.2. L'échec de l'Etat Islamique.....	14
1.3. L'échec de l'intervention internationale et de la politique du gouverneur .....	14
2) La prise de pouvoir des Talibans légitimée par leur stratégie politique à l'égard de la population.....	15
III - Les forces en présence avant la prise de pouvoir des talibans dans cette zone.....	16
1) Le contrôle du gouverneur et l'importance de l'intervention internationale avant l'arrivée au pouvoir des talibans.....	16
2) L'arrivée sur le territoire des forces ISKP : le point de départ à une multiplication des acteurs et des affrontements pour le pouvoir .....	18
IV - Les arbaki : entre milice pro gouvernementale et police locale .....	20
1) Les arbaki en tant que milice locale.....	20
2) Les arbaki en tant que système de police de proximité.....	21
3) Les arbaki en tant que renforts de la police et de l'armée .....	22
V - La Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) : une unité particulière au sein des forces armées afghanes.....	24
1) Une unité spéciale au service de la lutte contre la drogue .....	24
2) Une unité soutenue par des forces extérieures.....	25
3) Une unité en expansion .....	27
VI - Les modalités de recrutement des afghans au sein de la CNPA.....	28
1) Un recrutement effectué au sein des autres unités de la police afghane.....	28
2) Une formation sur-mesure pour une unité d'élite .....	28
3) Le recrutement et la formation de l'unité par l'implication des forces extérieures .....	30
4) Une unité d'élite au fonctionnement lacunaire .....	31
VII - La nécessité pour les membres de la CNPA et leurs familles de se protéger des talibans.	31
1) Des craintes déjà présentes avant la prise de pouvoir des talibans en 2021 .....	31
2) Des persécutions aggravées depuis la prise de pouvoir des talibans en 2021 .....	33
VIII - Les usines de fabrication de stupéfiants en Afghanistan et leurs caractéristiques .....	35

1) La précarité des usines de fabrication de stupéfiants.....	36
2) Les usines de fabrication de stupéfiant concentrées et cachées sur une partie du territoire afghan .....	37
2.1. Les principaux districts abritant des usines de fabrication de stupéfiants .....	37
2.2. Les usines de fabrication de drogue, objet d'une lutte américaine dérisoire .....	38
2.3. Des usines davantage dissimulées depuis l'interdiction de la production de stupéfiants par les Talibans.....	39
Sources consultées .....	41
1. Organisations gouvernementales internationales .....	41
2. ONG, Think Tanks .....	43
3. Médias.....	44
4. Législation et jurisprudence .....	46
5. Ouvrages et thèses .....	47
6. Autres.....	47

## **Demandes de recherche**

1. Etat des lieux dans le district de Khogyani, province Nangarhar au niveau sécuritaire depuis la prise de pouvoir des talibans ?
2. Existe-t-il des éléments sur les modalités de prise de pouvoir des talibans dans les villages de ce district ?
3. A-t-on des informations sur les forces en présence (Armée, police nationale et locale) avant la prise de pouvoir des talibans dans cette zone ?
4. Qui sont les arbaki ? milice pro gouvernementale ou police locale ou les deux (traduction du terme) ?
5. Quelle est l'Unité spéciale – Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan - NCPA ?
6. Quelles sont/étaient les modalités des américains pour recruter des afghans dans la police anti stupéfiants et les intégrer à ces unités ?
7. Quelles précautions ces membres d'unités ainsi que leurs familles devaient prendre par rapport aux talibans ?
8. Qu'appelle-t-on une usine de fabrication de stupéfiants en Afghanistan ? Est-ce que ces usines étaient plutôt cachées ou aux vues des villageois ?

## Synthèse générale

Depuis la chute des talibans en 2001, l'Afghanistan connaît une **instabilité politique et sécuritaire importante**. Malgré les efforts des forces internationales pour stabiliser le pays, les **violences et les conflits armés ont persistés**. Par conséquent, en 2021, les talibans ont lancé une offensive à grande échelle contre le gouvernement afghan, leur permettant de prendre le contrôle de Kaboul le 15 août. Cette prise de pouvoir a entraîné une grande incertitude quant à la sécurité et à la stabilité du pays. De nombreuses provinces font face à une **situation sécuritaire alarmante**. C'est notamment le **cas de la province de Nangarhar**, à l'est de l'Etat, dont les ressortissants sont régulièrement victimes de violences de la part des forces talibanes.

**Bien avant cette prise de pouvoir, la situation sécuritaire de cette région afghane était déjà inquiétante**. En effet, dès 2015, l'État islamique au Khorassan (ci-après ISKP) contrôle de nombreux districts. Bien que les forces américaines soient engagées dans la lutte contre le terrorisme aux côtés du gouvernement afghan, l'ISKP commet de **nombreuses exactions envers les populations civiles**. Plusieurs leaders locaux se tournent alors vers les forces armées talibanes, y voyant une alternative plus proche du peuple dans leur façon de diriger. La prise du pouvoir du district de Khogyani en 2021 s'est ainsi réalisée presque sans obstacle pour les talibans.

**Les forces armées américaines ont également été un acteur important dans l'instabilité de la situation sécuritaire**. En effet, en plus de sa politique de lutte contre le terrorisme, ont également été engagé de nombreuses opérations visant à soutenir le gouvernement afghan et à stabiliser le pays. Dans le cadre de leur stratégie de contre-insurrection, les américains ont pu s'appuyer sur un **réseau de milices locales appelées « Arbaki » par les afghans**. Ceux-ci étant appréciés par les communautés et bénéficiant d'une légitimité locale, ils possèdent un **rôle important dans la protection des populations civiles**. Pour autant, ils ne disposent **pas d'un statut uniforme** : ils sont parfois considérés alternativement comme une milice locale, une police de proximité, ou encore des renforts de l'armée afghane.

L'armée américaine s'est également impliqué dans la poursuite d'un tout autre objectif sur le territoire afghan : la lutte contre le narcotrafic. En effet, au début des années 2000, l'Afghanistan devient un producteur majeur de drogue, notamment d'opium et d'héroïne. La fabrication de stupéfiants est régulièrement réalisée au sein de « laboratoires de fortune » par des populations pauvres de milieux ruraux. Les talibans, à la tête de ces réseaux très lucratifs, finançaient leur future insurrection avec cet argent. En réaction, la communauté internationale menée par les États-Unis, a créé en 2003 la "Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan" (ci-après CNPA). Cette unité **spécialisée dans la lutte contre le narcotrafic est formée de membres recrutés au sein même de la police afghane**. Malgré des succès notables, **des critiques persistent quant à son efficacité et à sa capacité à remplir ses missions**. Cette lutte contre le narcotrafic et son affiliation aux forces américaines expose les membres de la CNPA, ainsi que leurs familles, à des **représailles violentes des talibans**, qui voient en eux une menace pour leurs activités économiques. Depuis l'arrivée des talibans au pouvoir, ces **menaces ont été exacerbées** et la production de stupéfiants interdite. Les usines de fabrication sont ainsi davantage dissimulées, rendant plus difficile leur localisation et leur démantèlement.

## I - Etat des lieux dans le district de Khogyani, province Nangarhar au niveau sécuritaire depuis la prise de pouvoir des talibans

Après avoir renversé le gouvernement afghan en août 2021, les talibans ont consolidé leur pouvoir sur une grande partie du pays. Leur prise de pouvoir n’a cependant pas fait cesser les violences quotidiennes envers les civils. La province de Nangarhar, où la situation sécuritaire est alarmante, en est un bon exemple. Quant au district de Khogyani, peu d’informations sur le contexte sécuritaire ont pu être trouvées. Cependant, l’aide humanitaire continue d’être acheminée, bien qu’elle reste largement insuffisante face à l’ampleur de la crise actuelle.

### 1) La province de Nangarhar : une situation sécuritaire alarmante depuis la prise de pouvoir des talibans

Source: Geology and Earth Science News and Information, *Afghanistan Map and Satellite Image*, 2009.






Source: Maps of world, *Nangarhar Map*, 2014.



Source: ACLED, *Two Years Of Repression : Mapping Taliban Violence Targeting Civilians in Afghanistan*, 11 août 2023.





Source: Human Rights Watch Afghanistan, *Les talibans exécutent et font « disparaître » des combattants présumés de l'ISKP New York*, 7 juillet 2022.

« Depuis que les talibans ont pris le pouvoir en août 2021, **les habitants des provinces de Nangahar et de Kunar, à l'est de Kaboul, ont découvert les corps de plus de 100 hommes dans des canaux et à d'autres endroits.** »

Source: Le Monde, *Afghanistan : les talibans s'emparent de Jalalabad, des consultations en cours pour mettre fin à la guerre*, 2021.

« Dimanche matin, ils se sont emparés de la ville de Jalalabad (est), ont rapporté des résidents, confirmant les revendications des talibans. « Il y a quelques instants, **les moudjahidin sont entrés dans Jalalabad, la capitale de la province du Nangarhar.** Toutes les zones sont maintenant sous leur contrôle », a déclaré Zabihullah Mujahid, l'un de leurs porte-parole. »

Source: Amnesty International, Afghanistan, *Les victimes de violences fondées sur le genre sont abandonnées depuis la prise de pouvoir par les talibans*, 2021.

« Une intervenante installée dans le **Nangarhar** a indiqué : “Je reçois des **menaces des talibans**, de l'État islamique, des auteurs de violences et des membres des familles... et ce **tous les jours.**” »

Source: European Union Agency for Asylum, *Nangarhar Province - Security events coded as 'battles', 'remote violence/ explosions,' and 'violence against civilians' from 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, based on ACLED data*, 2022.




Figure 11. Nangarhar Province - Security events coded as 'battles', 'remote violence/ explosions,' and 'violence against civilians' from 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2022, based on ACLED data<sup>1536</sup>

Source : European Union Agency for Asylum, *Country of origin information - Afghanistan security situation*, 2022.

“The UN Secretary General identified Nangarhar Province as one of the four most conflict-affected provinces in Afghanistan in the period between 19 August and 21 May 2022. According to an independent Afghan analyst consulted by EUAA in December 2021, ISKP continued to have its strongest foothold in Nangarhar and Kunar provinces. In February and April 2022, Nangarhar Province was referred to as being the group’s stronghold.”

[...]

“During the reference period, ACLED recorded **214 security incidents in Nangarhar Province (average of 3.5 incidents per week)** of which 80 were battles, 89 cases of violence against civilians and 45 explosions/remote violence.”

Source: Cour nationale du droit d’asile (CNDA), C+, n° 22023959, 14 février 2023.

« Examinant le recours d’un ressortissant afghan originaire de la province de Nangarhar, la Cour a été conduite à analyser la situation sécuritaire prévalant dans son pays, où des conflits armés opposent dans certaines régions l’organisation « *État islamique – Province du Khorassan* » aux forces talibanes au pouvoir depuis l’été 2021.

En s’appuyant sur les données et conclusions publiées en janvier 2023 par l’AUEA, la Cour a estimé que **les provinces de Badakhshan, Baghlan, Balkh, Kaboul, Kapisa, Kunar, Kunduz, Nangarhar, Panchir, Parwan et Takhar, situées dans l’est du pays, ainsi que la province de Kandahar, située au sud, étaient livrées à une situation de violence aveugle, dont sont victimes les populations civiles.**

Selon le rapport de l’AUEA, la province du Panchir est la province la plus affectée par la violence aveugle, laquelle y atteint un niveau qui, sans être « *exceptionnel* », est plus élevé que dans les autres provinces concernées. **La violence dans les autres provinces, comme celle de Nangarhar, n’atteint pas un niveau aussi élevé.** La protection accordée aux victimes potentielles de conflits armés pourra être accordée en cas d’éléments caractérisant un **risque accru d’être exposé aux conséquences de cette violence aveugle en cas de retour dans leur pays**, tels qu’une situation de handicap ou une activité professionnelle spécifique »

« M. S., qui déclare être de nationalité afghane, soutient que :

[...]

- **il risque de subir des atteintes graves en raison de la situation sécuritaire prévalant en Afghanistan et, plus spécialement, dans sa province d’origine, la province de Nangarhar,**  
[...]. »

Source : European Union Agency for Asylum, *Country Guidance : Afghanistan (January 2023)*, 2023.

Figure 1. Level of indiscriminate violence in Afghanistan (based on information up to 31 October 2022).



- The level of indiscriminate violence is high and, therefore, a lower level of individual elements is required in order to substantiate subsidiary protection needs under Article 15(c) QD.
- Indiscriminate violence is also taking place, however not at a high level. Moreover, a significant proportion of the civilian fatalities in these provinces is considered to be the result of security incidents of a targeted nature. A high level of individual elements is required in order to substantiate subsidiary protection needs under Article 15(c) QD.
- There is currently no real risk for a civilian to be personally affected by indiscriminate violence within the meaning of Article 15(c) QD.

2) *Le district de Khogyani : une situation sécuritaire peu documentée depuis la prise de pouvoir des talibans*

Source: Human Rights Watch, *Afghanistan : Taliban Execute, 'Disappear' Alleged Militants*, 7 juillet 2022.

**“Taliban security forces have summarily executed and forcibly disappeared alleged members and supporters of an Islamic State offshoot in eastern Afghanistan,** Human Rights Watch said today. Since the Taliban took power in August 2021, residents of Nangahar and Kunar provinces east of Kabul have discovered the bodies of more than 100 men dumped in canals and other locations.

While there are no verified numbers of those killed and forcibly disappeared since August 2021, **bodies of some victims have been displayed in various parts of Jalalabad and the surrounding area.** Between August and December in the Farm Adda park, south of Jalalabad, local residents and relatives said that while looking for missing family members they found bodies of people whom the Taliban had taken hanging from trees. Taliban officials have acknowledged that they have displayed bodies along main roads and intersections as a warning to others that “this is what happens” if you join the ISKP. **Family members have found the bodies of their relatives in the neighborhood known as Khalis Baba in Khogyani.** Others have discovered bodies in canals and rivers.”

Source: Eurasia Review, *Afghanistan : Dramatic Increase Of Islamic State-KP Activity – Analysis*, 26 avril 2022.

**“On April 21, 2022, Islamic State - Khorasan Province claimed responsibility for four attacks:** [...]

Four Taliban fighters were killed in a roadside explosion in the Mamli area of **Khogyani District in Nangarhar Province.**”

Source: Afghan Red Crescent, *The ARCS Provided Emergency Water Cleaning And Conservation Training To 40 Volunteers In Nangarhar Province*, 10 mai 2022.

**“The Afghan Red Crescent Society health department staff conducted three days emergency water cleaning and conservation training to 40 male and female volunteers in Khogyani district of Nangarhar province.”**

Source: UNICEF, WASH Cluster, *Afghanistan Humanitarian Response: WASH Cluster Updates - Cluster Achievements - March 2023*, 26 avril 2023.

**“Construction of solar powered pipe schemes in Chamtala Settlement of Khogyani district of Nangarhar province. The project also includes hygiene promotion and distribution of hygiene kits along with training of water management committee targeting about 960 household (6,720 people).”**

## II - Les modalités de la prise de pouvoir des talibans dans les villages du district de Khogyani

L'arrivée officielle des talibans au pouvoir dans le district de Khogyani remonte à 2021 mais de nombreuses sources montrent **qu'ils y étaient déjà présents avant**. Ils ont ainsi pu prendre le contrôle du district **sans passer par la force, notamment grâce à la conclusion d'alliances avec les leaders locaux**. De plus, les pratiques violentes de l'Etat islamique envers la population de ce district et l'échec de l'intervention américaine n'a fait qu'accroître leur importance au sein de la population. Leur politique est considérée comme étant plus proche des besoins de celle-ci.

### 1) La prise de pouvoir des talibans facilitée par divers acteurs

#### 1.1. Facilitée par des alliances locales

Source: Le Monde, *Afghanistan : les talibans s'emparent de Jalalabad, des consultations en cours pour mettre fin à la guerre*, 2021.

« Dimanche matin, ils se sont emparés de la ville de Jalalabad (est), ont rapporté des résidents, confirmant les revendications des talibans. “Il y a quelques instants, les moudjahidin sont entrés dans Jalalabad, la capitale de la province du Nangarhar. Toutes les zones sont maintenant sous leur contrôle”, a déclaré Zabihullah Mujahid, l'un de leurs porte-parole. “Nous nous sommes réveillés ce matin avec les drapeaux blancs des talibans partout en ville. **Ils sont dans la ville. Ils sont entrés sans combattre**”, a aussi rapporté à l'Agence France-Presse (AFP) Ahmad Wali, un habitant de Jalalabad. »

Source: Division de l'information, de la documentation et des recherches (DIDR), *Afghanistan : Situation sécuritaire, présence des groupes d'insurgés dans le district de Sherzad (Province de Nangarhar), en particulier dans la localité de Toto*, 2021.

« Selon un rapport datant de 2016, les districts du “sud-ouest de Nangarhar, soit Hesarak, Sherzad et **Khogyani ont longtemps été le fief des talibans**” dans la province. Les talibans ont conclu des **alliances avec les leaders locaux** qui avaient du pouvoir et **inspiraient confiance au sein des districts**.

Ainsi, **les alliances locales et le respect des traditions locales par les talibans ont permis à ces derniers de s'installer avec une opposition limitée des populations**. Les populations sont soumises à des impôts et elles sont amenées à saisir les tribunaux mis en place par les talibans. Néanmoins, **il n'y a pas de place pour l'opposition et cette dernière aurait été réprimée sévèrement**. »

Source: New York Times, *Dans la guerre afghane enchevêtrée, une mince ligne de défense contre l'Etat islamique*, 2017.

“After years of war with no clear victor, the region had settled into a strange sort of calm as the **Taliban and the government found ways to coexist**, as has happened to varying degrees around the country.”

## 1.2. L'échec de l'Etat Islamique

Source: New York Times, *Dans la guerre afghane enchevêtrée, une mince ligne de défense contre l'Etat islamique*, 2017.

“A visit this month to Khogyani, a district in the east where Islamic State fighters have shifted, showed the increasing complexity of the Afghan conflict, and **underlined how daunting a task it will be to defeat the Islamic State**, also known as ISIS.”

Source: Les clés du Moyen Orient, *L'État islamique dans le Khorasan (2/2)*, 2020.

« Il faut attendre septembre 2015 pour que les Taliban commencent à regagner du terrain sur l'ISKP dans Nangarhar, au prix d'une **mobilisation massive de combattants des provinces voisines** (jusqu'à 2000) et de la concentration de leurs red units. »

« **Les pratiques violentes de l'ISKP dans les zones qu'il contrôle ont contraint une majorité des populations à fuir vers les centres de district et les zones sous contrôle du gouvernement ou des Taliban.** »

## 1.3. L'échec de l'intervention internationale et de la politique du gouverneur

Source: Paris Match, *Afghanistan : la revanche des talibans*, 2019.

« Dans les campagnes, les talibans incarnent le meilleur rempart à la barbarie de Daech. En effet, après dix-sept ans de combats et les milliards de dollars injectés par la communauté internationale, le gouvernement contrôle à peine plus de la moitié du pays. **Les talibans ont réussi là où les Américains ont échoué. Ils ont su «gagner les cœurs et les esprits»**. Dans les campagnes, ils incarnent à la fois la seule alternative au pouvoir central, lointain et corrompu, et le meilleur rempart à la barbarie de Daech. **Même au sein des classes éduquées, leur combat contre la présence étrangère trouve un certain écho.** D'autant que la stratégie des insurgés a évolué depuis 2001. Plutôt que de détruire les hôpitaux ou les écoles – notamment celles destinées aux filles – financés par Kaboul, ils préfèrent les contrôler en assurant leur protection. Lorsque les troupes de Daech se sont emparées du district de Khogyani, la clinique de Zawa a dû fermer ses portes. « Grâce aux talibans, nous pouvons de nouveau soigner les gens », résume Nadia, qui exerce comme sage-femme dans ce centre de santé rudimentaire où les patientes commencent à revenir. « Peu importe, dit la jeune femme, si porter la burqa est le prix à payer pour vivre en paix. » »

Source: Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium, *Politics and Governance in Afghanistan: the Case of Nangarhar Province*, 2014.

“**Sherzai's governance strategy created rifts through which the Taliban were able to gain a foothold in the province.** The first districts to turn to the Taliban, in particular Sherzad and Khogyani, have actively resisted eradication campaigns in recent years, **are underrepresented in national and provincial government and have been largely neglected by Sherzai** (beyond what patronage was required to secure their participation in the early eradication drives). They are on

the periphery of the province and support for HIK is comparatively strong. The insurgency has increased its power by manipulating tribal divisions, land conflicts (see Box 2) and the growing anger at international forces and opium eradication (Mansfield, 2011)”

Source: Cairn, *Le Gouvernement transnational de l'Afghanistan - Une si prévisible défaite*, 2021.

« Fort de ce soutien, le clan Shobli a attaqué le clan Ali Sher Khel en raison d'une vieille querelle foncière. Or, ce dernier avait de bonnes relations avec le gouverneur de la province, Gul Agha Shirzai, qui en avait fait un élément de son dispositif de sécurité. **L'initiative américaine a donc eu pour premier effet de créer une situation de désordre à la frontière, au seul bénéfice des Talibans.** »

## **2) La prise de pouvoir des Talibans légitimée par leur stratégie politique à l'égard de la population**

Source: Division de l'information, de la documentation et des recherches (OFPPA), *Les talibans et l'ISKP (Daech) dans le district de Khogyani (province de Nangarhar)*, 2018.

« Selon un journaliste local interviewé par les homologues suédois de la DIDR, Landinfo, lors d'une mission de recueil d'information à Kaboul en avril 2016 :

« Les autorités ont un meilleur contrôle à Khogyani que [dans les districts de] Sherzad et Hesarak. [...] **Cela signifie qu'il y a de nombreuses personnes qui soutiennent le gouvernement.** En même temps, [...] la dynamique du conflit est compliquée. En sus des talibans, il y a plusieurs autres groupes armés illégaux. [Il y a] un réseau criminel bien installé à Khogyani et responsable entre autres des enlèvements [...]. De plus, les conflits tribaux et rivalités familiales sont aussi des facteurs contribuant aux incidents sécuritaires »

« **Les talibans ont tenté d'être plus proches des besoins de la population locale.** [...] par exemple, [...] ils ont construit des routes dans la partie supérieure de Khogyani. Celles -ci sont des routes secondaires qui traversent les villages dans des endroits comme Khelago, Hakimabad, Ahmedkhel, Kozakhel, Pirakhel et Jawarah »

« Ces routes financées par les taxes talibanes prélevées auprès des civils **ont servi à améliorer le quotidien de ces derniers tout en permettant un meilleur accès aux talibans dans les zones desservies pour contrecarrer les incursions de combattants** de l'ISKP.

Dans le district de Khogyani, les trois cliniques existantes emploient des femmes et les filles sont scolarisées. Les talibans ont fait état sur leur site web de l'organisation d'un rassemblement d'étudiants, de professeurs et d'oulémas afin de promouvoir et d'améliorer l'éducation. Au cours de cet événement, ils ont déclaré qu'ils « feraient tout ce qui est en leur pouvoir pour promouvoir une éducation de qualité et améliorer le niveau de l'éducation, garantissant l'alphabétisation de tous, particulièrement des jeunes ».

Source: New York Times, *Dans la guerre afghane enchevêtrée, une mince ligne de défense contre l'Etat islamique*, 2017.

“The Afghan government’s authority in Khogyani, in a remote region of Nangarhar Province, has long been confined to the district compound and the immediate surroundings. **The Taliban ruled the rest.** Opium has been grown all around.”

“Although the Taliban are known for their opposition to girls’ education, in Khogyani, the militants here allowed schooling, showing a willingness to drop a demand that had lost them hearts and minds before. In return for having nominal control, the government has paid the salaries of teachers and health workers that the Taliban could not afford.”

**So established was Taliban rule in Khogyani** that when Islamic State fighters started shifting there, **many people said they trusted in the Taliban’s protection.**”

Source: Les clés du Moyen Orient, *L’État islamique dans le Khorasan (2/2)*, 2020.

« Dans la majeure partie des zones pachtounes de l’Afghanistan, **y compris à Nangarhar**, les solidarités sociales et communautaires empêchent les groupes armés de se livrer à des comportements de prédation et limitent leur multiplication. Le caractère traditionnellement local du **recrutement des groupes insurgés en Afghanistan, notamment des Taliban, favorise la coopération et les compromis avec les populations.** »

### **III - Les forces en présence avant la prise de pouvoir des talibans dans cette zone**

Dans la province de Nangarhar, **une police est présente conséquemment aux financements provenant de la CIA et des forces spéciales américaines.** Ces forces étrangères sont présentes dans la région depuis 2001 et viennent seulement, théoriquement, en aide au gouverneur pour lutter contre les talibans et le trafic de drogue. Or elles semblent avoir, dans **la pratique, beaucoup plus de pouvoir.** En parallèle, dès 2015, l’ISKP (groupe de l’Etat islamique) **s’empare du pouvoir** dans de nombreux districts de la province de Nangarhar, notamment Khogyani. Ainsi, de **nombreux affrontements** apparaissent, mettant en confrontation ces derniers, les talibans et les forces gouvernementales et américaines.

#### **1) Le contrôle du gouverneur et l’importance de l’intervention internationale avant l’arrivée au pouvoir des talibans**

Source: UNHCR, *Politics and Governance in Afghanistan: the Case of Nangarhar Province*, Ashley Jackson, 2014.

“Other key eastern mujahedeen reasserted themselves. **These included Hazrat Ali, who became the quasi-official police chief under the interim government.** After the fall of the Taliban, he took control of large swathes **of Jalalabad** and his men were accused of widespread looting and criminal activity. He was **given significant funds from the CIA and US Special Forces in the early post-Taliban years;** at its height, his militia was reportedly 18,000 strong. Haji Zaman Ghamsharik, rival of Ali, **assumed the role of provincial defence chief. Ali and Zaman – together with Qadir’s son, Haji Zahir Qadir – led the botched operation supported by US Special Forces to find Osama bin Laden at Tora Bora.**”

“Ali was officially appointed as the Nangarhar police chief the following year. He was removed in 2004 and elected to the Wolesi Jirga in 2005. In the east, the international community’s efforts have **prioritised security and poppy eradication. US forces, falling under the command of the NATO-led International Assistance Forces after 2006, have played a pivotal role in**



**Nangarhar, with a heavy presence of US military and Special Forces as well as civilian aid officials.** In the early years, US forces provided significant bilateral support to individual commanders (as in the case of Ali). This began to change around 2004, with the establishment of the Nangarhar Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). With the PRT, support became more formalised and project-focused; the military began to pursue basic infrastructure and quick impact projects in an attempt to **fill the gap in state authority and service provision.**”

“The impact of these projects and broader **US military presence** has gone well beyond building roads and providing security.”

“In Nangarhar, Sherzai was forced to build a network of relationships from scratch. Many of the same tactics he used in Kandahar to undercut the Karzai family **were applied to building a power base to rival and disempower the Arsalas.** He cultivated **relationships with commanders, including Hazrat Ali,** as well as elders and tribes, like the Shinwari, that had been excluded by the Arsalas. He strengthened the position of key maliks and **created his own system of new maliks to oppose ones who would not be co-opted.** He in turn boosted the status of these maliks with their rural constituencies through development projects and his influence over line ministries.”

“Sherzai leveraged his relationships with the rural elite to deliver on **key priorities of the international community,** such as counter-narcotics.”

“**He opposed the Taliban as a commander** and helped lead the Tora Bora operations to hunt down bin Laden.”

“**He then served as the Frontier Force Commander for Nangarhar** and later in the northern province of Takhar, where he was dismissed in 2006. Even afterwards he continued to pay his **men’s salaries, effectively operating a militia of over approximately 1,000 fighters in the north** **ahir’s brother,** Jamal, was elected to the Provincial Council in 2009. **Jamal served as the Provincial Council’s chair in 2010 and 2011, and leveraged this position to support Zahir’s challenge to Sherzai’s authority.**”

“Due to his most recent legal troubles, Jamal has been suspended from the Provincial Council but appears **to continue to use the stature of that position in pursuit of personal aims.**”

“**The most powerful of the enduring ex-commanders is Hazrat Ali,** who was elected to the Wolesi Jirga in 2005. Ali is Pashayee (an ethnic minority group), **with a power base in the north of Nangarhar.** He is described in a US Congressional report as having a ‘fourth grade education and a reputation as a bully (US Senate, 2009: 11). **As police chief of Nangarhar, he exercised significant influence beyond this role through his close alliance with international forces.** His fighters were heavily **integrated into US Special Forces-supported militias** and have come to **play a major role in the provincial security forces as well as in private security companies** run by Ali’s associates. If Sherzai and the Arsalas constitute two main political factions, Hazrat Ali forms a weaker third. **He lacks the power of his rivals but possesses enough influence to make his complicity and support something that both Sherzai and the Arsalas have actively sought at various times.**”

“At village level, the constitution **sets out elected village councils**. Again, no elections have been held. **In Nangarhar, maliks, mullahs and others play an important role both inside and beyond the structures that have been established** (see Brick, 2009). However both formal and informal village governance structures vary widely across the country in form, function and influence (see Pain and Kantor, 2010; Saltmarshe and Medhi, 2011).”

“**The present head of the DDA** is a former jihadi commander with links to Hazrat Ali and Gul Karim, **who worked in the National Directorate of Security (NDS)** in Jalalabad and, like many men from Dari Noor, worked with **US forces** stationed at the Jalalabad Airfield. **He previously served as the district chief of police and is now the head of the CDC cluster for Almah village.**”  
“While Rodat’s population is comparatively well educated, it is politically marginalised. Rodat is located in the middle of the province, intersected by the Jalalabad-Torkham highway and approximately 20 km from Jalalabad. It is bordered to the east, south and west by Nangarhar's most insecure districts and security within Rodat has deteriorated markedly in recent years. **Government officials are nominally in control during daylight hours and along major roads, but the armed opposition moves freely and threatens civilians at night. The district police chief reported having only ten police officers assigned to the district, despite Rodat’s designation as a first category district where 150 officers should be deployed.**”

## 2) *L’arrivée sur le territoire des forces ISKP : le point de départ à une multiplication des acteurs et des affrontements pour le pouvoir*

Source: Division de l’information, de la documentation et des recherches (DIDR), *Afghanistan : Situation sécuritaire, présence des groupes d’insurgés dans le district de Sherzad (Province de Nangarhar), en particulier dans la localité de Toto*, 2021.

« **La présence de Daesh dans la province de Nangarhar est signalée pour la première fois en décembre 2014 et l’ISKP est créé en janvier 2015.** »

« Entre septembre 2015 et avril 2016, à la suite d’offensives successives » des talibans et de l’Armée nationale afghane (ANA), l’ISKP “a perdu le contrôle des six districts frontaliers du Nangarhar” »

« En février 2018, Mawlawi Rafifullah, **en charge du recrutement taliban** et actif dans le **district de Khogyani**, et Mullah Saber, un combattant taliban actif dans le district de Sherzad, ont été arrêtés dans la province de Nangarhar. »

« Mi-2018, **des groupes formés de civils soutenus par le NDS, les milices de soulèvement populaire (Popular Uprising Forces)**, ont repoussé l’ISKP dans certaines parties des districts de Sherzad, Achin, Nazyan, Khogyani et Pachir wa Agam »

« Le 26 octobre 2019, **les forces de sécurité afghanes ont lancé plusieurs opérations militaires contre les forces talibanes dans le district de Sherzad. La création de 18 nouveaux checkpoints et de bases militaires a été promis**, notamment pour sécuriser la route qui traverse le district. Le 19 novembre 2019, le président de la République d’Afghanistan, Ashraf Ghani, s’est déplacé dans la province de Nangarhar, où il a tenu un discours et **a déclaré que la province était**

**«nettoyée» des combattants de l'ISKP et des talibans.** Une semaine plus tard, le 27 novembre 2019, **les talibans ont déclaré avoir gagné contre l'ISKP.** Les talibans contrôlaient alors une « large partie » du district de Sherzad. En décembre 2019, les autorités afghanes ont déclaré qu'il n'y avait plus de talibans dans le district de Sherzad, deux mois après le début des combats menés par les forces de sécurité afghanes. Dans le même temps, le Long War Journal, indique que les talibans ont renversé l'ISKP à la fin de l'année 2019 et que **le district est sous contrôle taliban.** »

Source : Les clés du Moyen Orient, *L'État islamique dans le Khorasan (2/2)*, 2020.

« Pour comprendre l'ancrage territorial de l'ISKP et sa capacité à s'inscrire dans la durée dans le conflit en Afghanistan, il convient donc de se pencher de façon plus spécifique sur le cas particulier de **la province de Nangarhar. C'est dans cette province que le groupe (ISKP) s'est installé en 2015 en prenant le contrôle de huit des vingt-deux districts.** C'est également cette province qui a été le théâtre principal de la confrontation entre les Taliban et l'ISKP. »

« Les politiques pakistanaises et afghanes sur la zone frontalière de la province de Nangarhar ont pour effet **le passage des militants pakistanais chassés par les opérations militaires** dans les zones tribales et des réfugiés afghans présents au Pakistan »

« **Les réseaux gouvernementaux et Taliban qui structurent le reste du territoire afghan étaient faibles dans cette région. Officiellement, le sud de Nangarhar est contrôlé par le gouvernement jusqu'en 2015. Mais les forces afghanes ne contrôlaient en réalité que les centres urbains et quelques axes routiers, laissant le reste à la gestion de milices locales plus ou moins officielles.** »

« Scélérosées par les luttes tribales et le clientélisme, **l'autorité de l'administration est rejetée depuis le début des années 2010 dans toute la province. Cet état de fait s'est étendu aux forces de sécurité afghanes dès le retrait international de 2014.** Elles se sont alors cantonnées à un rôle défensif et ont **peu à peu abandonné tout contrôle des zones rurales** dans les districts qui bordent le massif de Spin Ghar »

« L'abondance de volontaires et la densité des réseaux de trafics d'armes et de fonds depuis le Pakistan permettent à **des commandants locaux d'acquérir rapidement une certaine notoriété,** et les moyens humains et matériels de s'affranchir d'une tutelle trop stricte. La structure tribale des clans pachtouns de l'est est également propice **aux guerres d'influence et à la désunion.** En conséquence, **au moins treize groupes armés étaient actifs** dans le sud de la province lors de **l'apparition de l'ISKP.** Les gouverneurs clandestins des Taliban y ont le plus grand mal à faire respecter par les combattants les règles de conduite décrites en première partie, ou à mettre en place une administration civile. Une partie des groupes armés s'engage dans des activités criminelles pourtant interdites par les Taliban. **L'absence de gouvernance dans les régions rurales de la province s'est traduite par une grande perméabilité à la propagande de l'EI et par l'adhésion rapide de groupes de combattants peu concernés par le projet général des Taliban.** »

## IV - Les arbaki : entre milice pro gouvernementale et police locale

Les **arbaki** représentent des **forces armées ayant un rôle important dans la protection de la sécurité des populations locales**. Cependant, ces groupes armés ne **bénéficient pas d'un statut unique et uniforme**. En effet, plusieurs termes sont utilisés pour les décrire. Les arbaki peuvent être considérés comme des unités de **milices locales**. Ils sont également décrits comme une **police de proximité**, une police locale composée de volontaires des communautés. Ils peuvent aussi être analysés comme des **renforts de la police et de l'armée afghane**, étant appréciés par les communautés et bénéficiant d'une légitimité locale.

### 1) Les arbaki en tant que milice locale

Source: Le Monde, *Près de Kandahar, les milices anti talibans font régner un ordre précaire*, 2014.

« L'ALP [Afghan Local Police] est l'un des piliers de la **stratégie de contre-insurrection conçue par les Américains** en Afghanistan. **Réseau de milices locales – appelées arbakis par les Afghans** –, cette force supplétive opérant en appont de l'armée et de la police afghanes a pour mission de tenir les insurgés à distance des villages. Elle recrute dans la population. »

Source: Human Rights Watch, *Just Don't Call It a Militia ; Impunity, Militias, and the "Afghan Local Police"*, 2011.

“In response, the Afghan government and its international supporters, as part of the international exit strategy, are expanding the national army and police at high speed. The government has reactivated **various irregular armed groups**, particularly in the north. Hundreds of **small militias** have also been created, by **powerful local figures** and sometimes by **communities themselves**, to respond to the deteriorating security situation in many parts of the country. **International forces** operating in Afghanistan **work closely with militias**, many of which have been accused of human rights abuses.

For decades, Afghans have suffered serious human rights abuses at the hands of local militias, which include a diverse array of irregular forces ranging from armed groups working for tribal leaders to private security companies, criminal gangs, and insurgent groups. The **closest Afghan word for militia is arbaki**. This term also encompasses **irregular forces created by formal government programs**.”

Source: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), *Afghanistan Livelihood Trajectories: Evidence from Faryab*, 2010.

“The district government, reportedly with the backing of the Ministry of Interior, turned over the provision of security for the elections in Dawlatabad to a **local militia**—an **arbaki**—led by Auraz Zabet.”

Source: UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), *Afghanistan Protection Cluster: Protection Overview (Northern and North-Eastern Region - 2010)*, 2011.

“In order to obtain control over these areas, deployment of the Afghan Local Police (ALP) and “**Arbaki**” (**local militias units**) was initiated by the Government.”

Source: Human Rights Watch, *"Today We Shall All Die": Afghanistan's Strongmen and the Legacy of Impunity*, 2015.

“Arbaki: A generic term for **locally based militia**.”

Source: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), *Subnational State-Building in Afghanistan*, 2008.

“The role of local militias in providing security gained prominence in several local contexts in Afghanistan during 2005-06. Among the case provinces during the research, Paktia was mobilising **arbakai** (or **arbakian**, as it is known in plural), a **form of tribal militia**. For its own defence, each district provided fifty men who were to be paid 2,000 Afghani each per month. Provincial interlocutors, including UNAMA and AIHRC staff, viewed this development generally positively, but stressed that **arbakai** were a supplement — not a replacement — for the police. The work of **arbakai** is **different from police work**. As they are **derived from the local tribes**, they have help from residents. They know people in the area and know who may be active among the insurgency.”

Source : European Asylum Support Office (EASO), *Rapport d'information sur les pays d'origine (COI): Afghanistan – Recrutement par des groupes armés*, 2016.

« L'utilisation contemporaine de ce terme s'écarte de son sens originel. **Aujourd'hui, le mot arbakai est utilisé pour désigner tout type de milice semi-officielle ou non officielle, en particulier dans le Nord.** »

Source: European Asylum Support Office (EASO), *Country of Origin Information Report: Afghanistan – Security Situation*, 2016.

“In the northern districts, several **former Jihadi warlords** have rearmed their followers and **created arbaki** in 2014”.

## 2) **Les arbaki en tant que système de police de proximité**

Source: TARIQ, Mohammad Osman, *The Tribal Security System (Arbakai) in Southeast Afghanistan*, Occasional Papers, n° 7, 2008.

“**Forms of community policing** known as **Arbakai** have existed in Southeast Afghanistan for centuries, their survival facilitated by the particularly **weak state presence in this region**. Their existence initially became a matter of controversy during the Security Sector Reform (SSR) process in post-conflict Afghanistan (2001-). This was only exacerbated in 2007-08 when ideas of sponsoring similar militias surfaced within the Afghan government and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)”.

“In Afghanistan however, the **institution of the Arbakai** is based on the **customary tribal code of the Pashtuns** (Pashtunwali) though this is rarely discussed in related texts”.

“**The Arbakai is a tribal based community policing system** grounded in **volunteer** grassroots initiatives. They **differ from those in militia or hired by private security companies**. They have greater **support** and are **embedded within the community**. In Pashto the derivation of the word ‘Arbakai’ is ‘messenger’. However, with reference to the security system, it is used in the broader context of **security enforcement**”.

“First, in those areas where both the Arbakai and state security system operate, people may **prefer to go to the Arbakai for their security** rather than to the corrupt police system”.

Source: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), *Drivers of Anti-Government Mobilisation in Afghanistan, 1978-2011*, 2012.

“**arbaki: tribally mobilised community police** force in southeastern Afghanistan”

Source: International Crisis Group (ICG), *The Future of the Afghan Local Police*, Asia Report N°268, 2015.

“The irregular **arbakai** in the south east, a **traditional form of tribal police**, became synonymous with the Policy of National Reconciliation under the communist regime of Dr Mohammad Najibullah, which, starting in 1986, offered weapons, money and uniforms to rebel groups willing to switch sides and fight for the government.”

Source: SCHMEIDL, Susanne et KAROKHAIL, Masood, *The Role of Non-State Actors in ‘Community-Based Policing’ – An Exploration of the Arbakai (Tribal Police) in South-Eastern Afghanistan*, Contemporary Security Policy, vol. 20, no. 2, 2009.

“The arbakai are best described as a **community-based customary policing structure** with a central focus on keeping law and order and stopping fighting within tribal communities.”

### 3) **Les arbaki en tant que renforts de la police et de l’armée**

Source: Afghanistan Analysts Network, *Enemy Number One: How the Taleban deal with the ALP and uprising groups*, 2018.

“It is one of the few ‘truths’ of the Afghan insurgency that the **Taleban hate arbaki**– their term for **locally-recruited defence forces**, primarily the **Afghan Local Police and uprising groups**. These forces have always been a mixed bag, with some abusing the local population or captured by ethnic, factional or criminal interests. However, especially where they have **local legitimacy**, they have posed a serious threat to the insurgency”.

Source: Reliefweb, *More Militias? Part 1: Déjà vu double plus with the proposed ‘Afghan Territorial Army*, 2017.

“Successful ALP units, ones which usefully **protect the local population** against the insurgency and do not abuse them, tend to be where the **community has wanted the force and has control over it**. They are often in places where the community is homogenous. **Often it is in Pashtun areas where it fits best, within the known framework of arbaki** or other traditions of setting up temporary, local, tribal **defence forces**”

Source: TARIQ, Mohammad Osman, *The Tribal Security System (Arbakai) in Southeast Afghanistan*, Occasional Papers, n° 7, 2008.

“Within the **current conflict** in Afghanistan, a similar division of responsibilities could be attempted. Thus, the **Arbakai** could be used as **peace keepers**”.

“Yet examples do exist where the Arbakai were recognised and **approached by the state for assistance**. For example, the Arbakai were asked to **assist the security sector** during the elections to secure polling stations (Baldauf 2004)”.

Source: European Asylum Support Office (EASO), *Country of Origin Information Report: Afghanistan – Security Situation*, 2016.

“A specific **local security structure** has existed in Afghan society for hundreds of years: **the arbaki, community or tribal armies**”.

Source : Aljazeera, *Opinion: The Arbaki can secure Afghanistan better than the US*, 2014.

“The solution to this major problem lies in restoring the **ancient tribal security system – known as Arbaki** – to **assist the national army** in defending the country, especially the borders, against enemy encroachment and infiltration. In recent weeks, there have been reports that the US is studying local power structures with the possible objective of reviving a version of this traditional Afghan model of security. Contrary to the beliefs of the international forces, **the Arbaki is not a militia force.**”

Source: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), *The Resilient Oligopoly: A Political-Economy of Northern Afghanistan 2001 and Onwards*, 2012.

“**Arbaki: Local armed groups** sponsored by the local authorities and managed through a network of personal relations, without any institutionalised relationship.”

Source: Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), *From Arbaki to Local Police*, 2012.

“[A]rbakis and illegal armed forces have massively infiltrated into the ALP structure and composition and in some cases, arbaki groups have been armed by foreign Special Forces to fight the Taliban and then registered as the ALP by MoI [Ministry of Interior]. Likewise, there is no serious and accurate monitoring and control on the ALP recruitment and performance by the Afghan Government. Arbakis and illegal armed groups are also present in communities, causing sometimes conflicts in communities. **One of the major problems** is that **in most communities, people cannot distinguish between the ALP and arbakis. Hence, they think that**



**the ALP and arbakis are the same.** As a result, acts committed by arbakis and arbitrary armed forces can negatively affect the reputation of the ALP from the point of view of public people.”

Source: TARIQ, Mohammad Osman, « The Tribal Security System (Arbakai) in Southeast Afghanistan », *Occasional Papers*, n° 7, 2008.

“The Arbakai are often understood to be a militia, but there are **clear differences between militias and the Arbakai**. First, the Arbakai are unpaid. Second, they are not hired by government, a person, or a company. Third, they carry responsibilities which are approved and recognized as the common or public good. The definition of militias can of course vary, but it seems far-fetched to include community-based armed groups. In Southeast Afghanistan, people are very clear about the distinction: **being an Arbakai member is considered an honour** while belonging to a militia is considered shameful. As Kakar states, honour is one of the Pashtunwali principles. **The responsibility of any specific Arbakai differs from one tribe to another though they do have common tasks and duties. These are as follows: To implement the Jirga’s decisions; To maintain law and order; To protect and defend borders and boundaries of the tribe or community.** Any of these three general categories may have various subcategories related to what is accepted or recognised as a ‘common good’ or as a ‘threat or challenge for overall security’.”

## **V - La Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) : une unité particulière au sein des forces armées afghanes**

La Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) est une **unité spéciale de police afghane entièrement dédiée à lutter contre le narcotrafic**, particulièrement marquée par **l’implication des forces extérieures**. Forte d’un certain succès, cette unité n’a cessé de s’étendre.

### **1) Une unité spéciale au service de la lutte contre la drogue**

Source : UNODC, *AF-CNPA*.

“The Counter Narcotic Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) was **set-up in 2009** in order to **conduct counter narcotics investigations, operations and drug seizures**. The CPNA has offices **located all 34 provinces of the country** and consists of 3,200 personnel.

The CNPA have received training, advisory and mentoring **support from several international counterparts** including the United States Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and the United Kingdom’s National Crime Agency (NCA).

The **CNPA consists of multiple specialized units** including the Special Investigation Unit responsible for investigating smuggling networks, a Judicial Unit composed of judges, attorneys, courts which undertakes in-depth investigations of drug trafficking networks.

The CNPA has also established: **a special unit consisting of 300 personnel trained by international advisors which provides support to eliminate narcotics by support of law enforcement of DEA administration which consists of 300 personnel and trained by US advisors and trainers**. They have the responsibility to support this unit on their investigation and operations; a special chemical unit to handle drug eradication issues and violent detainees involved in drug trafficking; district teams responsible for district level enforcement and detention of traffickers; and Air Units which support local level operations.”

Source: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), *Cops or Robbers? The Struggle to Reform the Afghan National Police*, 2007.

“The function of the CNPA, which has an approved force size of 2,264, is **counter-narcotics investigation and enforcement**. Unlike all the other police forces, which report to the MoI’s Deputy Minister for Security, the CNPA reports to the Deputy Minister for Counter Narcotics. The CNPA includes a National Interdiction Unit (NIU), established in October 2004, that conducts interdiction raids across Afghanistan.”

## 2) *Une unité soutenue par des forces extérieures*

Source: SIGAR, *Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan: U.S. Assistance to Provincial Units Cannot Be Fully Tracked and Formal Capability Assessments Are Needed*, 2014.

“The Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) was established in 2003 as a **special force element of the Afghan National Police (ANP), under the Afghan Ministry of Interior (MOI)**, responsible for counternarcotics operations throughout Afghanistan. The CNPA is comprised of **provincial units and vetted (specialized) units, which include intelligence, investigative, and interdiction forces**.

**As part of U.S. counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan**, the Department of Defense (DOD), Department of State (State), and Department of Justice (DOJ), primarily through its Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), **all have roles in building Afghan capacity to combat the drug trade through support to the CNPA”**

Source: Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, *Militarized versus Civilian Policing: Problems of Reforming the Afghan National Police*, Report n°102, 2011.

“The Counter-Narcotics Police of Afghanistan conducted **operations against the drugs industry** and received support from British and US police officers and special forces.”

Source: Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), *Fighting the UK’s war on drugs in Afghanistan*, 2007.

“**With support from UNODC and the UK**, Hamid Kharzai’s administration has taken several steps since 2002 to combat the threat of illicit drugs:

- the Counter Narcotics Directorate (CND) was created in October 2002 to provide technical support and advice to relevant ministries and to ensure the timely implementation of national drug control objectives;
- Afghanistan introduced a National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS) in May 2003, aimed at eliminating the production, consumption and trafficking of illicit narcotics over a 10-year period;
- **the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA)** was created within the Ministry of Interior; and
- a National Drug Law was adopted on 20 October 2003.

The most prominent and publicised aspect of the UK’s counter-narcotics support scheme has been a poppy eradication programme conducted in late 2002 and 2003. It offered US\$1,750 for each hectare of poppies destroyed; however, poppy growers can generate double that sum from

harvesting and selling their crops. Compounding this inherent problem, many farmers claimed that they were not duly compensated for the destruction of their crops, provoking violent unrest in many areas. The abject failure of this US\$34 million programme prompted UK and Afghan officials to shelve it.”

Source: UNODC, *Afghanistan Counter Narcotics Law Enforcement*, 2007.

“This ongoing project which has been funded by the governments of the United Kingdom, Austria, and Japan was developed to assist in building an Afghanistan national narcotics law enforcement police force. This project includes **the building and remodeling of a Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) operational headquarters and a fully trained and equipped CNPA Investigative unit**. In addition, nine provincial satellite offices are being established in key locations (Zaranj, Khost, Herat, Lashkargah, Kandahar, Jalalabad, Mazar, Kunduz and Fiazabad) throughout Afghanistan. **By Afghan law the CNPA is established as an independent body but within the organizational structure of the Afghan National Police of the Ministry of Interior**. This ongoing project which has been **funded by government of the United States** was designed to assist the Afghan authorities to effectively counter the problem of drug trafficking through the systematic building of an effective, equipped and trained National Interdiction Unit (NIU) within the structure of CNPA. In order to respond to the National and International counterparts plans and to further support the operational capacity of NIU outside the CNPA HQs Kabul, UNODC was approved to assist in equipping the new NIU building which is being constructed by US Government. This facility will include housing, food preparation, firing ranges, heliports, training rooms, and a communication center.

**During the year 2006 a considerable amount of narcotics were seized by CNPA, ANSF (Anti-Narcotics Special Force) and ANP. The seized narcotics consisted of heroin, morphine, hashish, opium and different types of the precursor chemicals used in the processing of heroin.** In addition a number of vehicles, weapons, ammunition, and radio communication equipment were also seized. Raids were conducted on clandestine laboratories, bazaars, and residences.”

Source: US Department of State, Archive, *U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy for Afghanistan*, 2007.

“In FY2007, the USG will contribute \$343 million towards interdiction efforts. The USG must continue to improve the interdiction capabilities of the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) by building up specialized units, continuing support for the Foreign-deployed Advisory Support Teams (FAST), assigning additional DEA agents to Kabul, expanding the core of the CNPA with a five-year plan, and more aggressively implementing the northern, eastern, and southern Enforcement Strategies.”

“Focuses on **decreasing narcotics trafficking and processing in Afghanistan** by helping the GOA build its capacity to disrupt and dismantle the most significant drug trafficking organizations. **Groups such as the DEA-trained Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA), the Afghanistan Special Narcotics Force (ASNF), and the National Interdiction Unit (NIU) of the CNPA are being equipped to arrest and prosecute the command and control elements of narcotics trafficking organizations.** Over the past two years, interdiction initiatives have resulted in the seizure of more than 26 metric tons of heroin, the initiation of hundreds of investigations, and the arrest of more than 1,000 individuals.”

“DEA is working with the Departments of State and Defense to help the GOA build its investigative and interdiction capabilities through **the funding and training of the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA)**. Without a **dedicated narcotics police investigative agency like the CNPA**, interdiction efforts will be left to roadside checkpoint discoveries.”

**“Provide the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) with the Capacity to Protect All Elements of the Five Pillar Strategy:** Develop an implementation plan for a security capacity within the CNPA for CN enforcement operations including, but not limited to, eradication and interdiction in non-permissive environments. The CNPA security capacity will not assume the role of a maneuver force; rather training and equipping will focus on enforcing Afghan civil law and supporting all the activities included in the Five Pillar CN strategy when confronted by determined opposition. This capability will be entirely resident within the MOI and will not increase ANP manning above the 82,000 currently authorized. Other segments of the criminal justice system will also need to be increased accordingly.

Force protection capacity for eradication, interdiction, and aid delivery operations is lacking. DOD intends to work on an implementation plan that defines the scope, roles/responsibilities, desired effects, timelines, and priorities for establishing such a force protection capacity within the CNPA. Moreover, DOD will examine potential interim options to fulfill this role by leveraging existing or already planned capabilities. DOD will then report the findings of this assessment to the interagency and begin refining the details of a way forward with this matter. Because of the difficulty of working in an environment like Helmand, this initiative is especially critical to the success of AEF and interdiction operations.

Building this CNPA force would require training, equipment, and maintenance. **The force could be modeled on the successful U.S.-trained Colombian Army Counterdrug Brigade, the new ANA Commando Battalion structure, the Colombian police "Mobile Carabintero Squadrons" and/or the Colombian Police "Junglas."** The USG could provide training, equipment, and mentors for the force until they are capable of conducting operations on their own. The Colombians have offered to assist with the training. Special Protection Force operations would initially focus on the southern provinces of Helmand, Kandahar, and Nimruz.”

### ***3) Une unité en expansion***

Source: UNODC, *Mid-term Evaluation Report Afghanistan*, 2009.

“Since its creation in 2003, with a staff of 30 personnel, **CNPA, the primary law enforcement agency in Afghanistan in the fight against narcotics** has seen a **year-on-year growth in operational capabilities and expertise reaching to its current staff of 3725** as authorized in the latest approved organisational structure. The CNPA now has personnel in **all 34 provinces of Afghanistan**. This increased capability is a testimony to the government’s strong commitment to improve CN efforts in Afghanistan and strong bases to build on.

UNODC has made a major contribution to the establishment of an effective and credible Forensic Science Laboratory, run by Afghans, dedicated to the analysis and identification of controlled substances including precursor chemicals. Compared to period before project intervention, for which counter parts admit was insignificant, the CNPA has in 2008 (1387), tested a total of 1823

samples of which 65% were found to be either heroin or opium, with 30% cannabis, and 5% precursor chemicals. This was made possible as a result of its **enhanced capability in forensics**. The increased level and competency of CNPA specialist investigative techniques, has resulted during 2008, in a total of 397 serious cases involving a total of 442 suspects, being prosecuted through the special Criminal Justice Task Force (CJTF) of the CNPA. **Of these 442 suspects, a total of 355 were convicted and sentenced to substantial terms of imprisonment.**”

## **VI - Les modalités de recrutement des afghans au sein de la CNPA**

La CNPA est une unité spéciale constituée de **membres recrutés au sein des autres unités** de la police afghane et dévouée à la lutte contre la production et le trafic de drogue. A ce titre, les membres vont devoir suivre une **formation particulière et renforcée** propre aux activités de lutte contre le narcotrafic et supervisée par des **forces extérieures**. Néanmoins, certaines lacunes dans ce fonctionnement perdurent et sont pointées du doigt.

### **1) Un recrutement effectué au sein des autres unités de la police afghane**

Source: Afghan War News, *Contre-stupéfiants de l'Afghanistan (CNPA)*.

« Le personnel de la CNPA est **sélectionné dans la police nationale afghane (ANP) et doit avoir suivi le cours de police de base.** »

Source: United States Congress, *Counternarcotics*, 2019.

“The Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA), **comprising regular narcotics police and specialized units**, leads counternarcotics efforts by Afghan law-enforcement personnel.”

Source: Eurasianet, *Afghan Authorities Win a Battle in the Countrys War on Drugs*, 2005.

“The troops belong to the National Interdiction Unit of the Counter-Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA), a force that reports directly to the Ministry of the Interior. So far, **four classes of NIU (National Interdiction Uni) officers -- the latest class comprising 23 cadets have gone through a six-week training course.** The four female graduates bring to 10 the number of women trained as NIU officers. Besides **encouraging other women** to take part in their country's reconstruction, it is hoped that their presence will ensure that strict cultural norms of gender separation are upheld during NIU searches for illegal drug production in private homes.”

### **2) Une formation sur-mesure pour une unité d'élite**

Source: Afghan War News, *Contre-stupéfiants de l'Afghanistan (CNPA)*.

« Les candidats à la CNPA devraient avoir suivi le cours de police de base et le cours de police anti-stupéfiants. »

Source: UNODC, *Afghanistan Counter Narcotics Law Enforcement*, 2007.

“**Twenty-five CNPA officers** from the Investigation unit of Kabul and seven key provincial locations, headed by General Abdullah, Deputy Director General of CNPA **participated in the Advance Drug Law Enforcement Investigation Skills course, sponsored by UNODC. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) conducted the training**, which was held in Rawalpindi, **Pakistan**. The trainees also had the opportunity to meet their counterpart officials of Pakistan’s Anti Narcotics Force at its HQs in Rawalpindi. **The course also included a trip to the ANF Regional Directorate in Peshawar**, during which the CNPA officials were also able to meet with counterparts from the Frontier Corps NWFP and understand the drug trafficking problem from the Pakistani perspective. The tour also included a visit to a forensic laboratory to see how drug analysis was carried out. These visits enabled the CNPA officers to not only interact with their counterparts but also understand and see the ANF structure, how it worked and also to exchange views. The National Project Coordinator and two interpreters from UNODC also assisted in the presentation of this course.”

“**A team of Afghan judges, prosecutors and investigators** began training on Sunday 12th December 2005 as part of a drive to accelerate a crackdown on Afghanistan’s booming drug **trade at CNPA** Headquarter in Kabul. A total number of 10 investigators participated in the training introduced by CNPA.

**The Counter Narcotics Criminal Justice Task Force is composed of selected judges, prosecutors, CNPA Investigation Unit officers who received specialized training on how to bring offenders of illicit drug-related crimes to justice.** Some 20 individuals, including 3 judges, 7 prosecutors and 10 investigators have been receiving training from an Italian Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences in order to prepare them for speeding narcotics cases through Afghan courts.”

Source: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, *Cops or Robbers? The Struggle to Reform the Afghan National Police*, 2007.

“Box 2: CTC and RTC Training Courses

Basic I, II and III. Basic I is a **nine-week entry-level course** for literate students, and Basic II a **five-week version** of the same course for illiterate students (it omits classes such as report writing, note taking, and obtaining witness statements). A new Basic III course was designed in 2006 to replace Basic II. Basic III provides five weeks of literacy training followed by the nine-week Basic I course. In interviews for this study, some police trainers expressed concern that five weeks of literacy training would not be enough to develop sufficient literacy skills for students to participate fully in the Basic I course. Transition Integration Programme (TIP) I, II and III. TIP courses are more advanced in-service courses intended to provide follow-on training to graduates of the Basic I, II and III courses

(although some TIP students have not attended a Basic course). TIP I is a three-week advanced officer-in-service course created for literate members of the ANP, and TIP II is a three-week course that supplements the TIP I course. TIP III is a new five-week programme that will supersede TIP I and II; it is designed to become a requirement for all in-service ANP personnel. Three versions of TIP III will be offered — A, B and C for junior, mid-level and senior officers, respectively.

Other Specialised Courses. These include the advanced ANCOP training course, a Border Police Course, a Criminal Investigation Course, a Field Training Officer Programme, a Firearms Training Course, an Instructor Development Course, courses in police driving and record-keeping, an

anticorruption course at the MoI, and specialised training courses for the Professional Standards Unit, the Police Tactical Training Initiative, and the Women's Police Corps.”

### 3) *Le recrutement et la formation de l'unité par l'implication des forces extérieures*

Source: UNODC, *International Counter Narcotics Conference on Afghanistan*, 2004.

“The Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) were created as a specialist counter narcotics department of the Ministry of Interior at the start of 2003. CNPA units have been developed with international assistance in Kabul and seven key priority cities (Jalalabad, Kandahar, Lashkargar, Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, Kunduz, Feyzabad). **Recruitment has been carried out and basic training has been provided (through UNODC and the UK)**”

Source: UNODC, *Afghanistan Counter Narcotics Law Enforcement*, 2007.

“The US is also committed to **train an elite force** capable of conducting investigation of high value targets (HVTs) seizures, raids, and arrests which are designed to have a national enforcement impact.”

Source: Under Secretary of Defense, *Drug interdiction and counter drug activities*, 2007.

“Narrative Justification: Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) Expansion Plan – Establish a CNP-A force that is a self-sustaining law enforcement agency comprised of a **2,900 man force that strengthens the Afghanistan law enforcement capacity** by providing intelligence, interdiction, eradication, and investigative capabilities in order to support long-term stability in Afghanistan and disrupt production and trafficking of illicit drugs across international borders.

Execution of this plan will occur in two phases:

- Phase I is to **build the capacity of the CNPA by constructing facilities; train, equip, and mentor additional Afghan personnel** for the National Interdiction Unit, Mobile Detection Teams, Special Investigative Unit, **CNPA officers (investigative/intelligence/support)**, Counternarcotics Police Special Forces, and the aviation squadron; develop a train the trainer program; and increase CNPA intelligence capacity.

Phase II is the transition the program to the Afghans.”

Source: PRIF, *Militarized versus Civilian Policing: Problems of Reforming the Afghan National Police*, 2011.

“**The United States' dominant role in building up the police was uncontested.** Responsibility for the police programme was in the hands of the State Department or its Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), which in turn commissioned DynCorp, a private security company. DynCorp mainly **employed retired members of the US police or soldiers for its police-building work in Afghanistan.** Few of them were professional instructors. Many of the Afghan translators required for the training programme, which was held in English, were poorly trained and unfamiliar with police terminology (Perito 2009: 4).”



#### 4) Une unité d'élite au fonctionnement lacunaire

Source: US Department of State, Archive, *U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy for Afghanistan*, 2007.

“2. **Increase the Number of DEA Agents or Other Law Enforcement Advisors for CNPA**: In order to provide comprehensive mentor support and training of a large CNPA special protection police force, the USG should significantly increase the number of DEA agents or other law enforcement mentors/trainers assigned to Kabul. Although the DEA 90-day Foreign-Deployed Advisory Support Teams (FAST) have proven very effective, successful training of a large self-sustaining CNPA investigative and special protection force will require a substantial increase in the number of DEA agents and law enforcement mentors and trainers assigned to Kabul. DEA could take the lead role in identifying the most effective mix of DEA agents, other USG law enforcement agents and/or law enforcement contractors required to support the enhanced CNPA protection force to be developed by DOD for interagency community review.”

Source: UNODC, *Mid-term Evaluation Report Afghanistan*, 2009.

“Developing implementation work plan prepared with such analytical approach is critical to delivery of project results, which requires the involvement of counterparts, identifying external constraints that could inhibit delivery, counterpart organizational constraints, the capacity of project management at UNODC, key assumptions and risks. Evaluation Team has observed that more parallel activities could have been launched, which could have realized better results at a much shorter time frame. For example, design and bill of quantity of Ghazni and Baghlan could have been initiated in parallel; there is also no evidence that the recruitment of mentors for CNPA support services (Financial and Administrative system) could not have been recruited much earlier; in the same vein training needs assessment could have been launched and completed by now; identifying and training of “trainers”, one of the key elements to raise the CNPA capability has not even yet initiated. As discussed in more detail in Section 4, this situation clearly indicates that the **project lacked serious, involved, and dynamic implementation planning from the very start**”

### VII - La nécessité pour les membres de la CNPA et leurs familles de se protéger des talibans

En luttant contre la production de drogue, les membres de la CNPA menaçaient directement les talibans et leurs activités économiques. Se faisant, ils s'exposaient, ainsi que leurs familles, à de **violentes représailles**. Les talibans les persécutaient également volontairement de par **leurs liens avec les forces internationales**, et notamment américaines. **La prise de pouvoir des talibans en 2021 n'a que renforcé ces menaces et persécutions déjà présentes.**

#### 1) Des craintes déjà présentes avant la prise de pouvoir des talibans en 2021

Source: European Union Agency for Asylum, *Country Guidance Afghanistan 2020, Refugee Status, 2.1 Members of the security forces and pro-government militias*, 2020.

“It should be noted that **family members of security forces have also been targeted by insurgents.**

Moreover, **family members are often pressured to convince their relative to give up his or her position in the security forces.** There are also reports of former members of the ANSF who have been targeted after having left the ANSF [Anti-government elements, 2.6.1; Conflict targeting, 1.3.1, 1.4.1].”

Source: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), *Afghanistan: Conflict-Induced Internal Displacement Monthly Update September 2015*, 2015.

“The assessed IDPs originated from Kot, Achin, Khugyani, Nazyan, Ghani Khel and Shirzad districts. Most of the IDPs profiled in September were displaced in July and August 2015. The profiled IDP families from Kot and Achin reported to **have been displaced due to harassment and intimidation by non-State Armed Groups affiliated to IS-DAESH as well as by the frequent armed clashes between these groups and Taliban militants in/around their villages.** On several occasions IDPs indicated **the deliberate harassment and targeting of families and members perceived as government supporters or de facto engaged as members of the Afghan Army and Police** and serving in different provinces. According to the reports received, the pressure mounted progressively from the initial appearance of these groups, with **increasing level of harassment**, requests for material support and **stricter restrictions imposed to women and girls in terms of personal conduct and freedom of movement.**”

Source: Haut Commissariat pour les Réfugiés (HCR), *Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Asylum-Seekers from Afghanistan*, 2016.

“d) **Civilians Associated with or Perceived as Supportive of the International Military Forces**  
AGEs have **reportedly threatened and attacked Afghan civilians who work for the international military forces** as drivers, interpreters or in other civilian capacities. There are also reports of AGEs targeting former employees of the international forces and the government.”

Source: United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), *Afghanistan - Midyear Report 2015, Protection Of Civilians In Armed Conflict*, 2015.

“**The majority of the deaths and injuries resulted from abductions where Anti-Government Elements deliberately killed their abductee** (often following **accusations of spying for Pro-Government Forces**) or in which the intended victims resisted the abduction and was subsequently killed.”

Source: United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), *Afghanistan annual report 2014 - Protection of civilians in armed conflict*, 2015.

#### “**Beheadings of civilians for spying for the Government**

Of the 1,114 civilian casualties from targeted killings and killings where the victim was in the custody of the perpetrators, UNAMA documented 12 incidents in which Anti-Government Elements beheaded 17 civilians.

In all but one incident where the motive could not be ascertained, **Anti-Government Elements had abducted and beheaded 16 civilians, accusing them of spying for the Government or punishing them for supporting Afghan national security forces.**”

[...]

“On 5 December, a group of Anti-Government Elements abducted four civilian men in Deh Bala district, **Nangarhar province**. Local residents found the beheaded bodies of the four victims on 8 December and stated that local Taliban had accused the men of spying and supporting the Government.”

## 2) *Des persécutions aggravées depuis la prise de pouvoir des talibans en 2021*

Source: European Union Agency for Asylum, *Country Guidance Afghanistan 2022, Refugee Status, 2.1. Persons affiliated with the former Afghan government, 2022.*

“Shortly after the takeover, a source reported that the Taliban rounded up Afghans on a blacklist and **targeted people with suspected links to the previous administration or US-led forces**, noting that those ‘particularly at risk are individuals in central positions in military, police and investigative units’. **House-to-house searches** to find blacklisted individuals were also reported.”

Source: European Union Agency for Asylum, *Country Guidance Afghanistan 2022, Refugee Status, 2.2. Individuals who have worked for foreign military troops or perceived as supporting them, 2022.*

“**Relatives** of individuals who worked with foreign troops also **faced threats**, including a report of a ‘death sentence’ for a translator’s brother who was accused of ‘helping the Americans’ and of providing security to his interpreting brother.”

Source: L’Obs, *Les talibans traquent les Afghans ayant collaboré avec les Etats-Unis et l’Otan, 2021.*

« **Les talibans ont intensifié leur recherche des personnes ayant travaillé avec les forces américaines et de l’Otan**, affirme un document confidentiel des Nations unies, malgré la promesse des insurgés de ne pas chercher à se venger de leurs opposants.

Le rapport, rédigé par un groupe d’experts d’évaluation des risques pour l’ONU et consulté par l’AFP, affirme que les talibans possèdent des « **listes prioritaires** » **d’individus qu’ils souhaitent arrêter.**

**Les plus à risque sont ceux qui possédaient des postes à responsabilité au sein des forces armées afghanes, de la police et des unités de renseignement**, selon le document.

[...]

“Ils ciblent les familles de ceux qui refusent de se rendre, et poursuivent et punissent les familles “selon la charia””, a déclaré à l’AFP le directeur du groupe Christian Nellemann.

“Nous nous attendons à ce que les individus ayant travaillé pour les forces américaines et de l’Otan et leurs alliés, ainsi que les **membres de leurs familles, soient menacés de torture et d’exécutions**”, a-t-il ajouté. »

Source: Defense One, *4 in 5 Afghans Who Worked for the US Have Faced Taliban Threats, Poll Finds, August 2022.*

“Those people are facing a “grim” security situation, Duggan said. No One Left Behind recently polled 6,500 special immigrant visa applicants who are still outside the United States on what dangers they are facing because of their support of the United States. Just 6.5 percent of respondents in Afghanistan said they are living “securely and safe from harm.” **Nearly 64 percent said they are not living safely**, and nearly 30 percent they are only safe sometimes.

Applicants and their families are also facing **regular direct threats from the Taliban**. Nearly 10 percent say they have been directly threatened in the past week, and 26.1 percent have faced threats in the past month. Only about 14 percent say they have never been directly threatened by the Taliban.”

Source: Human Rights Watch, *No forgiveness for People Like You - Executions and Enforced Disappearances in Afghanistan under the Taliban*, 2021.

“In smaller Afghan towns and villages, residents tend to know each other within communities and established neighborhoods. Because of these relationships, **the Taliban, even when not from the area, have been able to obtain information as well as identify individuals who have worked for the previous government**. These people have been singled out for questioning or further investigation and some have been **summarily executed or forcibly disappeared**. Those executed on the spot often included lower-level security force members who were less well-known or lacked the protection of tribal leaders, especially in the south.

The Taliban have also **searched for known former security force members**, often **threatening and abusing family members** to reveal the whereabouts of those in hiding. Some of those eventually apprehended have been **executed or taken into custody** without acknowledgment of their detention or their location, the crime of **enforced disappearance**.”

Source: National Geographic, *Quelles sont les conséquences du retour des talibans pour l'Afghanistan?*, 2021.

« Des Afghans se pressent dans un cybercafé de la ville afin de faire des demandes de visas pour les États-Unis. Des milliers d'Afghans qui travaillaient comme interprètes et traducteurs pour les Américains **craignent désormais pour leur vie**. »

Source: Radio Free Europe, *'The Taliban Will Kill Us': Afghans Who Helped Foreign Forces At Risk Of Reprisals After Withdrawal*, 2021.

**“The Taliban has vowed for years that it will kill any Afghans who have worked for U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan, branding them “traitors.”**

With all foreign troops leaving the country by September, the tens of thousands of Afghans who have worked in support roles are gripped by fear and panic.

Their worries are well grounded. **The Taliban has killed hundreds of Afghans who have worked for foreign military forces and their family members over the years.**

Those fears have been exacerbated by intensifying violence and Taliban gains on the battlefield in recent months.

Since the start of the withdrawal on May 1, the militant group has seized dozens of districts, military bases, and besieged towns and cities, fueling fears that it could topple the Western-backed Afghan government.”

Source: EuroNews, *Loin des regards, les talibans tuent les anciens collaborateurs des forces de sécurité afghanes*, 2021.

« Après leur prise de pouvoir, les **talibans ont exigé des anciens membres des forces de sécurité de s’enregistrer** afin de recevoir une lettre garantissant leur sécurité. "Cependant, **les talibans ont utilisé ces vérifications pour détenir et exécuter sommairement ou faire disparaître de force des personnes** quelques jours après leur enregistrement, laissant leurs corps à la disposition de leurs proches ou de leurs communautés", indique le rapport. En cas de non-déclaration auprès de l’administration talibane, ils risquaient l’arrestation.

C’est le cas de **Baz Muhammad qui travaillait pour le NDS**. Sur la base de plusieurs témoignages, l’ONG affirme qu’il a été arrêté le 30 septembre dernier chez lui dans sa maison de Kandahar. **Son cadavre sera retrouvé plusieurs jours plus tard.** »

Source: Courrier International, *Représailles. Une enquête recense 490 Afghans tués par les talibans pour leurs liens avec les États-Unis*, 14 avril 2022.

« Une enquête menée par le “New York Times” en collaboration avec des journalistes afghans révèle **l’exécution ou la disparition forcée de 490 individus considérés comme des alliés des Américains**. Parmi les victimes de cette chasse aux sorcières, **des membres des forces de l’ordre et des employés du précédent gouvernement.** »

« Le New York Times met particulièrement en lumière l’histoire de Safi Ahmad, un **soldat afghan** de 34 ans. Il a désespérément essayé de s’échapper après la prise de pouvoir des talibans. En étant dans l’armée, et en **ayant collaboré avec les soldats américains**, il pensait avoir une place dans un avion d’évacuation, mais ce ne fut pas le cas. L’oncle de Safi explique qu’**il a été tué de trois tirs en pleine tête**, lorsque les talibans ont trouvé sur lui des selfies pris en compagnie de membres de l’armée américaine. »

## **VIII - Les usines de fabrication de stupéfiants en Afghanistan et leurs caractéristiques**

La majorité des usines de fabrication de stupéfiants en Afghanistan sont des **installations précaires**, souvent désignées comme des « laboratoires de fortune ». Bien que le narcotrafic **profite avant tout aux talibans ou à des investisseurs étrangers**, ce sont les **populations pauvres de milieux ruraux qui sont chargées de la production** au sein de ces usines. Ces installations sont principalement **concentrées dans certaines parties du territoire afghan**, notamment dans des districts clés où la production et le transport de drogue sont stratégiques. Depuis l’interdiction de la production de stupéfiants par les talibans, ces installations se sont **davantage dissimulées**.

## 1) La précarité des usines de fabrication de stupéfiants

Source: Libération, *Afghanistan : le trafic d'héroïne surpassé par celui de méthamphétamine, selon l'ONU*, 11 septembre 2023.

« Dans son rapport, l'organisme constate une « augmentation considérable, presque douze fois plus importante, des saisies de drogue en cinq ans, passant de 2,5 tonnes en 2017 à 29,7 tonnes en 2021 ». Cette expansion de la production de drogue s'explique notamment par sa fabrication, qui **se réalise sur de petites surfaces agricoles et avec peu de main-d'œuvre dans des laboratoires de fortune.** »

Source: The Washington Post, *The drug trade now flourishing in Afghanistan: Meth*, 2022

“His makeshift lab consists of a simple grain thresher beside a row of mud sheds. After the ephedra is ground and sifted into a fine dust, it's mixed in waist-high vats of chemicals before being boiled down over an open flame, laid out to dry in the sun, then mixed with another chemical compound that changes the white powder into glasslike crystals.”

Source: Alcis, *Methamphetamine Production in Afghanistan*, 9 août 2022.



Inside an ephedrine processing lab

Source: European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, *EU4MD SPECIAL REPORT Emerging evidence of Afghanistan's role as a producer and supplier of ephedrine and methamphetamine*, 2020.

“According to cooks in the area, extracting ephedrine from the dried and ground ephedra plant takes about 24 hours and requires only basic skills. One or two bags of ephedra (70-140 kg) can be processed in **an outbuilding of a residential compound**, and there are reports that **a large number of households** in Bakwa, and the surrounding area, have taken up production.

In addition to these relatively small operations, **more specialised processing facilities, known locally as 'factories'**, also appear to have emerged across the district of Bakwa. These are mostly found in **old abandoned compounds**, but in some cases are purpose built and are typically run by local ephedrine traders, some of whom were, or are, also involved in the opium trade.”

Source: BBC, *Afghanistan, home to the heroin trade, moves into meth*, 2020.

“The US has in the past carried out airstrikes on alleged drugs labs in Afghanistan, bombing 68 in a single day in May 2019. But the combination of civilian casualties and **ease with which the makeshift factories can be rebuilt** led the campaign to be abandoned.”

Source: United Nation Office on Drugs and Crime, *Drug Situation in Afghanistan 2021 - Latest findings and emerging threats*, 2021.

“Most of the farmers who cultivate opium poppy live in **villages with lower quality infrastructure, and with less advantaged living conditions. Opium poppy villages tend to have less access** than non-poppy villages to **functioning public electricity grids, schools, literacy programs, and agricultural cooperatives**.

In addition, farmers in opium poppy villages have on average 40 per cent less available agricultural land and **face 20 per cent longer journeys to markets for selling legal crops**, as well as 23 per cent more road closures each year owing to security conditions.”

Source: BBC, *Afghanistan, home to the heroin trade, moves into meth*, 2020.

“The team discovered that methamphetamine production was a "two-tiered process", with ephedrine relatively **easy to make even for people in poor households**, who then sell it on to more specialised "meth cooks". The researchers **were able to identify the images of ephedrine labs** through the large quantities of waste water and dried ephedra crops left over from the process and dumped outside the buildings.”

## 2) *Les usines de fabrication de stupéfiant concentrées et cachées sur une partie du territoire afghan*

### 2.1. Les principaux districts abritant des usines de fabrication de stupéfiants

Source: Office des Nations Unies contre la drogue et le crime, *Update*, 2002.

« En outre, d’après les résultats de l’enquête annuelle sur le pavot à opium réalisée en octobre dernier par l’Office des Nations Unies contre la drogue et le crime, **90 % des cultures restent concentrées dans cinq provinces** (Helmand, **Nangarhar**, Badakhshan, Uruzgan et Kandahar). »

Source: Foreign Policy, *How the Taliban’s ‘War on Drugs’ Could Backfire*, 1 février 2023.


“The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reported an uptick in opium production after the Taliban seized power in August 2021, including a 32 percent rise in 2022. **This production was concentrated in the southern provinces of Nimroz, Kandahar, Helmand, Uruzgan, and Zabul**, which together account for nearly three-quarters of the total area under cultivation. Kandahar saw 12,300 extra hectares dedicated to poppy in 2022, a 72 percent increase from the year before. Processing of ephedra has also increased since 2017, supplying a cottage industry in ephedrine extraction at hundreds of meth labs across the country.”



Source: BBC, *Afghanistan: How much opium is produced and what's the Taliban's record?*, 2021.

### Opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan

Hectares used by province, 2020



Source: UNODC

BBC

Source : VICE, *Une nouvelle meth afghane à base de plantes circule partout dans le monde*, 2021.

« L'équipe de Mansfield a recensé **448 laboratoires d'éphédrine dans seulement deux districts d'Afghanistan, Bakwa et Khash Rod.**»

Source: BBC, *Afghanistan, home to the heroin trade, moves into meth*, 2020.

“Using satellite images, as well as interviews with Afghan drug producers, Dr Mansfield and a team of researchers have mapped out **more than 300 suspected ephedrine labs in just one district in western Afghanistan, Bakwa. The area has become the hub of the meth trade in the country**, but Dr Mansfield has also begun identifying labs elsewhere.”

Source: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), *"From Bad They Made It Worse" The concentration of opium poppy in areas of conflict in the provinces of Helmand and Nangarhar*, 2014.

“The **southern districts of Nangarhar** have a long history of **opium poppy cultivation** but had largely abandoned opium production between 2008 and 2010”.

## 2.2. Les usines de fabrication de drogue, objet d'une lutte américaine dérisoire

Source: AA, *Afghanistan : Washington détruit une usine de fabrication de drogues*, 2017.

« Nicholson [...] a souligné que « la politique de destruction des usines de production des drogues sert à couper les sources de financement du **Mouvement Talibans**, qui gagne près de 200 millions de dollars chaque année provenant de la culture du pavot et de la production de l'opium ».

Source: Le Monde, *Comment les Etats-Unis ont consolidé un narco-Etat en Afghanistan*, 2021.

« En 2017, l’Afghanistan bat un nouveau et triste record, avec une production de 9000 tonnes d’opium. Ashraf Ghani, qui a succédé trois ans plus tôt à Karzai dans des élections très contestées, avoue son impuissance. Donald Trump décide de lancer l’opération « **Tempête de Fer** », au cours de laquelle **des dizaines d’ateliers de transformation de l’opium en héroïne sont, en territoire taliban, bombardés par des B52 et des drones Raptor**. Washington affirme que cette très coûteuse campagne, suspendue au bout d’un an, a privé les talibans de 20% de leurs revenus liés aux stupéfiants, ce qui correspond à seulement 1% des profits de la drogue dans le pays. »

Source: Pour l’Eco. *Afghanistan : pourquoi les talibans ne renonceront (sans doute) pas à l’opium*, 2017.

« Plus d’une centaine de raids aériens ont été menés par la Force aérienne afghane et l’U.S. Air Force sur environ une centaine des quatre cents à cinq cents laboratoires.

Problème pour les Américains, la production d’héroïne est flexible et mobile. En moyenne, un laboratoire se reconstruit en trois à quatre jours.

**Cette stratégie, particulièrement inefficace, a plus fait de victimes civiles que réduit le trafic et a renforcé la main mise des talibans sur la production et amélioré leurs infrastructures, en les déplaçant à l’abri dans les montagnes. »**

Source: BBC, *Afghanistan, home to the heroin trade, moves into meth*, 2020.

“The US has in the past carried out airstrikes on alleged drugs labs in Afghanistan, **bombing 68 in a single day in May 2019**. But the combination of civilian casualties and ease with which the makeshift factories can be rebuilt led the campaign to be abandoned.”

### **2.3. Des usines davantage dissimulées depuis l’interdiction de la production de stupéfiants par les Talibans**

Source: The Washington Post, *The drug trade now flourishing in Afghanistan: Meth*, 2022.

“Ghousaddin is a farmer in western Afghanistan, in the same stretch of **desert** as the **Bakwa bazaar**. In 2019, he was approached by Iranian businessmen about **building a meth lab on the edge of his fields**. The men offered to teach him the process and provide the needed chemicals and the dried ephedra plant in exchange for a large cut of his profits. Years of little rainfall had left him struggling to support his family. So he agreed.”

“**Everyone was up in the mountains for the ephedra harvest in August and September — ex-army people, ex-police, everyone** — because it is the only source of income in some of these highland areas,” said Mansfield, the expert on Afghanistan’s illicit economy.”

Source: BBC, *Meth and heroin fuel Afghanistan drugs boom*, 2021.

“In parts of Afghanistan, the **drug industry is deeply enmeshed in the local economy**. Gandum Rez, a remote cluster of villages in Helmand, **is only reachable by a dusty gravel track**. But it’s at the centre of the global heroin trade. As well as a large number of market stalls devoted to the

sale of opium, **it's home to factories**, employing 60-70 people each, which process it into heroin. The drug is smuggled into Pakistan and Iran, and then westwards to the rest of the world, including Europe.

Source: Cairn, *Agricultures et paysanneries du monde, Chapitre 12 - Les territoires de l'opium : paysans et coercitions*, 2010.

« En revanche, les prix de l'opium à la ferme, en Afghanistan, peuvent varier de 30 à 1 000 \$ le kg et les prix peuvent doubler en une semaine. Dans le Badakhshan, **avoir un voisin qui sait que vous avez 10 kg d'opium chez vous, est quasiment signer votre arrêt de mort** tellement la valeur du produit est élevée. Cela montre que c'est une production extrêmement rentable et donc qui suscite beaucoup de convoitise. »

Source: Foreign Policy, *How the Taliban's 'War on Drugs' Could Backfire*, 1 février 2023.

“Having leveraged the drug trade to fund their insurgency for decades, **in 2021 the Taliban outlawed the harvesting of ephedra**, which grows wild in the mountains and from which ephedrine, a **meth precursor**, can be extracted, **and the following April abruptly banned opium cultivation and production. This move blindsided many farmers in Afghanistan's poppy-growing heartlands.** Standing outside his shed-like motorbike repair shop on the side of the road in Kandahar province, Wakil Ahmad pointed to an empty swath of land behind the building.”

“**Before, this was a poppy farm,**” he said. Six months earlier, just a few weeks before harvesting began, the Taliban told his family that this harvest would be their last. **If they continued to grow poppies, they would be fined and thrown in jail.** “The fields are useless now,” Ahmad said. “We lost everything. We don't have any other options. We can't grow anything else.”

Source: BBC, *Myanmar overtakes Afghanistan as top opium producer*, 12 décembre 2023.

“**Poppy cultivation in Afghanistan dropped by 95% after a drug ban by the ruling Taliban last year.**”

Source: Le Monde, *Dans l'Afghanistan des talibans, le trafic de « crystal meth » remplace celui de l'héroïne*, 14 septembre 2023.

« Depuis avril 2022 et **la « stricte interdiction » de sa production** prononcée par le chef suprême des talibans, Haibatullah Akhundzada, **« le commerce de l'héroïne a ralenti »**, a relevé, le 10 septembre, l'Office des Nations unies contre la drogue et le crime (ONUDD)»

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